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Case Summary: Kitchen v. Kitchen et al., No. 5343 (Utah Dec. 4, 1934)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Sarah Frances Kitchen, brought this action seeking recovery of a home and ten acres of land with water rights that she allegedly had deeded to her children, Thomas L. Kitchen and Emma F. Riding, through instruments she claims she signed under misleading representations. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was over eighty years old, physically infirm, inexperienced in business and legal forms, and largely dependent upon her children; that in about 1924 her son Landrum R. Kitchen agreed to sell his interest in plaintiff's estate to certain siblings for $500; that Thomas L. Kitchen represented to plaintiff that certain papers were prepared to "fix the matter up" so the purchasers would be protected and asked plaintiff to sign them; that plaintiff signed papers at a bank without reading them and, believing they only transferred Landrum's interest to the purchasing children, later learned (about one year before filing suit) that a deed had been recorded conveying her property to Thomas and Emma; and that she received no consideration and did not intend to convey her property.

The relationship of the parties and the fact that a deed was recorded were admitted by respondents. The case was tried to the court without a jury. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendants moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to show fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and therefore insufficient to entitle plaintiff to relief. The trial court granted the nonsuit and dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the cause and proceed to hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the admissions in the pleadings together with the facts proved and every fair inference deducible therefrom constituted sufficient proof, as a matter of law, to preclude a nonsuit and permit the plaintiff to proceed on her claim that the deed was obtained by fraudulent or misleading representations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Plaintiff alleged she was over eighty years old, infirm, inexperienced in business and legal forms, and dependent on her children for care and advice.
  • Plaintiff alleged that Thomas L. Kitchen proposed and arranged for certain children to purchase Landrum R. Kitchen's interest for $500, and represented to plaintiff that certain papers were necessary to protect the purchasers' rights; relying on Thomas, plaintiff signed those papers without reading or understanding them.
  • Plaintiff alleged she did not know the papers were a deed conveying her property, received no consideration for the conveyance, and had no intention to convey; she learned only about a year before filing suit that a deed had been recorded purporting to convey her property to Thomas and Emma.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • At the close of plaintiff's testimony, defendants moved for a nonsuit on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show that plaintiff was entitled to relief.
  • Defendants specifically contended there was no proof of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation practiced upon the plaintiff by any of the defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am.St.Rep. 708 Supports the rule that, when a motion for nonsuit is interposed, the court must consider facts well pleaded and admitted as established and assume as true all facts which could be properly found by a jury, giving plaintiff benefit of every fair and legitimate inference. Cited as authority for applying that standard in evaluating the defendants' motion for nonsuit and for concluding the evidence (and inferences) were sufficient to preclude a nonsuit.
Jennings v. Pratt, 19 Utah 129, 56 P. 951 Same rule regarding the standard to be applied on a motion for nonsuit and the necessity to accept plaintiff's proved facts and reasonable inferences. Relied upon to support the court's duty to view the plaintiff's evidence and admissible inferences as sufficient to avoid a nonsuit.
McGarry v. Tanner Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P. 93 Same nonsuit standard—court must assume as true facts properly provable and give plaintiff benefit of legitimate inferences. Applied for the proposition that the trial court should not have granted nonsuit where admissions and testimony, with fair inferences, supported plaintiff's case.
Dunn v. Salt Lake O. Ry. Co., 47 Utah 137, 151 P. 979 Same rule concerning evaluation of motions for nonsuit and treatment of plaintiff's evidence and inferences. Used to reinforce the standard applied by the court in determining that the nonsuit should have been denied and that the cause should be reinstated for further hearing.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the sole question on appeal as whether the admissions in the pleadings together with the facts directly proved and every fair inference deducible from them established sufficient proof to support the plaintiff's case such that a nonsuit was improper. The court recited the applicable rule—unsupported facts and inferences favorable to plaintiff must be accepted when ruling on a nonsuit—and cited prior Utah authorities for that principle.

The court summarized the evidence: plaintiff's age (81), infirmity, dependence on children, lack of business experience; origin of the transaction in about 1924 when Thomas L. Kitchen proposed purchasing Landrum R. Kitchen's interest for $500 and told plaintiff he and other children would pay and that papers were necessary; that plaintiff and Landrum were taken to the bank and each signed papers without reading or understanding them and believing they were intended to transfer only Landrum's interest; that $500 (or $520/$521) was paid and $500 was later paid by plaintiff to Landrum; that a deed was recorded purporting to convey the property to Thomas and Emma, giving them possession and rents except for plaintiff's right to occupy one room during her lifetime; and that plaintiff did not discover the deed until about a year before filing suit.

