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Attorney(S)

R.B. Owe, ( R.L. Ryder with him,) for the respondents. S.R. Wrightington, for the petitioner.

Judges

DONAHUE, J.

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Town of Lexington v. Charles W. Ryder, et al. — Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (March 2, 1937)

Factual and Procedural Background

The town of Lexington filed a petition in the Land Court (petition filed September 9, 1935) seeking foreclosure of all right of redemption under a tax sale pursuant to G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 65. The tax sale at issue occurred on September 25, 1931. At that sale a bidder named Tenney was recorded as having bid in the real estate. The collector of taxes later executed a deed to the town dated and acknowledged October 15, 1931 (the twentieth day after the tax sale). The deed contained an express recital that Tenney had failed to pay the amount bid within twenty days after the sale and that the town thereby became the purchaser. It was conceded by the respondents that the deed was recorded within the time required by statute.

The respondents contended that the deed to the town was invalid because, they argued, the deed had been delivered while the twenty-day period within which Tenney could make payment had not yet expired, so that the sale to Tenney had not become void and the town could not be deemed purchaser. A judge of the Land Court found on the evidence that the tax sale to the town was valid. Because the respondents offered to redeem if the tax title was held valid, the Land Court ordered the case to stand for further hearing on the matter of redemption. The respondents appealed the Land Court's decision. The case was heard in this court with a panel including Chief Justice Rugg and Justices Crosby, Donahue, Lummus and Qua. The opinion was delivered by Justice Donahue.

Counsel of record: R.B. Owe (R.L. Ryder with him) for the respondents; S.R. Wrightington for the petitioner.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a recorded tax deed containing a recital that the purchaser at a tax sale failed to pay within twenty days after the sale is, under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, §§ 45, 49, 50, prima facie evidence that the purchaser did not pay within that statutory period and that the town thereby became the purchaser.
When a deed both (a) recites that the purchaser failed to pay within twenty days and (b) is dated on the twentieth day after the sale (thus suggesting delivery before expiration of the twenty-day period), how should a court treat these two conflicting, prima facie pieces of evidence — i.e., whether the tribunal must weigh them as factual matters rather than resolving the conflict as a matter of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Town of Lexington) Position

The petitioner claimed title under the tax deed executed by the collector of taxes, which expressly recited that the purchaser (Tenney) failed to pay within twenty days after the sale and that the town thereby became purchaser. The deed was recorded within the statutory period, and by statute a recorded tax deed is prima facie evidence of all facts essential to the validity of the conveyed title (citing G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 45).
The petitioner relied on the statutory effect of the deed's recital (G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 50) and on the ordinary rule that a recorded tax deed becomes prima facie evidence of facts essential to the title.

Respondents' (Ryder and others) Position

The respondents contended that the deed was invalid because, as dated, it was executed on the twentieth day after the sale — a time when the twenty-day period for the purchaser to pay had not yet expired — and they argued the deed must have been delivered before the statutory period expired, so the sale had not become void and the town could not be deemed purchaser under § 49.
Thus they challenged the effectiveness of the deed on the ground that delivery occurred before the expiration of the purchaser's statutory payment period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Welch v. Haley, 224 Mass. 261	Recorded tax deed is prima facie evidence of all facts essential to validity of title (statutory effect under G.L. c. 60, § 45).	The court relied on this authority to treat the deed's recital that the purchaser failed to pay within twenty days as prima facie evidence of that fact.
Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 179-180	Contradictory evidence will prevent a statute-created prima facie conclusion from being conclusive; instead a question of fact arises.	Used to support the proposition that if the statutory prima facie evidence is contradicted, the trier must determine the factual question.
Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Wiggin, 209 Mass. 542, 548	Same principle regarding effect of contradictory evidence on prima facie statutory proof.	One of the authorities cited to show conflicting prima facie evidence yields a factual question for the trier.
Shamlian v. Equitable Accident Co., 226 Mass. 67, 70	Similar authority about the treatment of prima facie evidence when contradicted.	Cited among authorities establishing that contradictory evidence prevents a statutory recital from being decisive as a matter of law.
Thomes v. Meyer Store Inc., 268 Mass. 587, 589-590	Another authority on weighing prima facie evidence against contradictory proof.	Included with other cases to demonstrate the practice of treating conflicting prima facie evidence as a factual issue.
Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407	Delivery of a deed is essential to its validity; date may be controlled by other recitals or extrinsic facts and circumstances.	The court invoked this case to explain that a deed is effective upon delivery and that the date on the deed is only prima facie evidence of delivery and may be rebutted.
Berkshire Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 13 Gray 177	Authority for the proposition that delivery is essential to the validity of a deed.	Used to support the statement that a deed becomes effective only at delivery.
Harrison v. Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 455, 461	Authority for the delivery principle for deeds.	Cited in connection with the rule that delivery, not date, makes a deed effective.
Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray 66	Date appearing in a deed furnishes prima facie evidence that it was delivered on the day of its date.	The court relied on this line of authority to recognize that the deed's date constituted prima facie evidence that the deed was delivered on that date.
Conley v. Finn, 171 Mass. 70	Same rule: date as prima facie evidence of delivery.	Quoted among cases establishing that a deed's date is prima facie evidence of delivery but may be controlled by other recitals or facts.
Hall v. Sears, 210 Mass. 185	Same rule regarding the date in a deed being prima facie evidence of delivery.	Included in the authorities acknowledging the prima facie character of a deed's date.
Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451, 455	When two pieces of evidence, each prima facie, conflict, the tribunal must weigh their inherent evidential value and decide the facts; not all prima facie evidence has equal probative force.	Relied on heavily to support the conclusion that conflicting prima facie statements in the deed required the trier to weigh and determine which carried greater probative value.
Adams v. Hayden, 236 Mass. 454, 459	Supports the approach that when prima facie evidence conflicts, the tribunal considers all the evidence to ascertain truth.	Used to reinforce the principle that conflicting prima facie evidence creates a factual issue for the judge.
Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 505 (compare)	Comparison authority regarding evidentiary weighing (cited for contrast).	Cited by way of comparison in the discussion of how conflicting evidence should be handled.
Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 183 (compare)	Comparison authority in the context of evidentiary evaluation.	Cited for comparative purposes in the court's discussion of weighing evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory framework. Under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 49, if the purchaser at a tax sale pays the amount bid within twenty days after the sale he becomes the owner of the tax title; if he fails to make payment within that period "the sale shall be void, and the town shall be deemed to be the purchaser." Section 50 requires that a deed, where the town becomes purchaser under § 49, "shall set forth the fact . . . that the purchaser failed to pay the amount bid." By § 45 a recorded tax deed becomes prima facie evidence of all facts essential to the validity of the title thereby conveyed.

