Summary of Opinion: Thornton et al. v. Thornton et al., No. 12988 (Ct. Civ. App. Fort Worth, Apr. 13, 1934; rehearing denied Sept. 14, 1934)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of Denton County overruling a plea of privilege. The suit was brought by Addie V. Thornton and another against Lida Thornton and others, seeking partition of a farm located in Young County, Texas. The farm had been acquired during the prior marriage of S. L. Thornton (now residing in Denton County) and his former wife; the marriage was later dissolved without division of the community property. The son (one of the appellants) acquired a portion of his father's interest in the farm and, together with the former wife, resides in Young County.

The petition for partition was filed in Denton County on the ground that an appellee named Parker resided in Denton County and claimed an interest in the land, invoking venue under R.S. art. 1995, subd. 13. At the trial the only testimony was that of Parker, who testified that (1) he had performed work for S. L. Thornton and had been owed sums amounting to about $50; (2) Thornton agreed to deed him an acre interest in the farm as payment; (3) Thornton executed a deed to Parker for an acre interest and authorized Parker's lawyer to file the suit; and (4) the deed was not recorded because Parker did not have revenue stamps and did not regard the deed as worth 50 cents. The district court overruled the plea of privilege; the defendants (appellants) appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the plaintiff's (Parker's) claimed residence in Denton County and asserted ownership interest in the Young County land (as evidenced by the unrecorded deed) properly created venue in Denton County under R.S. art. 1995, subd. 13.
Whether the substance of the transaction — specifically that Parker was in fact acting as the real plaintiff and that the suit was instituted by his lawyer — required disregarding form and enforcing the defendants' privilege to be sued in Young County.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Baldwin v. Baldwin (Tex.Civ.App.) 233 S.W. 130	The venue inquiry is governed by the substance of the transaction and the actual facts, not by labels or artificial designations of parties' positions.	The court relied on this principle to conclude that, regardless of the formal description of parties, the facts showed Parker to be the effective plaintiff (and that his lawyer represented him). Consequently, the court treated the suit as one in which all real defendants were residents of Young County and therefore entitled to their venue privilege.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the practical effect of the facts rather than the formal labels used in the pleadings. Key steps in its analysis were:

Identification of residence and property: The farm subject to partition is located in Young County; appellants (the son and former wife) reside in Young County; S. L. Thornton and his present wife (appellee Addie Thornton) reside in Denton County.
Statutory basis invoked by plaintiffs: The suit had been filed in Denton County on the asserted ground that Parker resided in Denton County and claimed an interest in the Young County land, invoking R.S. art. 1995, subd. 13 as the venue provision relied upon.
Assessment of the sole witness: Parker was the only witness, and he testified that his claimed interest arose from services rendered and an agreed conveyance (a deed of one acre), that Thornton authorized Parker's lawyer to file the suit, and that the deed was not recorded due to lack of revenue stamps.
Substance over form: Applying the controlling principle (as in Baldwin v. Baldwin), the court emphasized that venue depends on the actual facts and substance of the transaction rather than the nominal designation of parties. Even if the trial court credited Parker's testimony that he had an interest, the court concluded that, in reality, Parker was the actor instigating the suit and that the lawyer for the named plaintiff was Parker's attorney.
Effect on venue: Because the transaction's facts showed the suit to be effectively brought at Parker's instance and all actual defendants resided in Young County, the defendants' statutory privilege to be sued in their home county had not been overcome by a genuine, independent Denton County plaintiff-interest that would justify venue in Denton County.

The court therefore found the trial court's overruling of the plea of privilege to be improper on the factual and legal basis stated above.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the trial court overruling the plea of privilege is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to transfer the case to the district court in Young County.

Implications: The direct consequence is that the lawsuit must be transferred to Young County for further proceedings. The court applied established venue principles (substance over form) rather than announcing any new or broader rule of law; thus no new precedent beyond the cited authorities was created by this opinion.

Disposition as stated in the opinion: "Reversed and remanded, with instructions to transfer the same to the district court in Young county."

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THORNTON et al. v. THORNTON et al.

LATTIMORE, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege.

Appellants are the son and former wife of appellee, S. L. Thornton, and reside in Young county, Tex. During that marriage those spouses acquired a farm located in Young county, Tex., and thereafter were divorced without a division of that community property. The son acquired a portion of his father's interest in the farm.

The said S. L. Thornton now resides in Denton county with his present wife, who is appellee Addie Thornton.

This is a suit for partition of the Young county farm, filed in Denton county upon the contention that appellee Parker resides in that latter county and owns an interest in the land. R.S. art. 1995, subd. 13.

The only testimony on the trial was that of Parker. He says he was working at a sorghum mill for S. L. Thornton, who thereby became indebted to him "15 or 20 dollars," and that Thornton agreed to deed him an acre interest in the farm; that thereafter Thornton became further indebted to him to a total of "about $50" "something less than fifty dollars," and he insisted that Thornton secure a partition of the land. Thereupon he took said S. L. Thornton to his (Parker's) lawyer, and on that occasion Thornton executed to him a deed of one acre interest in the farm and authorized the lawyer to file this suit. The deed was not recorded for want of revenue stamps, because, as Parker testified, he did not think the deed worth 50 cents.

If we concede the prerogative of the trial court to believe Parker had an interest in the land itself, still it is to us quite plain that Parker is in fact a plaintiff in the suit and counsel for plaintiff in the suit is such because he is the lawyer for Parker. It is the facts of the transaction that decide the venue, not the name given them (Baldwin v. Baldwin (Tex.Civ.App.) 233 S.W. 130) or any artificial designation of the position in the suit of the parties thereto. All the actual defendants reside in Young county, and their privilege must be respected.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial court, with instructions to transfer the same to the district court in Young county.

THORNTON v. THORNTON