Viewing these admitted facts and plaintiff's testimony, and giving plaintiff the benefit of every fair and legitimate inference, the court concluded the evidence was sufficient to preclude a nonsuit. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting the nonsuit and dismissing the action without further hearing on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of dismissal is REVERSED AND REMANDED, WITH DIRECTIONS TO REINSTATE CAUSE.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to require the trial court to reinstate the plaintiff's cause and proceed to hearing on the merits. The Supreme Court concluded that the admissions and evidence, together with reasonable inferences, were sufficient to avoid a nonsuit; it did not purport to resolve the ultimate merits of the fraud claim. The opinion does not announce a new legal rule beyond applying existing nonsuit standards to the facts; it directs further proceedings consistent with that standard. The appellant was awarded costs.

KITCHEN v. KITCHEN et al.

1. TRIAL. In passing upon motion for nonsuit, court must consider facts well pleaded and admitted as established, and must assume as true all facts which could be properly found by jury from evidence, and must give plaintiff benefit of every fair and legitimate inference and intendment which may fairly and legitimately arise from evidence received. 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES. In action to recover realty deeded by mother to children who allegedly secured it fraudulently, evidence held sufficient as against motion for nonsuit. Facts disclosed that the plaintiff was 81 years old, that she was the mother of the defendants, that about 1924 her son purchased his brother's right in plaintiff's property, and asked plaintiff to sign certain papers representing that such papers would transfer the other son's interest in the property, and that about a year before bringing the action plaintiff discovered that she signed deed conveying property to the defendants.

Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am.St.Rep. 708; Jennings v. Pratt, 19 Utah 129, 56 P. 951; McGarry v. Tanner Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P. 93; Dunn v. Salt Lake O. Ry. Co., 47 Utah 137, 151 P. 979.

MOFFAT, J.

The plaintiff's complaint in substance alleges: That Thomas L. Kitchen and Emma F. Riding are son and daughter, respectively, of the plaintiff, and Myrtle A. Kitchen is the wife of Thomas L. Kitchen. That the plaintiff is the mother of seven additional living children. The names and addresses are set out. That the plaintiff is over eighty years of age, physically infirm and in failing health due to her advancing years. That she has felt herself largely dependent upon her children for care, protection, and advice. That she has had little business experience, and is wholly unacquainted with property titles and legal forms of conveyances. That since the death of her husband, which occurred about the year 1919, plaintiff has resided upon, and in and through the probate proceedings in the matter of the estate of her deceased husband she became the owner of the home and ten acres of land with the water rights — the property involved in the action.

In the year 1924, a son of the plaintiff, L.R. Kitchen, and his family were living on the property with plaintiff. Thomas L. Kitchen, a brother of L.R. Kitchen and son of plaintiff, proposed that he and certain of his sisters purchase the interest of L.R. Kitchen in the estate of plaintiff after her death for the sum of $500; that L.R. Kitchen agreed with Thomas L. Kitchen that he would sell his interest in his mother's estate, and would then in no way participate in the estate after the death of his mother.

It is also alleged that the property referred to in the complaint, except the household furniture, was the only property possessed by plaintiff; that Thomas L. Kitchen advised the plaintiff of the agreement between him and L.R. Kitchen and that he (Thomas L. Kitchen) and certain other children of plaintiff had agreed to purchase the interest of L.R. Kitchen, and that, in order to fix the matter up so the purchasers would be protected, it was necessary for plaintiff to sign certain papers; that about August 5, 1924, Thomas L. Kitchen came to the home of plaintiff and represented to her that he had the papers prepared for her to sign. It is also alleged that, plaintiff believing that the papers she was requested to sign were papers that would protect Thomas L. Kitchen and the other children who had or were about to pay the $500 to L.R. Kitchen for his interest in the estate plaintiff would leave, and relying upon Thomas L. Kitchen, her son, in that respect, she signed the papers which she now is informed and believes was a deed to her home and the water rights; that, when plaintiff signed the papers, she did not know the contents of the papers, and did not understand the papers she signed was a deed to her home, but that she thought the papers signed were papers to protect the children, who paid the $500 to L.R. Kitchen, against any interest he might have by inheritance in plaintiff's property; that until about a year before the bringing of this action plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that she had signed a deed to her home and property, or that a deed had been recorded which purported to convey all of her property to Thomas L. Kitchen and Emma F. Riding.

Plaintiff further alleges that she received no consideration for her property, and it was at no time her intention or purpose to convey away by deed her property. Plaintiff claims to be impecunious and dependent upon charity unless her property be restored to her.

The relationship of the parties, the way the plaintiff became the owner of the property, the age, infirmities, of plaintiff, places of residence, the receiving and recording of the deed, are admitted. It is also admitted the defendants claim an interest in the property.

