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Factual and Procedural Background

On February 26, 1935, the Malheur County Circuit Court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Jennie Ward (plaintiff, later Jennie Larsen) and Earl Ward (defendant), prescribing custody arrangements for their three minor children: plaintiff to have custody for six months beginning September 1 of each year and defendant to have custody for six months beginning March 1 of each year. The decree ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $20 per month for the children's support during the periods they were in her custody, required the children to remain within the court's jurisdiction, and provided that in the event of the plaintiff's remarriage she "shall relinquish all claim to the payment of said monthly sum as support money directly to her, but the defendant shall remain liable for the support of said children at all times, and shall, in the event of such remarriage by plaintiff, to another, have the right to provide for them directly himself."

After remarriage, plaintiff sought modification. On March 7, 1936 she moved to modify the decree to award custody of the minor child Delma to her; a temporary order followed based on stipulation. On June 26, 1936 plaintiff moved to vacate the restriction against removal of the children from the court's jurisdiction, supported by affidavit stating her husband had been transferred to Oakridge, Nebraska, where their home then was and where he would be for many months. Defendant filed a counter-motion on October 18, 1936 seeking custody, alleging plaintiff's husband had no permanent abode, would move the children among construction camps, that the husband was an unfit custodian, and that plaintiff knew the decree terms when she remarried.

The trial court, after considering affidavits and the stipulation, entered an order (August 27, 1936) modifying the original decree: it ordered alternating-year custody beginning September 1, 1936 (plaintiff to have custody for the year ending August 31, 1937), and it permitted plaintiff to take the children outside the court's jurisdiction provided she file a bond conditioned on returning the children and paying costs if she failed to do so. Defendant appealed from that adverse order to the Oregon Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the circuit court erred in modifying the original custody decree to permit the mother (plaintiff) to take the minor children out of the state of Oregon and the jurisdiction of the court.
  2. Whether, given the plaintiff's remarriage and changed circumstances, the custody modification was consistent with the controlling standard that custody modifications must serve the best interests of the minor children.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The original decree provided that upon the plaintiff's remarriage she would relinquish direct claim to the support payments and the defendant would "have the right to provide for them directly himself."
  • Plaintiff married Earl Larsen, who is employed in construction work and has no permanent abode; Larsen will move from one construction camp to another and cannot provide a stable home or suitable educational opportunities for the children.
  • Plaintiff intends to rejoin her husband in Nebraska and take the children, which would disrupt their schooling and place them in an unfit environment.
  • The defendant is not financially able to support the children away from his home and would be put to great expense if they are removed; plaintiff knew the decree terms when she remarried.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Plaintiff sought leave to take the children out of the court's jurisdiction to live with her husband, who had been transferred to Oakridge, Nebraska, where their home was then situated and where he would be employed for many months.
  • She asserted that denial of leave would, without just cause, deprive her of care, custody and comfort of her children or force her to remain in Oregon and lose the protection, support and companionship of her husband.
  • Plaintiff relied on a temporary custody award (from the earlier stipulation) and requested modification to remove the restriction against out-of-state relocation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Oregon Code 1930, § 6-914 Statutory basis for the court's retained jurisdiction to enforce support and custody provisions after a divorce decree becomes absolute. The court cited the statute to state that, after a decree becomes absolute, the court retains jurisdiction only to require compliance with support or custody provisions.
Hertzen v. Hertzen, 104 Or. 423 (208 P. 580) Authority confirming the court's continued jurisdiction over maintenance or support and minor children after decree. Used to support the proposition that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce support and custody terms of a decree.
Sachs v. Sachs, 145 Or. 23 (25 P.2d 159, 26 P.2d 780) Principle that a stipulation regarding custody, adopted in a decree, should not be modified unless changed conditions make the stipulation no longer in the best interests of the children. The court relied on Sachs to apply the "changed conditions" / "best interests of the children" standard in deciding whether to modify custody provisions adopted in the decree.
Borigo v. Borigo, 142 Or. 46 (18 P.2d 810) Supporting authority for the rule that custody provisions incorporated from stipulation should be disturbed only when changes in circumstances render them contrary to children's best interests. Applied alongside Sachs as part of the standard limiting when custody decrees based on stipulation may be modified.
Merges v. Merges, 94 Or. 246 (186 P. 36) Authority emphasizing that the best interests of the children are the controlling and paramount consideration in custody determinations. The court invoked Merges to emphasize that continuity of schooling and stability are significant in assessing children's best interests.
McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Or. 644 (174 P. 721, 184 P. 272) Further authority affirming that children's best interests govern custody decisions. Used with other cases to support the conclusion that custody should be awarded to the party who will best promote the children's stability and educational continuity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reciting the terms of the original decree, including the alternating custody schedule, the $20 monthly payment to plaintiff while children were in her custody, the restriction that the children remain within the court's jurisdiction, and the clause addressing plaintiff's remarriage. It observed that when a divorce decree becomes absolute, the court's continuing interest is limited to enforcing provisions for maintenance or support and for minor children, citing Oregon Code 1930, § 6-914 and Hertzen v. Hertzen.

