Terence McGrath v. The Crane Company — Supreme Court of Connecticut (Dec. 8, 1934)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sought workers' compensation for loss of vision in his right eye resulting from a detached retina. He was employed as a shipping clerk whose duties included packing fittings into bags weighing two hundred to three hundred pounds, transporting them on a truck up a ramp to a platform, and piling them. The plaintiff claimed the detached retina resulted from strain in piling the bags.

A compensation commissioner found that the plaintiff gave no history of any definite strain to which the detached retina could be attributed and dismissed the claim. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court in Fairfield County (Cornell, J.), which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the award. The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut and also had filed, after the initial decision, a motion to open the finding and award on the ground of newly discovered evidence; the commissioner denied that motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings (No error).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the compensation commissioner's finding should be corrected to reflect additional testimony that, on July 25, 1932, while lifting bags, the plaintiff experienced immediate symptoms (stars shooting from his right eye) and thereafter complained of his eye.
Whether the commissioner abused his discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open the finding and award on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The plaintiff claimed that his detached retina and resulting loss of vision were caused by strain from his employment duties (lifting and piling heavy bags).
After the commissioner issued the finding and award, the plaintiff offered additional testimony that on July 25, 1932, while lifting bags, he experienced stars in his right eye and complained about it that evening; he sought to have the finding corrected to include that history and moved to open the award as newly discovered evidence.
The plaintiff assigned error to (1) the refusal to correct the commissioner's finding and (2) the denial of the motion to open the award.

Appellee's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gonirenki v. American Steel Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 7, 137 A. 26	Principles governing motions to open judgments/new trials and the discretionary nature of such rulings.	Used to state that a motion to open an award is governed by substantially the same principles as a motion to open a court judgment and that discretion will not be overturned absent abuse.
Morisi v. Ansonia Mfg. Co., 108 Conn. 31, 142 A. 393	That the action of a compensation commissioner on a motion to open his award is discretionary and analogous to a court's action on like motions.	Applied to support the proposition that the commissioner's denial of the motion to open the award is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Wysocki v. Bradley Hubbard Co., 113 Conn. 170, 179, 154 A. 431	Same discretionary standard applied to commissioners' actions on motions to open awards.	Relied on to confirm that the commissioner's decision is largely within his reasonable discretion.
O'Hara v. Hewlitt Construction Co., 113 Conn. 262, 266, 155 A. 229	Same discretionary standard (commissioner's motion-to-open analogous to court motions).	Used to reinforce that denial of a motion to open will not be overturned absent abuse of discretion.
Hart v. Brainerd, 68 Conn. 50, 54, 35 A. 776	Limitations on opening judgments for newly discovered evidence: must be newly discovered, not discoverable by due diligence, not merely cumulative, and likely to change the result.	Applied as the test for whether the plaintiff's evidence qualified as newly discovered and would probably change the result.
Gannon v. State, 75 Conn. 576, 583, 54 A. 199	An afterthought of a witness as to facts omitted or incorrectly stated ordinarily does not justify a new trial.	Applied to characterize the plaintiff's revised testimony as an afterthought within his knowledge at the original hearing and therefore not newly discovered.
Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714, 134 A. 259	Evidential principle that mere possibility of a connection between employment and injury, unsupported by expert testimony that it is reasonably probable, is insufficient to prove proximate cause.	Applied to hold that the evidence (including experts who testified only as to possibility) was insufficient to support a conclusion that the employment was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's detached retina.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the commissioner's factual finding that at the original hearing the plaintiff testified that in early July 1932 he discovered his sight was failing but did not give any history of a definite strain. After the award, at the motion-to-open hearing, the plaintiff testified that on July 25, 1932, while lifting bags, he experienced "stars" in his right eye and complained that evening at home. The court reasoned that this evidence was not newly discovered: it was within the plaintiff's knowledge at the time of the original hearing and could and should have been given in answer to specific inquiries then made.