The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury. At the close of plaintiff's testimony, counsel for defendants interposed a motion for a nonsuit upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show the plaintiff was entitled to relief, and further that there was no evidence of any fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation practiced upon plaintiff by defendants or either of them. The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed. From the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff and appellant prosecutes this appeal.

There is then but one question here for review. That question is: Do the admissions in the pleadings and the facts directly proved and every fair inference deducible from the facts establish sufficient proof to support plaintiff's case? If the question is answered in the affirmative, the judgment must be reversed; if in the negative, affirmed.

It is the duty of the court when a motion for a nonsuit is interposed, in passing upon the motion, to consider the facts well pleaded and admitted as established, and to assume as true all facts which could be properly found by a 1 jury from the evidence, and in addition thereto give the plaintiff the benefit of every fair and legitimate inference and intendment which may fairly and legitimately arise from the evidence received. Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 91, 44 P. 1050, 57 Am.St.Rep. 708; Jennings v. Pratt, 19 Utah 129, 56 P. 951; McGarry v. Tanner Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P. 93; Dunn v. Salt Lake O. Ry. Co., 47 Utah 137, 151 P. 979.

The evidence establishes the following: The plaintiff is 81 years of age. She is the mother of the defendants Thomas L. Kitchen and Emma F. Riding. Myrtle A. Kitchen, the other defendant, is the wife of Thomas L. Kitchen. Thomas L. Kitchen and his wife live at Lovell, Wyo. Emma F. Riding resides at Provo, Utah. It was shown that others named in the complaint were children of plaintiff. About the year 1924, Landrum R. Kitchen, youngest son of plaintiff, with his family resided with the plaintiff at or near Pleasant Grove, Utah. The farm consisted of about ten acres of land with water rights. There was a dwelling house upon the property. No values are mentioned.

Some time about the year 1924, and before the transaction furnishing the basis of this litigation, Thomas L. Kitchen came to Pleasant Grove. While there he talked to Landrum R. Kitchen, his brother, and proposed to purchase from Landrum his interest, as an heir, in his mother's estate for the sum of $500, to which Landrum agreed. Thomas L. Kitchen also called upon his mother, the plaintiff, and told her that he (Thomas) and some of the other children wanted to buy Landrum's interest in the home property of the plaintiff after her death. So far as appears, this proposal originated with Thomas L. Kitchen. Both plaintiff and Landrum testified that they had not thought about the matter until it was suggested by Thomas. Thomas told his mother he would have the papers fixed up so that when Landrum was paid $500 he would have no interest in the place. Mrs. Kitchen, the plaintiff, testified that Thomas told her "that five of the children wanted to get his (Landrum's) interest in the place at my death, he told me he wanted to buy it. He made me understand he and Emma and Mary and Flossie and Anna would pay him $500, over to Landrum, then they were to get it at my death if there was anything to get." Some time later Thomas came to the plaintiff and Landrum, and advised them the papers were prepared and at the Pleasant Grove Bank, and asked them to come to the bank and sign them so Landrum could get his money.

The evidence discloses that they went to the bank, that both of them signed some papers which neither of them read, and without knowing the contents; but understood they were for the purpose of transferring to Thomas and certain of his sisters the interest that Landrum had or might have in her property as an heir. Later $500 or $520 or $521 was paid at the bank and credited to plaintiff's account, $500 of which was shortly after paid to Landrum by plaintiff.

About a year before the commencement of this action, through certain of her daughters, plaintiff learned there was a deed on record from which it appeared that plaintiff had deeded the ten acres with the water rights to Thomas L. Kitchen and Emma F. Riding, and that Thomas and Emma were entitled to take possession on demand and receive all the rents from the property, except plaintiff had the right to occupy one room during her lifetime. Mrs. Kitchen, the plaintiff, testified that she had not known nor did she understand that when the papers were signed that she was deeding her property to the defendants or any one else, but that, when she signed the papers at the bank, she understood she was signing papers that would transfer any interest Landrum might have in her property at her death to the five children she had named; that she understood the children were purchasing the interest of Landrum.

It is not necessary to quote or more fully digest the testimony of the witnesses who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. The testimony as above summarized is a substantial statement of the evidence, and, if set out at length, would be stronger and clearer than the condensed statement above set forth, but of unnecessary length.

We think that plaintiff's (appellant's) proof in the case, with respondent's admissions, in the light of the rules laid down by the cases, is sufficient to preclude a judgment of nonsuit. The motion of nonsuit, without question, 2 should have been denied. We do not deem it necessary to further discuss the matter.

The case is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court, with directions to reinstate the cause and proceed to the hearing of the case. Appellant to recover costs.

STRAUP, C.J., and ELIAS HANSEN, FOLLAND, and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur.

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KITCHEN v. KITCHEN ET AL
(Jan 4, 1934)