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Docket Number

Docket No. 5469.

Attorney(S)

Siemon, Chaflin Maas for Petitioners. Charles L. Gilmore and L. Nelson Hayhurst for Respondent.

Judges

PULLEN, P.J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: N.N. Brown et al. v. The Superior Court of Sierra County (Docket No. 5469)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners sought a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court of Sierra County to enter judgment pursuant to a stipulation for judgment filed in the pending action Brown et al. v. Cleary et al., No. 1882. The cause was partially tried before Judge Henry B. Neville; before the hearing concluded counsel for the parties signed and filed a stipulation for judgment. Judge Neville died before the court acted on the stipulation. His successor, Judge J.M. McMahon, became the presiding judge.

Petitioners moved the court to enter judgment in accordance with the stipulation. Defendants opposed the motion, submitting affidavits and documents alleging certain trial witnesses had given untrue testimony and that counsel for defendants entered into the stipulation as the result of that untrue testimony; defendants also moved for a new trial on statutory grounds. The trial court refused to order judgment on the stipulation, concluding the compromise was based on misleading and untrue testimony, that enforcing the stipulation would deprive defendants of rights and result in a miscarriage of justice, and that petitioners had not acted to their detriment or relied on the stipulation (it was merely executory). The court also granted the motion for a new trial. Petitioners then sought mandamus relief in the Court of Appeal; that court discharged the writ.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a writ of mandate will lie to compel the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with a stipulation for judgment filed during a pending trial.
Whether the trial court's grant of a new trial was proper or premature where no final decision had been announced by the court.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to enforce a stipulation alleged to have been entered into as the result of untrue or misleading testimony and thereby granting relief from the stipulation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners requested that the trial court be compelled to enter judgment as provided in the filed stipulation for judgment.
Petitioners advanced a theory that the stipulation effectively amounted to findings of fact and conclusions of law such that enforcement should follow (implicitly supporting mandamus relief).

Respondent / Defendants' Arguments

Defendants produced affidavits and documentary evidence asserting that certain trial witnesses had given untrue testimony and that counsel for defendants entered into the stipulation as a result of that untrue testimony.
Defendants moved for a new trial on all statutory grounds.
The trial court (respondent) argued that enforcing the stipulation would deprive defendants of their rights and produce a miscarriage of justice, and that petitioners had not changed position or relied upon the stipulation (it remained executory).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Reclamation District v. Thisby, 131 Cal. 572 [63 P. 918]	Notice of intention to move for a new trial is premature until the trial is concluded by decision on all issues; new trial defined as reexamination after trial and decision (Code Civ. Proc., § 656).	Used to hold that the trial court's grant of a new trial could not be sustained because no decision had been rendered and a new trial under the statutory definition was premature.
Moffitt v. Jordan, 127 Cal. 628 [60 P. 175]	Motions to be relieved from stipulations rest largely in the sound discretion of the trial court; discretion exercised liberally in furtherance of justice but will not be interfered with absent abuse.	Supported the proposition that the trial court has wide discretion to set aside or refuse to enforce a stipulation and that appellate interference is limited to clear abuse of discretion.
Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483 [39 P. 863]	Inadvertence or negligence in entering stipulation will not be looked upon kindly by the court when relief is sought.	Quoted within Moffitt to illustrate standards the trial court applies when considering relief from stipulation.
Robinson v. Exempt Fire Co., 103 Cal. 6 [36 P. 955, 42 Am. St. Rep. 93, 24 L.R.A. 715]	Appellate courts will not interfere in doubtful cases nor unless it is apparent the trial court abused its discretion.	Used to support the limited scope of appellate review of the trial court's discretionary acts regarding stipulations.
Pacific Paving Co. v. Vizelich, 2 Cal.App. 515 [83 P. 459]	Affirmed that power is vested in the trial court to set aside stipulations, even if the facts do not warrant it in a particular case.	Supported the court's statement that the trial court possesses the power to refuse enforcement of stipulations under appropriate circumstances.
Bare v. Parker, 51 Cal.App. 106 [196 P. 280]	A trial court may ignore a stipulation entered into through inadvertence or that would unjustly deprive a party of his rights; refusal to enforce is not error.	Applied to the proposition that the trial court may properly refuse to permit inadvertence or counsel's want of attention to produce an injustice by enforcing a stipulation.
Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Cal.App. 452 [182 P. 989]	It is within the province and duty of the trial court to see that issues are disposed of on their merits and not merely act as a referee between counsel's agreements.	Quoted in Bare v. Parker and cited to reinforce the trial court's duty to protect the merits of issues from inadvertent stipulations.
Broder v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. 121 [37 P. 143]	Mandamus will not lie to compel judgment where the matter involves more than a ministerial duty and is mixed with the exercise of discretion (e.g., where findings and conclusions had been signed).	Applied to deny petitioners' theory that mandamus should compel entry of judgment based on the stipulation; court emphasized that mandate cannot review discretionary acts.
Hilmer v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71 [29 P.2d 175]	The court can be compelled to act, but having acted, its act cannot be reviewed by mandamus.	Used to support the principle that because the trial court acted upon the motion regarding the stipulation, mandamus relief was not available to review the merits of that action.
Sherer v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Unrep. 680 [31 P. 565]	When an application for writ is submitted on petition and answer, the allegations in the answer must be accepted as true.	Applied to state that the appellate court must accept the trial court's answer allegations as true when reviewing the submitted petition for writ.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeal addressed two principal aspects of the matter: (1) the order granting a new trial and (2) the trial court's refusal to enter judgment on the stipulation.

