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Case Summary: Simpson v. Simpson

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Margaret J. Simpson and defendant H.L. Simpson were married January 6, 1914. Two children were born of the marriage: Billy Simpson (born August 18, 1916) and Jack Simpson (born July 15, 1922). A decree of divorce was granted to plaintiff on February 23, 1926, awarding plaintiff custody of the children and providing alimony of $50 per month to plaintiff and $25 per month for the support of each child, to continue during their minority. The decree as to plaintiff's permanent alimony was modified twice: first from $50 to $35 per month, and second (August 1933) from $35 to $25 per month. The August 1933 modification included the proviso: "This decree is made without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to apply for an increase of alimony in case the earnings of the defendant are increased."

On August 15, 1935, plaintiff filed a motion to increase her alimony from $25 per month to the original $50 per month. Defendant filed a counteraffidavit and moved that the lump sum payment of $75 per month (consisting of $25 permanent alimony and $25 for each child) be reduced to $50 per month in a lump sum. The trial court dismissed both motions. Plaintiff appealed from the order denying modification. The Oregon Supreme Court, in banc, affirmed the decree of the lower court.

Relevant factual details appearing in the record: plaintiff had not remarried; defendant had remarried. Defendant is a locomotive engineer who at the time of the original decree earned approximately $300 per month; at the time of the motion he stated he received "but a little over $200 per month" due to reduced miles and reduced ability to work overtime following wage-rate and schedule changes during and after the depression. Defendant was about 57 years old and would be subject to retirement on a pension in about eight years. The railroad deducts sums from his pay (doctor/hospital service $1.50 per month, group insurance $2.40, and other federal deductions). Defendant was advised by his physician that he suffered from a prostate-gland affection related to his work. The older child was about 20 and "capable of earning his living, if he can find employment"; the younger was about 14 and "capable of earning something, if he can find the right kind of work to do." The record does not show any written property settlement or agreement as to alimony, nor that plaintiff brought property to the defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court should grant plaintiff's motion to increase her permanent alimony from $25 per month to $50 per month under the proviso that she might apply if defendant's earnings increased.
  2. Whether the court should grant defendant's motion to reduce the lump-sum payments for permanent alimony and child support from $75 per month to $50 per month.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477 (67 P. 408) The court's power to modify provisions for alimony, not accrued, extends to all provisions for maintenance, unless the allowance proceeds from a consideration of restitution of property brought to the husband by the wife, or a partition of property accumulations. Cited as authority for the general rule that the trial court may modify alimony and maintenance provisions, subject to the noted exceptions; used to frame the scope of the court's modification power relevant to the motions before it.
Phy v. Phy, 116 Or. 31 (236 P. 751, 240 P. 237, 42 A.L.R. 588) Same principle regarding the court's power to modify alimony and maintenance provisions (as to alimony not based on property restitution or partition). Invoked to support the rule that modification power extends broadly to provisions for maintenance; supplies precedent for deferring to trial-court discretion in such matters.
Warner v. Warner, 145 Or. 541 (28 P.2d 625) Reinforces the scope of the court's modification power over alimony and maintenance allowances. Cited with the other authorities to justify appellate deference to the trial court's exercise of discretion in fixing alimony and maintenance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the governing principle that the court's power to modify alimony provisions (where not based on restitution or property partition) extends broadly to maintenance allowances, citing Brandt v. Brandt, Phy v. Phy, and Warner v. Warner. The court emphasized that in fixing the amount of alimony and maintenance the trial court exercises a broad discretion, and that trial judges who heard the evidence were in a better position to determine the parties' status where testimony conflicted, because they observed demeanor and physical condition.

The court considered the uncertainties regarding defendant's future earnings — noting it was "impossible to tell exactly what the defendant will earn in the future," and that alimony obligations are based on his earnings. The opinion summarized the factual circumstances bearing on defendant's ability to pay: his present earnings had fallen from about $300 per month at the time of the original decree to "a little over $200 per month" due to reduced miles and overtime; he was 57 years old and nearing pension age; mandatory payroll deductions (doctor/hospital, group insurance, and federal deductions) further reduce his net income; and he suffered a work-related prostate condition.

The court also noted the children's ages and earning capacities: the older child (about 20) was capable of earning his living "if he can find employment," and the younger (about 14) was capable of earning something. The court observed that the $75 per month requirement then approximated one-half of what defendant was likely to earn in the future, given his health and prospects of continuous work.

Balancing these considerations and deferring to the trial court's discretion, the court concluded that defendant was contributing "all that he should be obligated to contribute as alimony and for the maintenance of the minor children" and that the trial court's decision dismissing both motions should not be disturbed.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED.

Holding: The decree of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's motion to increase alimony and defendant's motion to reduce alimony and maintenance was affirmed.

