SOLOMON v. RYDER

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Docket Number

Docket No. 187, Calendar No. 36,291.

Attorney(S)

Colombo, Colombo Colombo, for plaintiff. Charles C. Conklin ( Don W. Van Winkle and Perry W. Richwine, of counsel), for defendant.

Judges

WIEST, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Bertha Solomon, individually and as trustee for her insurer, brought suit against Charles Ryder for personal injuries and damage to her automobile resulting from an automobile accident. The automobile was insured, and the insurer paid Solomon for the loss, appointing her as trustee to recover damages from defendants. The suit was filed before the enactment of Act No. 271, Pub. Acts 1929, which permitted joinder of claims. The defendant appealed the verdict and judgment in favor of Solomon.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the action was properly brought by plaintiff as trustee for the insurance company under the applicable statutes and case law, specifically regarding the real party in interest requirement.
Whether the plaintiff improperly split her cause of action by seeking recovery both for personal injuries and for damages to the automobile prior to the statutory allowance for joinder.
Whether the admission of testimony concerning post-accident painting of skid marks constituted reversible error.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

The action should be dismissed because it was not brought in the name of the real party in interest, relying on 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14010 and established Michigan precedents.
The plaintiff had improperly split her cause of action by seeking damages for both personal injuries and loss to the automobile before statutory joinder was permitted.
The admission of testimony about a witness who saw skid marks being painted on the day of the accident was erroneous and prejudicial.

Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff and the insurance company waived all claims for damages to the automobile, thus making the action single in purpose and the plaintiff the sole party in interest.
The speculative concern that the insurance company might still have an interest under the original declaration was addressed by this waiver.
The testimony about the painting of skid marks, although of questionable probative value, did not constitute reversible error.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Waters v. Schultz, 233 Mich. 143	Requirement that the real party in interest bring the action.	Supported dismissal if plaintiff had not waived claims for automobile damages.
Heck v. Henne, 238 Mich. 198	Real party in interest doctrine and procedural propriety.	Reinforced the need to bring suit in the name of the correct party.
McPeake v. Railway Co., 242 Mich. 676	Limitations on splitting causes of action.	Supported defendant's argument on improper splitting prior to statutory joinder.
Grubaugh v. Murphy Co., 209 Mich. 551	Real party in interest and procedural requirements.	Part of the authority cited for dismissal if claims were not properly joined.
Michigan Employers Casualty Co. v. Doucette, 218 Mich. 363	Procedural rules regarding joinder and real party in interest.	Used to support defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Cox v. Railway, 234 Mich. 597	Joinder and real party in interest principles.	Referenced in the context of procedural propriety.
National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Foth, 254 Mich. 152	Real party in interest and cause of action splitting.	Supported defendant’s procedural objections.
Worth v. Wagner, 255 Mich. 433	Real party in interest rule and joinder.	Further authority cited for dismissal absent proper party alignment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized that the suit was filed before the statutory allowance for joinder of claims under Act No. 271, Pub. Acts 1929. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was based on the argument that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest, citing relevant statutes and case law. The court noted that had the plaintiff not waived the claim for damages to the automobile, dismissal would have been required. However, the plaintiff and insurer waived the claim for the automobile loss, leaving the action focused solely on personal injuries and making the plaintiff the sole party in interest.

The court addressed concerns about the insurer’s possible interest under the original declaration, deeming them speculative and sufficiently resolved by the waiver. Regarding the contested testimony about painting skid marks after the accident, the court found the admission of such evidence did not constitute reversible error despite its limited probative value. The court relied on its prior decision in the related Hoban v. Ryder case to affirm the defendants’ liability.

Holding and Implications

The judgment in favor of plaintiff is affirmed.

The court’s decision directly affirms the verdict awarding damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff while dismissing claims for automobile damages due to waiver. No new precedent was established; the ruling applies the existing real party in interest and procedural rules to the facts. Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, and the case proceeds on the basis of the personal injury claim only.

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SOLOMON v. RYDER.

WIEST, J.

In an automobile accident plaintiff's car was destroyed and she received personal injuries. The automobile was insured and the insurer paid plaintiff the loss, and, by writing, constituted plaintiff its trustee to have recovery from defendants along with her damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff filed a declaration, alleging that she brought suit for herself and as trustee. It developed at the trial that, for damages to the automobile, she was trustee for the insurance company. Suit was brought before the passage of Act No. 271, Pub. Acts 1929 (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14010), permitting joinder.

Defendants moved the court to dismiss the case on the ground that the action was not brought in the name of the real party in interest, relying upon 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14010, and the authority of Waters v. Schultz, 233 Mich. 143; Heck v. Henne, 238 Mich. 198; McPeake v. Railway Co., 242 Mich. 676; Grubaugh v. Murphy Co., 209 Mich. 551; Michigan Employers Casualty Co. v. Doucette, 218 Mich. 363; Cox v. Railway, 234 Mich. 597; National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Foth, 254 Mich. 152; Worth v. Wagner, 255 Mich. 433. Also that plaintiff had split her cause of action. Thereupon counsel for plaintiff and the insurance company waived all claim for damages for loss of the car, and the court permitted the case to proceed, and the jury rendered a verdict awarding damages solely for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff.

Had plaintiff stood upon the declaration it would have been the duty of the court, under the authorities cited, to have dismissed the action. The waiver by plaintiff, and the representative of the insurance company, of claim for loss of the car, made continuance of the action single in purpose and the plaintiff the only party in interest.

But, it is said, that the engagement between plaintiff and the insurance company obligated her to pay $750 out of any verdict rendered under the declaration as first filed, and the jury might not have awarded the amount of $750 for loss of the car, and, in such event, the insurance company was a party in interest in any recovery by plaintiff. This is rather speculative, and, we think, fully met by the waiver of right to recover any damages for the loss of the car.

The facts attending the accident are fully set forth in Hoban v. Ryder, ante, 188, and obviates the need of a restatement.

A witness, called in behalf of plaintiff, testified that he did not see the accident but heard the crash and went out, found the car on fire, but did not look for any skid marks, although after the accident he saw a person painting skid marks on the concrete pavement. Admission of this testimony, it is claimed, was error. The testimony of the witness further disclosed that the person painting the skid marks was the son of defendant Charles Ryder, and that the painting was done the same day of the accident. Perhaps the testimony did not have much probative value, but we cannot hold that its admission constituted reversible error.

Defendants' liability has been affirmed by our opinion in the Hoban Case.

We find no reversible error, and the judgment is affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.

CLARK, C.J., and McDONALD, POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, FEAD, and BUTZEL, JJ., concurred.