The court noted the established rule that stipulations regarding custody adopted into a decree should not be modified except when changed conditions would make the stipulation contrary to the children's best interests (citing Sachs v. Sachs and Borigo v. Borigo). Applying this principle, the court examined the factual changes resulting from plaintiff's remarriage: the husband is employed by a construction company with transfers (then in Nebraska), plaintiff wishes to live with him and to take the children out of state, and the husband's work would likely require frequent relocations.

The court found both parents to be competent and fit, but concluded that the convenience of the mother in following her husband's employment did not justify uprooting the children from the court's jurisdiction. The bond required of plaintiff (to return the children and to pay costs if she failed to do so) was deemed an unsatisfactory protection for the father's interests. The court emphasized the children's interest in completing their common school education in a single school with their classmates and held that maintaining custody with the father would best serve this continuity and stability.

On that basis, the court determined that the trial court erred in permitting the mother to remove the children from the state and the court's jurisdiction and that the modification should be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order modifying the original decree and set it aside. The court remanded with instructions to enter a decree giving the defendant the care, control, custody, and maintenance of the minor children. The opinion expressly states: REVERSED.

Additional rulings: Petition for rehearing was denied (June 29, 1937). The court also ruled that neither party shall recover costs and disbursements in the supreme court.

Implications: The direct effect is that custody was to be returned to the father and the children were to remain within the jurisdiction of the Oregon court, rather than being permitted to relocate with their mother to Nebraska. The opinion applies established Oregon authority about retention of jurisdiction and the paramountcy of children's best interests; it does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond those applications.

WARD v. WARD

In Banc.

CAMPBELL, J.

On February 26, 1935, a decree was entered in the circuit court for Malheur county dissolving the marriage contract then existing between plaintiff and defendant, and making provision for the care, custody and control of their minor children. This decree gave the custody of their three minor children for six months, commencing September 1, to plaintiff, and for six months, commencing March 1, to defendant, of each year; and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $20 per month for the support of said minor children during the time they were in the custody of plaintiff; ordered that the children remain within the jurisdiction of the court until further order of the court; and

"* * * that in the event of the remarriage of said plaintiff, the said plaintiff shall relinquish all claim to the payment of said monthly sum as support money directly to her, but the defendant shall remain liable for the support of said children at all times, and shall, in the event of such remarriage by plaintiff, to another, have the right to provide for them directly himself."

On March 7, 1936, plaintiff filed a motion supported by affidavit asking that the decree be modified so as to award her the custody of their minor child, Delma. Defendant filed a counter-affidavit opposing said motion. Thereafter the parties stipulated and, based thereon, the court made a temporary order awarding the temporary custody of Delma to the plaintiff and continuing the matter for further hearing.

On June 26, 1936, plaintiff filed a further motion asking for a further modification of the decree in that "* * * the restriction against removal of the children from the jurisdiction of the court be vacated".

This motion is supported by plaintiff's affidavit substantially setting forth the following facts: That, since the entry of the decree above mentioned, plaintiff has married one Earl Larsen who has been and is employed by a company engaged in the contracting and construction business; that, at the time of the filing of the affidavit, plaintiff's husband has been transferred to Oakridge, Nebraska, where he will be engaged for many months and where their home is now situated, and, as soon as his work there is completed, he will be transferred elsewhere;

"That to be refused leave to take my children from the jurisdiction of this court will, without just cause, deprive me of the care, custody and comfort of my said children or deprive me of the protection, support and companionship of my husband in the event I must remain in Oregon to be enabled to enjoy my children;"

Defendant thereafter on October 18, 1936, answered plaintiff's motion by filing a counter-motion asking that the decree be modified so as to award him the care, custody and control of said children. This motion was supported by defendant's affidavit in which he alleges: That the decree as entered provided that, in the event of the remarriage of plaintiff, the plaintiff shall relinquish all claim to the support money paid to plaintiff for the benefit of the minor children and that the defendant shall "have the right to provide for them directly himself."; that the plaintiff has married one Earl Larsen who is employed in construction camps and at the present time is in Nebraska; that Larsen has no permanent abode and has provided the plaintiff with no home suitable for the children; that said Earl Larsen will move from one construction camp to another and will force the children to live among a group of rough and uncouth men, far from proper school and educational facilities; that the plaintiff intends to rejoin her husband in Nebraska and take the children with her; that Earl Larsen is not a fit person to have the custody and control of said children; that the defendant is not financially able to support the children away from the home he maintains; that his home is a suitable place for the children; that in case the children are removed to Nebraska he will be put to great expense in order to have them with him and he is not able to incur such expense; that plaintiff was well acquainted with the terms of said decree and married the said Earl Larsen with full knowledge thereof.

