Promise to make bequest by will "In consideration of plaintiffs intermarrying and providing a home" for defendant comes within Statute of Frauds. Any essential part of the promise made after the wedding of the plaintiffs would be in consideration of past acts and not good consideration. Plaintiffs in their complaint alleged: (Paragraph 3) "Prior to the marriage of the plaintiffs said Wasil Holovack promised that in consideration of the plaintiffs intermarrying and providing a home in the City of Bridgeport at which he, Wasil Holovack, might reside should he so desire, he would, by will, make a bequest to them in the amount of $5,000., said bequest, however, not to be in payment for board and lodging furnished him." Plaintiffs, in their more specific statement, alleged: (Paragraph 2) "The promise of the said Wasil Holovack was made orally on several occasions as follows: `During the year prior to the wedding of the plaintiffs said promise was made almost weekly; also at a shower about two weeks prior to the wedding and also on the day before the wedding. Said promise was repeated several times after the wedding as late as two months prior to the death of said Wasil Holovack'." Defendant demurred to the first count of the plaintiffs' complaint as amended by the plaintiff's more specific statement — on the grounds that ". . . the same is insufficient in law in that said agreement is one made orally upon consideration of marriage and being not in writing, no civil action shall be maintained upon the same, as the same is contrary to the statute of frauds, Section 5982 of Chapter 138 of the Revision of 1930" and further "In and that any promises claimed to be made concerning the same after the wedding are based on past consideration in contemplation of law."
FOSTER, J.
The contract relied upon in the complaint was an oral contract. The consideration of the promise by the defendant's decedent, as set forth in the complaint, was not alone that the plaintiffs would provide a home for him — not alone that they should intermarry — but the continuing act that they should intermarry and provide a home for him. The intermarrying was a distinct part of the contract without which the contract could not be executed. The contract as set forth in the complaint plainly comes within the statute of frauds, G. S. Sec. 5982. The defect, as it appears in the complaint may be attacked by demurrer. Di Blasi vs. Di Blasi, 114 Conn. 539.
In the more specific statement filed by the plaintiffs, it appears that the promise upon which they rely was one promise often repeated. It would appear that the plaintiffs rely upon such repetitions to constitute the whole promise. Any essential part of the promise made after the wedding of the Plaintiffs was in consideration of the past acts of the plaintiffs and would not be good consideration in law.