Applying these provisions, the recorded deed's recital that Tenney failed to pay within twenty days constituted statutory prima facie evidence that Tenney did not make the payment and that the town became purchaser. However, the deed was dated October 15, 1931 — the twentieth day after the sale — and the date itself also furnished prima facie evidence that the deed was delivered on that date. Because the twentieth day had not yet expired on that date, the date in the deed tended to contradict the deed's recital that the purchaser had failed to pay within twenty days. Thus the record presented two conflicting pieces of evidence, each prima facie in character: (1) the statutory prima facie recital that the purchaser failed to pay within twenty days and (2) the deed's date as prima facie evidence of delivery before the expiration of the twenty-day period.

The court emphasized established principles: delivery is essential to the validity of a deed and a deed becomes effective upon delivery (Dresel v. Jordan and other authorities). The date on the deed is only prima facie evidence of the time of delivery and may be controlled by other recitals in the deed or by extrinsic facts and circumstances. Where two prima facie items of evidence conflict, the matter cannot be resolved as a question of law; instead it becomes a question of fact for the trier, who must determine which piece of evidence has greater probative value (Chandler v. Prince and related cases).

In this case the collector who executed the deed had died and there was no witness with personal knowledge of the execution and delivery; the only evidence as to execution and delivery was the deed itself. The trial judge found that the prima facie statutory recital that Tenney failed to pay within twenty days was of controlling force and, on that evidence, held the tax sale to the town valid. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the trial judge's factual determination was warranted: the deed's recital — made prima facie by statute — could be given controlling probative force over the deed's date, and the finding of validity was permissible on the evidence presented. The court also noted that the date written in the deed had no essential effect on when the deed should be operative because it is delivery, not date, that makes a deed effective.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Decision affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Land Court's finding that the tax sale to the town was valid.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: the Land Court's determination that the town acquired the tax title was affirmed; because the respondents had offered to redeem, the Land Court's order that the case stand for further hearing on redemption remains in effect.
Legal implication stated in the opinion: where a recorded tax deed contains a statutory recital and the deed's date suggests an inconsistent delivery time, the conflict between two prima facie pieces of evidence must be resolved by the trier of fact weighing their relative probative value; it is not a question to be decided as a matter of law.
The opinion does not purport to announce a new rule beyond applying established principles about the prima facie effect of recorded tax deeds, delivery as the operative moment for deed effectiveness, and the obligation of the factfinder to weigh conflicting prima facie evidence.

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TOWN OF LEXINGTON vs. CHARLES W. RYDER others.

Tax, Sale, Deed. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof. Deed, Validity, Delivery.

On the sole evidence of a deed by a tax collector to a town, dated and acknowledged on the twentieth day after a tax sale and containing a statement that the purchaser at the sale had failed to pay within twenty days thereafter the amount bid by him, a finding was warranted that the deed was delivered more than twenty days after the sale and that the statement therein was true, and therefore that the sale to the town was valid under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 49. Where an issue is to be determined upon two conflicting pieces of evidence, both prima facie in character, it cannot be ruled as matter of law that either is controlling; the trier of fact must determine which of the two pieces of evidence has the greater probative value.

DONAHUE, J.

The town of Lexington brought this petition in the Land Court for the foreclosure of all right of redemption under a tax sale. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 65.