The court then reviewed the applicable legal standard for opening an award on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the evidence must be truly newly discovered (not discoverable earlier by due diligence), not merely cumulative, and likely probably to change the result. The court treated the commissioner's power to open an award as analogous to a court's power to open a judgment and governed by the same principles, and emphasized that the commissioner's action rests largely in his discretion and will not be overturned absent abuse.

Applying those principles to the present record, the court concluded (1) the plaintiff's new testimony was essentially an afterthought and thus not newly discovered; and (2) even if considered, that testimony and the other evidence offered at the motion hearing would probably not change the result. The court noted that the plaintiff did not show that the labor on July 25 differed in kind or degree from ordinary work, there was no evidence that the described symptoms were symptoms of a detached retina, and medical witnesses testified only to a possibility—not a reasonable probability—of any causal connection between the employment and the detached retina. Under these circumstances the commissioner did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to open the award.

Holding and Implications

The judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the compensation commissioner's award is affirmed; no error.

Direct effect: the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment is left intact and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed. The court determined that the purportedly "new" testimony was within the plaintiff's prior knowledge and that the evidence presented at the motion-to-open hearing would probably not change the result. The opinion does not announce any new legal doctrine; it applies established standards for motions to open awards or judgments and upholds the commissioner's exercise of discretion.

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TERENCE McGRATH vs. THE CRANE COMPANY.

Evidence before the commissioner in connection with a motion to open the finding and award on the ground of newly discovered evidence, was not available for the purpose of correcting the finding. Upon the finding as made, the commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff had not sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment was inevitable. The action of a compensation commissioner upon a motion to open an award rests largely within the reasonable exercise of his discretion and will not be overturned unless that discretion has been abused. When the ground of the motion is newly discovered evidence, that evidence must not have been discoverable before the trial by the use of due diligence. It must not be merely cumulative, and it must appear that the new evidence would probably be sufficient to change the result. At the original hearing on his claim for loss of vision in his right eye resulting from a detached retina, the plaintiff testified that during the early part of July, 1932, he discovered that his sight was failing, but gave no history of any definite strain to which that condition could be attributed. At the hearing upon his motion to open the finding and award he testified that on July 25th, 1932, while he was lifting bags for the defendant, stars began to shoot out of his right eye, and that on that evening he complained at home about his eye. Held: 1. That this was not newly discovered evidence, but rather evidence which was at all times within the plaintiff's possession, and which he could and should have given, if such were the fact, in answer to specific inquiries made of him upon the hearing on his claim. 2. That this evidence standing alone — none of the medical experts having testified that it was reasonably probable that there was any connection between the plaintiff's occupation and the detached retina — would not justify a conclusion that the employment was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's condition, much less require such conclusion.

BANKS, J.

The plaintiff sought compensation for loss of vision in his right eye resulting from a detached retina. He was employed as a shipping clerk, and his duties required him to pack fittings into bags weighing two hundred to three hundred pounds each, which were carried on a truck up a ramp to a platform upon which they were piled. The handling of the bags was laborious work requiring the exertion of a certain amount of strength, and plaintiff claimed that the detached retina in his right eye resulted from strain in piling the bags on the platform. The commissioner found that the plaintiff gave no history of a definite strain to which the detached retina could be attributed, and dismissed the claim. Plaintiff appealed, and thereafter filed a motion to open the finding and award on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The commissioner heard the evidence offered in support of the motion which he denied. The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, and he assigns as error (1) the refusal to correct the finding of the commissioner, (2) the denial of the motion to open the finding and award.

The commissioner found that during the early part of July, 1932, the plaintiff began to have trouble with his right eye but that he gave no history of a definite strain to which the condition of his eye could be attributed. The plaintiff sought to have these findings stricken out, and to have substituted therefor a finding that on July 25th, 1932, while he was lifting the bags stars began to shoot out of his right eye, and that on that evening he complained at home about his eye; also a finding that he did give a history of a definite strain to which the condition of his eye was attributed. At the original hearing upon his claim the plaintiff testified that during the early part of July, 1932, he discovered that his sight was failing, but gave no history of any definite strain to which that condition could be attributed. At the hearing, upon his motion to open the finding and award, the plaintiff gave the testimony as to the occurrence on July 25th, which is made the basis of his request for a correction of the finding. It is apparent that this evidence was before the commissioner only in connection with the motion to open the award, and was not available for the purpose of correcting the finding. Upon the finding as made, the commissioner's conclusion that the plaintiff had not sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment was inevitable, and since any correction of the finding is dependent upon the opening of the award and the acceptance of the newly discovered evidence, the determinative question upon the appeal is that of the correctness of the action of the commissioner in denying the motion to open the award.