Direct consequences: Plaintiff's request to increase permanent alimony from $25 to $50 per month was denied; defendant's request to reduce the lump-sum payments from $75 to $50 per month was denied. The court ordered that neither party recover costs in the Supreme Court.

Broader implications: The opinion rests on established principles granting broad trial-court discretion in fixing and modifying alimony and maintenance, and it applied those principles to the facts. The opinion does not announce a new rule of law beyond applying existing precedent and deferring to the trial court's considered judgment.

Opinion by Justice Bean; in banc. Campbell, C.J., not sitting.

SIMPSON v. SIMPSON

IN BANC.

Suit by Margaret J. Simpson against H.L. Simpson, wherein plaintiff filed a motion to modify a former decree requiring defendant to pay plaintiff alimony, and wherein defendant filed a motion for reduction of alimony and maintenance money. From a decree dismissing both motions, plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

BEAN, J.

This is a proceeding to modify a former decree requiring defendant to pay plaintiff alimony. Plaintiff and defendant intermarried January 6, 1914. As the issue of said marriage Billy Simpson was born August 18, 1916, and Jack Simpson was born July 15, 1922. On February 23, 1926, a decree of divorce was granted plaintiff and she was given the custody of said children and allowed $50 per month alimony and $25 per month for the support of each child, to continue during their minority. The original decree has been modified twice as to plaintiff's permanent alimony. The first time it was reduced from $50 to $35 per month; the second time, in August, 1933, it was reduced from $35 to $25 per month. This last modification carried with it the following proviso:

"This decree is made without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to apply for an increase of alimony in case the earnings of the defendant are increased."

On August 15, 1935, plaintiff filed a motion to increase her alimony from $25 per month to the original sum of $50 per month. A counteraffidavit of defendant was filed and he moved that the $25 per month, permanent alimony, to plaintiff and $25 per month each for the support of the children, be further reduced from $75 in a lump sum to $50 per month in a lump sum. The trial court dismissed both motions and plaintiff prosecuted this appeal from the order of the court denying her modification.

The plaintiff has never remarried; defendant has remarried. Defendant is a locomotive engineer and has been for the major portion of his life. At the time of the rendition of the original decree and the order for the payment of $50 per month alimony to plaintiff, defendant was earning approximately $300 per month. He was and is now paid for the number of miles that he runs. During the depression the rate of payment per mile was reduced. Afterwards, while the rate per mile was restored, the number of miles that defendant usually ran the engine was decreased and defendant is unable to work overtime as formerly. The restoration of his rate of pay is offset in part by the reduction of hours of service, so that now, as he states, he receives but a little over $200 per month. Defendant is now 57 years of age and will be subject to retirement on a pension in about eight years, which will decrease his income. The railroad company deducts from defendant's pay check $1.50 per month for doctor bills and hospital service. It also deducts from his salary $2.40 for group insurance, and he is forced to suffer such other reduction as may be required by the act of Congress.

The defendant is advised by his physician that he is afflicted with a disease common to locomotive engineers caused by the ceaseless staccato vibration of an engine cab, namely, an affection of the prostate gland.

The older one of the children, now in the custody of plaintiff, is about 20 years of age and is capable of earning his living, if he can find employment. The other boy, now 14 years old, is capable of earning something, if he can find the right kind of work to do.

It does not appear from the record that the decree fixing alimony was based upon a contract. There was no written stipulation or agreement for a property settlement or any agreement as to alimony between the parties. It is not shown that plaintiff brought any property to the defendant.

The court's power to modify provisions for alimony, not accrued, extends to all provisions for maintenance, unless the allowance proceeds from a consideration of restitution of property brought to the husband by the wife, or a partition of property accumulations: Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477 ( 67 P. 408); Phy v. Phy, 116 Or. 31 ( 236 P. 751, 240 P. 237, 42 A.L.R. 588); Warner v. Warner, 145 Or. 541 ( 28 P.2d 625).

In fixing the amount of alimony and maintenance the trial court exercised a broad discretion. The several judges who passed upon the matter at different dates were in a better position to determine the real status of the parties, where the testimony is somewhat conflicting, than is this court. The circuit judges had the privilege of observing the demeanor and attitude of the parties and their physical condition, and their judgment, maturely considered, is entitled to great weight.

It is impossible to tell exactly what the defendant will earn in the future, and it is upon his earnings that his ability to pay alimony and maintenance is based. The requirement that he pay $75 per month is approaching one-half of what he will be likely to earn in the future, taking into consideration the condition of his health and chances of his being able to work all the time.

After a consideration of all the evidence and records, we think defendant is now contributing all that he should be obligated to contribute as alimony and for the maintenance of the minor children, and that the decision of the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, should not be disturbed.

The decree of the lower court is affirmed. Neither party will recover costs in this court.

CAMPBELL, C.J., not sitting.

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SIMPSON v. SIMPSON
(Sep 15, 1936)