The matter came on before the court for hearing on the affidavits supporting the motion and the counter-motion, and after considering the matter the court made an order modifying the decree in that:

"* * * the plaintiff * * * and the defendant * * * shall each have the care, custody and control of said minor children * * * each alternating year, beginning with September 1st, 1936, and that the plaintiff shall have the care, custody and control of said children beginning September 1st, 1936, for the year ending August 31st, 1937;"

The court further decreed that the plaintiff, during the time that the children are in her custody, might take the children outside the jurisdiction of the court, and that the plaintiff file a bond:

"* * * conditioned that the plaintiff will comply with the conditions of the decree with respect to the care, custody and control of said children and such further amendments and modifications to the said decree as may be made by the Court, and will return said children to the jurisdiction of this court at her own cost and expense in accordance with this and any other further order of this court, and that in the event of her failure so to do she will pay the costs and expenses entailed by the defendant in the enforcement of the decree in any other jurisdiction."

When a decree dissolving the marriage contract becomes absolute, the court has no further interest in the parties to the suit, other than to require the parties to comply with the decree in relation to the maintenance or support of either party or of the minor children of such marriage. The court retains jurisdiction over the subject matter for these purposes: Oregon Code 1930, § 6-914; Hertzen v. Hertzen, 104 Or. 423 ( 208 P. 580).

If the court deems that a stipulation, entered into between the parties, regarding the custody and maintenance of minor children, is for the best interest of the minor children, the court may adopt such stipulation as a part of the decree, and thereafter such decree, in that respect, will not be modified unless conditions of the parties have changed so that such provision would no longer be for the best interests of the minor children: Sachs v. Sachs, 145 Or. 23 ( 25 P.2d 159, 26 P.2d 780); Borigo v. Borigo, 142 Or. 46 ( 18 P.2d 810). In the instant case, it appears that either party is a competent and fit person to have the care and custody of the minor children.

At the time of the entry of the decree, the plaintiff lived in Nyssa, Malheur county, Oregon, and the defendant lived on a ranch about two miles therefrom. While the children lived in Nyssa with plaintiff, they attended school in that town. When the custody of the children was changed from the plaintiff to the defendant, the children went to live at defendant's home, and were transported to the same school in Nyssa by a school bus which picked them up directly in front of their father's home. Thus, their school routine remained uninterrupted by the change in custody.

Plaintiff's marriage to her present husband has somewhat altered the conditions existing at the time of the rendition of the decree. It appears that her present husband is employed by a construction company which has contracts in different parts of the country. At the time the motion was filed, his work had called him to the state of Nebraska. The plaintiff being anxious to live with her husband, desired to be permitted to take the children out of the state of Oregon and the jurisdiction of the court, to the state of Nebraska. It seems that the court had in mind at the time he rendered the original decree, that such a change might take place, consequently the court guarded against the effect that such change might produce. This was done by the provision in the decree which recites that in the event of the remarriage of plaintiff, the plaintiff shall relinquish all claim to the support money paid by defendant for the benefit of the minor children and that the defendant shall "have the right to provide for them directly himself".

The principal reason given by plaintiff for the modification of the decree is that unless she is permitted to take the children out of the state and the jurisdiction of the court, she will be deprived either of the control and companionship of said children or she will be required to remain in the state and lose the companionship, support and protection of her husband. We do not think that the mere convenience of the plaintiff would justify the taking of the children from the jurisdiction of the court.

It is true that a bond is required of plaintiff requiring that she pay "the costs and expenses entailed by the defendant in the enforcement of the decree in any other jurisdiction".

This is not a very satisfactory protection to afford the father. Plaintiff knew the terms of the decree at the time she entered into her second marriage, and we do not think it would be for the best interests of the minor children that their place of abode should be changed every time their stepfather transferred from one job to another. Plaintiff having established a home outside of the state, the children should be left in the custody of their father where they will have an opportunity of completing their common school education in one school and with their present classmates. We believe that this course would be for the best interests of the minor children; that is the controlling and paramount factor to be taken into consideration: Merges v. Merges, 94 Or. 246 ( 186 P. 36); McKissick v. McKissick, 93 Or. 644 ( 174 P. 721, 184 P. 272); Sachs v. Sachs, supra. It will work no particular hardship on the plaintiff, as she will be entitled to visit her children at all reasonable times; that should the conditions of the parties change, she could apply to the court for appropriate relief.

We are of the opinion that the court erred in modifying the decree so as to permit the mother to take the children out of the state of Oregon and the jurisdiction of the court.

The order of the circuit court, made and entered August 27, 1936, modifying the original decree, should be and hereby is set aside, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter a decree giving defendant the care, control, custody and maintenance of said minor children.

It is so ordered.

CAMPBELL, J.

Petition for rehearing denied June 29, 1937 ON PETITION FOR REHEARING ( 69 P.2d 963)

CAMPBELL, J.

The respondent has filed a petition for rehearing, but in his petition there are no propositions raised that the court did not give full and careful consideration to in the opinion, and the petition for rehearing will be denied.

It is further suggested that in the opinion no disposition was made by the court regarding costs and disbursements. Unless the opinion otherwise provides, costs and disbursements in an equity suit are allowable to the prevailing party. However in this cause, after due consideration, we are of the opinion that neither party shall recover costs and disbursements in this court, and the mandate will so provide.

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WARD v. WARD
(Jun 29, 1937)