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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The trial judge, by agreement of the parties, found the facts and entered judgment. On November 7, 1930, the Board of Education drew a draft payable to Central Bank and Trust Company of Asheville for $204,333.33 to pay notes at Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company ($200,000 plus interest). The board's secretary presented the draft to Central Bank with instructions to collect the proceeds from the Buncombe County treasurer and transmit them to Central Hanover for the stated purpose. On November 14–15, 1930, the Buncombe County treasurer executed a check on the county school fund for that amount; the county ledger was debited, reducing the fund balance, and Central Bank issued its cashier's check payable to “ourselves” for $204,333.33. That cashier's check was later marked paid and the amount was credited to the school fund, increasing its balance. Central Bank failed to transmit the proceeds to Central Hanover and closed on November 20, 1930. On closing the bank had items due from other banks totaling $144,474.85, of which only $65,493.13 in cash actually came into the hands of the receiver; the bank also had other unencumbered and unpledged assets of approximately $4,600,000 face value.

The trial court held that the plaintiff's claim constituted a preference and ordered it paid out of the cash actually on hand ($65,493.13), but not out of the bank's other general assets. Both parties appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the issuance of the bank's cashier's check under these circumstances constitutes a statutory preference as defined by C. S., 218(c).
  2. Whether the facts constitute a preference under the trust fund theory.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Bank, ante, 143 Authority that a cashier's check does not constitute a statutory preference under C. S., 218(c). Invoked to support the holding that the cashier's check was not a statutory preference.
Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730 Related authority on the non-preference nature of similar instruments or transactions. Listed as additional support for the conclusion that no statutory preference existed.
Parker v. Trust Co., 202 N.C. 230, 162 S.E. 564 Interpretation of the trust fund theory governing when a deposit or transaction creates a trust/preference. Used to demonstrate that the facts did not constitute a preference under the trust fund theory.
Williams v. Hood, Comr., ante, 140 Application/interpretation of the trust fund theory. Cited as authority showing the trust fund theory did not create a preference here.
Flack v. Hood, Comr., ante, 337 Related authority concerning the trust fund theory or similar banking insolvency issues. Referenced as further support for the court's conclusion on the trust fund theory.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court concluded that the cashier's check did not constitute a statutory preference as defined by C. S., 218(c), citing In re Bank and Morecock v. Hood as supporting authority. The court further held that the facts did not establish a preference under the trust fund theory, relying on the court's interpretations in Parker v. Trust Co., Williams v. Hood, and Flack v. Hood. The opinion contains no extended factual-to-legal-step analysis beyond these citations and the stated conclusions.

Holding and Implications

Reversed.

The court's core ruling is that the bank's cashier's check, under the circumstances described, did not constitute either a statutory preference under C. S., 218(c) or a preference under the trust fund theory. The direct effect is reversal of the trial court's judgment that the plaintiff's claim constituted a preference to be paid out of the cash on hand. The opinion does not announce the creation of a new precedent beyond its reliance on existing authorities.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BUNCOMBE COUNTY, AND T. H. REEVES, TREASURER OF BUNCOMBE COUNTY, v. GURNEY P. HOOD, COMMISSIONER OF BANKS, AND G. N. HENSON, LIQUIDATING AGENT OF CENTRAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY.

Banks and Banking H d — Cashier's check does not constitute statutory or equitable preference against assets of insolvent bank.

Where a bank debits a depositor's account with the amount of a check drawn by the depositor and issues its cashier's check for the amount, but is placed in a receiver's hands before remitting the proceeds to a third person as instructed to do by the depositor: Held, the cashier's check does not constitute a preference either as defined by C. S., 218(c) or under the trust fund theory.

It was agreed that the trial judge should find the facts and enter judgment thereon. Such of these facts as are pertinent to the point of law involved are as follows:

On 7 November, 1930, the board of education drew a draft, "payable to the Central Bank and Trust Company of Asheville," and drawn upon the treasurer of Buncombe County, in the sum of $204,333.33, with attached memorandum reading as follows: "Notes due Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, $200,000; interest on same from 12 June, 1930, at 5%, $4,333.33; total $204,333.33." Between the dates of 7 November and 15 November, the secretary of the board of education presented the draft to the Central Bank and Trust Company "with instructions that said bank collect the proceeds of said warrant or draft from the treasurer of Buncombe County and transmit the same to Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company for the express and sole purpose of paying off and discharging the aforesaid $200,000 of notes with accrued interest. On 15 November, 1930, L. L. Jenkins, treasurer of the public school fund of Buncombe County, executed and delivered to the Central Bank and Trust Company a check "on the Buncombe County school fund in the sum of the aforesaid warrant or draft, and the same is stamped paid by the bank on 14 November, 1930. On 14 November, 1930, the ledger sheet of Buncombe County school fund was debited with the aforesaid check, reducing the balance of the public school fund from $376,313.49 to $171,980.16. On the same day the Central Bank and Trust Company issued its cashier's check, payable to `ourselves' in the sum of $204,333.33." This cashier's check was marked paid 19 November, 1930, and said sum was credited to the Buncombe County school fund, increasing the balance in said fund to $390,373.39. The Central Bank and Trust Company failed to transmit or cause to be transmitted to the Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company of New York City the proceeds of said check and closed its doors on 20 November, 1930. On the day it closed the bank had these items and due from other banks the sum of $144,474.85. Of this sum only $65,493.13 in cash actually came into the hands of the receiver. The bank had other unencumbered and unpledged assets of the face value of approximately $4,600,000.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact the trial judge was of the opinion that the claim of plaintiff constituted a preference and ordered that plaintiff's claim be paid out of the amount of cash actually on hand at the time of failure, to wit, the sum of $65,493.13, and that such claim did not constitute a preference to be paid out of the other general assets of the bank.

From such judgment both parties appealed.

BROGDEN, J.

The cashier's check described in the evidence did not constitute a statutory preference as defined by C. S., 218(c). In re Bank, ante, 143. See, also, Morecock v. Hood, Comr., 202 N.C. 321, 162 S.E. 730. Nor do the facts constitute a preference upon the trust fund theory as interpreted in Parker v. Trust Co., 202 N.C. 230, 162 S.E. 564; Williams v. Hood, Comr., ante, 140. See, also, Flack v. Hood, Comr., ante, 337.

Reversed.

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BOARD OF EDUCATION v. HOOD, COMR
(Mar 1, 1933)