The motion to open the award is not based upon any change in the extent of the incapacity of the employee or any changed condition of fact since the making of the award, but upon the claim that the plaintiff has, since the making of the award, discovered new evidence which, when heard, will materially affect the decision. The commissioner had the same power to open his award upon that ground as would any court to open its judgment for the same reason, General Statutes, § 5240, and the determination of the plaintiff's motion is governed by substantially the same principles as in the case of a motion to open the judgment of a court and grant a new trial. Gonirenki v. American Steel Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 7, 137 A. 26. The action of a court upon a motion for a new trial rests largely within the reasonable exercise of its discretion and will not be overturned unless that discretion has been abused. Gonirenki v. American Steel Wire Co., supra, p. 7. The same is true as to the action of a compensation commissioner upon a motion to open his award. Morisi v. Ansonia Mfg. Co., 108 Conn. 31, 142 A. 393; Wysocki v. Bradley Hubbard Co., 113 Conn. 170, 179, 154 A. 431; O'Hara v. Hewlitt Construction Co., 113 Conn. 262, 266, 155 A. 229. Where it is sought to open the judgment of a court or the award of a commissioner upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, certain limitations are imposed upon the exercise of the power. The evidence must be newly discovered, and not have been discoverable before the trial by the use of due diligence. It must not be merely cumulative, and it must appear that the new evidence would probably be sufficient to change the result. Hart v. Brainerd, 68 Conn. 50, 54, 35 A. 776; Gonirenki v. American Steel Wire Co., supra, pp. 5, 6.

The newly discovered evidence here is that of the plaintiff himself, giving a version of the incipiency of the trouble with his eye which differs materially from that given by him in his original testimony, and one which it is claimed supplies a necessary element of proof which the finding and award disclosed to be lacking in the plaintiff's case. As an afterthought of a witness as to some fact omitted from his testimony, or incorrectly stated, it would not ordinarily afford sufficient ground for a new trial. Gannon v. State, 75 Conn. 576, 583, 54 A. 199. It is an offer of the plaintiff himself to add to his testimony to meet a deficiency in his proof called to his attention by the finding and award, as to a matter which must have been within his knowledge at the time of the original hearing, and which was the subject-matter of his testimony given in response to inquiries as to when and how he discovered that something was the matter with his eye. It was not newly discovered evidence, but rather evidence which was at all times within his possession, and which he could and should have given, if such were the fact, in answer to the specific inquiries made of him upon the hearing on his claim.

Furthermore, the court was clearly right in holding that the new evidence would probably not be sufficient to change the result. The new evidence of the plaintiff was that, on July 25th, while he was lifting the bags, stars began to shoot out of his right eye, that he complained about his eye at home on that evening, and the evidence of persons at his home that he made such complaint. The plaintiff did not testify that the labor of handling the bags on that day involved any strain differing in kind or degree from that involved in their handling on other occasions, nor was there any evidence that the symptoms described by him were symptoms of a detached retina, or such as might reasonably be expected to accompany an injury of that character. Aside from that, none of the medical experts testified that in his opinion it was reasonably probable that there was any connection between the plaintiff's occupation and the detached retina. None of them went farther than to testify that there was a possibility of such connection. Such evidence, standing alone, would not justify a conclusion that plaintiff's employment was the proximate cause of his condition, much less require such conclusion. Madore v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 104 Conn. 709, 714, 134 A. 259. It is apparent that the commissioner did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to open the award.

McGRATH v. CRANE CO