On the new-trial ruling, the court reasoned that a new trial, as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 656, is a reexamination after a trial and decision. Because no decision had been announced by the court in the underlying action, the motion for a new trial was premature. The court relied on Reclamation District v. Thisby to support the proposition that a new-trial motion filed before the trial is concluded or before a final decision is rendered is premature; therefore the order granting a new trial could not be sustained.

As to the trial court's refusal to enforce the stipulation, the appellate court observed that a wide discretion is vested in the trial court to relieve parties from stipulations entered into through inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect, and that such motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court cited Moffitt v. Jordan and related authorities showing that appellate interference is appropriate only for apparent abuse of discretion. The opinion also cited authorities (Pacific Paving Co.; Bare v. Parker; Farrar v. Farrar) recognizing the trial court's power and duty to refuse to permit inadvertent stipulations to produce an unjust disposition of the merits.

The court further explained that petitioners' contention that the stipulation amounted to findings and conclusions did not overcome the principle that mandamus will not lie to compel a discretionary act; Broder v. Superior Court and Hilmer v. Superior Court were cited to show that once the trial court has acted in the exercise of discretion, its act cannot be reviewed by mandamus. Because the respondent had acted upon the petitioners' motion (and the matter was presented on petition and answer, with the answer's allegations taken as true), the appellate court concluded it could not grant mandamus relief to review or reverse that discretionary action.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ of mandate is discharged.

Implications: The immediate effect is that petitioners' request for mandamus compelling the trial court to enter judgment pursuant to the stipulation was denied and the trial court's refusal to order judgment (and its related actions) stands. The opinion does not announce or establish a new rule of law beyond applying existing principles that (a) a new-trial motion is premature absent a decision, (b) trial courts have wide discretion to relieve parties from stipulations entered through inadvertence or mistake, and (c) mandamus will not review discretionary acts of the trial court once acted upon. No broader precedent beyond the cited authorities is newly established by this disposition.

Disposition: Writ discharged.

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N.N. BROWN et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY, Respondent.

PULLEN, P.J.

Petitioners herein seek by mandate to compel respondent to enter judgment in an action pending in the Superior Court of Sierra County, entitled Brown et al. v. Cleary et al., No. 1882, in the records of said court, pursuant to a stipulation for judgment entered into between respective counsel and filed with the clerk of said court. The cause was partially tried before the Honorable Henry B. Neville, the judge presiding, but before the conclusion of the hearing a stipulation for judgment was signed by respective counsel and filed in the case. Before any action was taken upon the stipulation, however, Judge Neville died. Thereafter Honorable J.M. McMahon was appointed his successor, and he became and now is the judge before whom these matters are pending.

Recently a motion was presented to respondent wherein petitioners formally moved that judgment be entered as provided in the stipulation. In response thereto defendants appeared and opposed the motion, accompanied by affidavits and documentary evidence to the effect that certain witnesses who testified in the cause had given evidence that was untrue, and that said stipulation was entered into by counsel for defendants as the result of such untrue testimony; at the same time defendants moved for a new trial upon all of the statutory grounds. After a full hearing respondent court refused to order judgment in accordance with the stipulation, upon the ground that the compromise was based upon misleading and untrue testimony and evidence, and the stipulation if enforced would amount to a deprivation of defendants of their rights and a miscarriage of justice, and furthermore that petitioners had not acted upon nor changed their position to their detriment nor suffered any loss or damage through or by the stipulation, nor had acted upon nor relied thereon and that the stipulation was merely an executory agreement. In addition to refusing to order judgment on the stipulation the court granted the motion for a new trial.

