CITY OF CLARKSDALE v. FITZHUGH

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Docket Number

No. 33501.

Attorney(S)

W.W. Venable, of Clarksdale, for appellant. The importance of this case lies not so much in the amount involved but is important for the sake of a ruling by this court as to the admissibility of Mrs. Fitzhugh's testimony as to what she would be willing to take for her property in connection with the instruction complained of. Everyone having had any experience knows that a jury of laymen is most apt to accept as the value of anything what the owner says he or she is willing to take for it, they naturally thinking that since it can be purchased for this amount, this must be what it is worth. They do not stop to think that an owner may have a number of private reasons for selling for less than the market price and also that an owner might say, "I will be willing to sell for a certain sum," in the absence of a specific offer, when if a specific offer was made the owner might value the property much higher. In tax appeal cases such evidence is highly prejudicial and if it is inadmissible under the rules of evidence, this case should be reversed, it is respectfully submitted. The testimony of Mrs. Fitzhugh as to what she would be willing to sell the respective lots and buildings for is not admissible. In order to show the value of property it is not competent to prove offers for the property itself. Sharpe v. U.S., 112 Fed. 893, 57 L.R.A. 932; Crosby v. Dorward, 248 Ill. 471, 140 A.S.R. 230; Hine v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 132 N.Y. 477, 30 N.E. 985; Union Traction Co. v. Anderson, 146 Tenn. 476, 25 A.L.R. 1496; Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 47 L.R.A. 25; Peters v. McPhadden, 75 Wn. 525, 135 P. 26; Peagler v. Davis, 143 Ga. 11, 84 S.E. 59; Kansas City Grandview Ry. Co. v. Haake, 84 A.L.R. 1477. The court erred in instructing the jury that they might consider in arriving at the true value "a price not at what it might bring at a forced sale but a price that the owner would be willing to accept and would expect to receive for it, if she were disposed to sell it to another, able and willing to buy." The test of the law as to market value is not what the owner might be willing to take but means the price which it will bring from the buyer who is willing to pay its value. Parish Co. v. Y. M.V.R.R. Co., 103 Miss. 288. J.M. Talbot, of Clarksdale, for appellee. Section 3145 of the Code requires that: "Lands shall be assessed according to its true value . . . not at what it might bring at a forced sale but what the owner would be willing to accept and would expect to receive for it if he were disposed to sell it to another able and willing to buy." Section 112 of the Constitution requires that property shall be assessed "according to its true value." Knox v. Southern Paper Co., 143 Miss. 870, 108 So. 288; Edward Hines Yellow Pine v. Knox, 144 Miss. 560, 108 So. 901; Bank of Tupelo v. Board of Supervisors, 155 Miss. 436, 124 So. 482. It is competent for a witness familiar with the particular land to say what crops it has been producing, its location, distance from a railroad or other means of transportation, the character of its soil, and from all this knowledge to give his opinion of its value. No showing of any expert training is required. Board of Levee Comrs. v. Nelms, 82 Miss. 416; Levee Comrs. v. Dillard, 76 Miss. 641. We respectfully submit that the competency of the evidence of Mrs. Fitzhugh in her deposition as to her questions and answers complained of by opposing counsel is definitely settled in the case of Gloster Compress Trading Co. v. Town of Gloster, 115 Miss. 578, 76 So. 550. We respectfully submit that no error was committed in the trial prejudicial to appellant and that the case should be affirmed.

Judges

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

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CITY OF CLARKSDALE v. FITZHUGH.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain judgment reducing taxable value of taxpayer's real estate in city as basis for municipal taxes.

2. EVIDENCE.

In proceeding involving value of realty as basis for municipal taxes, owner's testimony regarding amount she would be willing to accept and would expect to receive from any person able and willing to buy was admissible (Code 1930, section 3145).

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In proceeding involving value of realty as basis for municipal taxes, instruction that in finding the true value of property jury could consider price that owner would be willing to accept and would expect to receive for it if she were disposed to sell it to another able and willing to buy was proper (Code 1930, section 3145).

Anderson, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The City of Clarksdale appeals from a verdict and judgment of the circuit court of Coahoma County fixing the value of real estate owned by appellant in the city as the basis for municipal taxes.

She returned the value at $36,800. The municipal authorities raised it to $51,000. She protested against the raise and on the hearing thereof it was reduced to $48,000. From that judgment she appealed to the circuit court, where there was a trial resulting in a verdict and judgment reducing the amount to $42,000. From that judgment, the city prosecutes this appeal.

There was sufficient evidence, if competent, to sustain the verdict and judgment. The city assigns and argues as errors the admission of certain evidence given by Mrs. Fitzhugh as to value, and an instruction given her by the court. The evidence in question follows:

"Please state the amount of money or securities of the value thereof which you would be willing to accept and would expect to receive from any person able and willing to buy and if you are disposed to sell the said property.

"A. 3. $36,800.00."

The instruction complained of is in this language: "The Court instructs the jury that in finding the true value of property you may consider in arriving at the true value of the property a price not at what it might bring at a forced sale but a price that the owner would be willing to accept and would expect to receive for it if she were disposed to sell it to another able and willing to buy."

It will be seen that both objections raise the same question.

Section 3145, Code of 1930, provides, among other things, as follows: "Lands shall be assessed according to its true value, . . . not at what it might bring at a forced sale, but what the owner would be willing to accept and would expect to receive for it if he were disposed to sell it to another able and willing to buy."

It will be observed that the evidence in question was in substance authorized by the statute. In Board of Levee Commissioner, etc., v. Dillard, 76 Miss. 641, 25 So. 292, the court held that land has no market value in the sense that stocks, bonds, and other public securities have a market value, or even as the common and ordinary articles of commerce have such value, and because thereof the rules of evidence as to the value of land are modified to meet such circumstances. In Gloster Compress, etc., Co. v. Town of Gloster, 115 Miss. 578, 76 So. 550, the court held that on appeal from a municipal assessment for taxes on a cotton compress warehouse, it was competent for the owners to introduce evidence that they were willing to sell and had offered to sell the property for a less price than the amount of the assessment, where there was evidence that such offer was not in the nature of a forced sale, but was a bona fide offer by the owners, and in their opinion was a just valuation of the property in view of prevailing conditions.

We are of the opinion that the evidence was competent and there was no error in the giving of the instruction.

Affirmed.

CITY OF CLARKSDALE v. FITZHUGH.

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