The petitioner claims title under a deed from the collector of taxes of the town which recited that at a tax sale held on September 25, 1931, the real estate in question was bid in by one Tenney, that he failed to pay within twenty days after the sale the sum offered by him, and that the town thereby became the purchaser of the property. The deed was dated and acknowledged on October 15, 1931. It is conceded by the respondents that the deed was recorded within the time after the sale required by the statute. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 45.

The trial judge found that the deed was recorded on "October 26th." — REPORTER.

The respondents contend that the deed given by the collector of taxes to the town was invalid. Under the statute, Tenney, the purchaser at the tax sale, by paying to the collector the amount of his bid "within twenty days after the sale" would become the owner of the tax title, but in the event of his failure to make payment within that period "the sale shall be void, and the town shall be deemed to be the purchaser." G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 49. The day of the date of the deed was the twentieth day after the sale. The respondents contend that the deed to the town was delivered at a time when the twenty-day period within which Tenney could make payment had not expired, when the sale to him had not become void, and when the town could not be deemed to be the purchaser.

A judge of the Land Court found on the evidence that the tax sale to the town was valid. The respondents having offered to redeem if the tax title was held valid, the trial judge ordered that the case stand for further hearing on the matter of redemption. The respondents appealed from the decision of the Land Court.

The deed to the town contained a recital that the purchaser at the tax sale had failed to pay the amount he had bid within twenty days thereafter. Such a recital conformed to the provision of the statute which required that where a town becomes the purchaser by operation of § 49, the deed "shall set forth the fact . . . that the purchaser failed to pay the amount bid." G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 50. By reason of another section of the statute a tax deed when recorded becomes "prima facie evidence of all facts essential to the validity of the title thereby conveyed." G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 45. Welch v. Haley, 224 Mass. 261. A failure of the purchaser at the tax sale to make payment within twenty days was a fact essential to the validity of the title. By the introduction in evidence of the recorded deed containing such recital there came into the case prima facie evidence of the fact that the purchaser did not pay the amount bid by him within twenty days after the tax sale.

If this prima facie evidence was uncontradicted it would compel the conclusion that the purchaser at the tax sale did not make payment within twenty days after the sale. If, however, there was contradictory evidence, that conclusion would not be compelled, but there would be presented the question of fact whether, on the evidence which was made prima facie evidence by the statute and on any contradictory evidence, the purchaser had made payment within twenty days after the sale. Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 179-180. Bigelow Carpet Co. v. Wiggin, 209 Mass. 542, 548. Shamlian v. Equitable Accident Co. 226 Mass. 67, 70. Thomes v. Meyer Store Inc. 268 Mass. 587, 589-590.

On the date borne by the deed, the twenty-day period within which the purchaser might make payment had not expired, although the deed in effect recited that it had expired without payment having been made. Thus, the date in the deed was other evidence in the case, also prima facie in character, which tended to contradict the fact embraced in that recital which the statute made prima facie evidence. There was therefore a question of fact to be determined on two pieces of prima facie evidence both appearing in the deed. At the time of the trial the collector of taxes who gave the deed had died and there was no one who could testify from personal knowledge as to the facts respecting the execution and delivery of the deed. As to these matters the only evidence was in the deed itself.

The delivery of a deed is essential to its validity and a deed becomes effective only at the time of its delivery. Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407. Berkshire Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 13 Gray, 177. Harrison v. Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 455, 461. The date appearing in the deed in this case furnished prima facie evidence that it was delivered on the day of its date, Smith v. Porter, 10 Gray, 66, Conley v. Finn, 171 Mass. 70, Hall v. Sears, 210 Mass. 185, but this might "be controlled by other recitals in the deed, or by extrinsic facts and circumstances." Dresel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407, 417.

Where, as here, there are two conflicting pieces of evidence, both prima facie in character, it cannot be ruled as matter of law that either has controlling effect over the other. As was said in Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451, 455: ". . . the law does not put all prima facie evidence on the same footing, nor declare that it is all of equal probative force. . . . When two pieces of evidence conflict, each declared by law to be of prima facie force, then the case is thrown open and is to be considered at large upon all the evidence. The tribunal charged with the ascertainment of the facts is bound to determine the inherent evidential value of each piece of evidence and weigh it with the inferences and probabilities arising from all the circumstances, and thus reach a decision. . . . The evidence is to be considered as a whole and the truth ascertained as in other cases of contradictory evidence." See also Adams v. Hayden, 236 Mass. 454, 459. Compare Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 505; Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 183. It was here a question of fact for the trial judge to determine which of the two pieces of prima facie evidence had the greater probative value, the burden of proof being on the petitioner.

The express recital in the deed that the purchaser had failed to pay the amount bid was, under the statute, essential to its validity. But the date written in the deed had no essential effect on the time when it should be operative. It is the delivery of a deed and not the date which makes it effective. There is no reason why the collector should make the deed effective before the expiration of the twenty-day period and there were eleven days after its date within which, under the statute, it might be recorded. The trial judge found the prima facie evidence that payment was not made by the purchaser within twenty days after the sale to be of controlling force and "On the evidence" found the tax sale to the town to be valid. It cannot be said that this finding was unwarranted.

Decision affirmed.

LEXINGTON v. RYDER