[1] As to the motion for a new trial, we believe the defendant was premature, and the order of the court granting the same cannot be sustained. A new trial is defined in section 656 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a reexamination of any issue of fact after a trial and decision by a jury, court or referee. Here no decision had been announced by the court. In Reclamation District v. Thisby, 131 Cal. 572 [ 63 P. 918], certain issues had been determined by a jury and its verdict adopted by the court, and other issues were submitted to the court sitting without a jury. A notice of intention to move for a new trial was thereafter filed on November 1, 1897, whereas the decision of the court was not filed until some five months later. The Supreme Court held the notice premature as the trial was not concluded until the court had rendered its decision upon all issues submitted to it.

[2] However, as to the motion to set aside the stipulation, we believe that a wide discretion is vested in the trial court. In Moffitt v. Jordan, 127 Cal. 628 [ 60 P. 175], where the court, considering a motion to be relieved from a stipulation, said:

"Motions of this kind rest very much in the sound discretion of the court below. That discretion is usually exercised liberally and in furtherance of justice. The court, being made acquainted with all the reasons, will, if the inadvertence is wholly inexcusable, or if it arises from negligence, not look upon it kindly. ( Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483, 485 [39 P. 863].) This court will not interfere in doubtful cases, nor unless it is apparent that the court abused its discretion. ( Robinson v. Exempt Fire Co., 103 Cal. 6 [36 P. 955, 42 Am. St. Rep. 93, 24 L.R.A. 715].)"

In Pacific Paving Co. v. Vizelich, 2 Cal.App. 515 [ 83 P. 459], this court held that although the facts did not there warrant the setting aside of the stipulation, yet it is not only inferred but directly held that such power was vested in the trial court.

In Bare v. Parker, 51 Cal.App. 106 [ 196 P. 280], a stipulation was entered into which the court ignored. This was not error, — the court saying:

"Undoubtedly assent was unwittingly given to this stipulation. It negatives the theory of plaintiff's case and would have stipulated him out of court. The trial court appreciated the situation and properly refused to permit an inadvertence or want of attention on the part of counsel to work what he conceived to be an injustice. `A trial court does not sit as a mere referee in a contest of wits between counsel in the case, but that it is not only within his province, but is his duty, to see that as nearly as possible the issues shall be disposed of on their merits. . . .' ( Farrar v. Farrar, 41 Cal.App. 452 [ 182 P. 989].)"

[3] Under petitioners' theory of the present action the stipulation involved amounted in effect to findings of fact and conclusions of law. In Broder v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. 121 [37 P. 143], the court denied a writ of mandate for judgment where findings and conclusions had been signed. There, as here, the thing asked is more than a ministerial duty and is mixed with an exercise of discretion and therefore mandate will not lie. As had often been said, the court can be compelled to act, but having acted, its act cannot be reviewed on mandamus. ( Hilmer v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71 [ 29 P.2d 175].) The court here has acted upon the motion to enter judgment, and we cannot in this proceeding pass upon the merits of that act.

Many cases are to be found where the action of the trial court has been upheld in relieving a party from a stipulation upon the ground that it was entered into through inadvertence, excusable neglect and mistake of fact. ( Moffitt v. Jordan, supra.) Such motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be interfered with in doubtful cases nor unless it is apparent that the court has abused its discretion. Here the point was presented by respondent not on its own motion, but as a reply to the motion of petitioners to have judgment entered in accordance therewith, but we can see no reason for a different rule on that account. The issue is here presented by the petition of Brown, the plaintiff in the trial below, and a demurrer and verified answer thereto by respondent setting forth the various reasons why the stipulation should not be accepted.

[4] The application for the writ having been submitted on the petition and the answer thereto, we must accept the allegations in the answer as true. ( Sherer v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Unrep. 680 [31 P. 565].)

The writ is discharged.

Plummer, J., and Thompson, J., concurred.

BROWN v. SUPERIOR COURT