1. Prosecutor was convicted of violation of the municipality's ordinance regulating traffic, and expressly prohibiting the parking of any vehicle on any street for the purpose and during the process of selling and delivering therefrom, to a consumer, goods, etc.; parking being defined therein substantially as it is in the Traffic act. R.S. 39:1-1. The conceded facts were that on a particular occasion he stopped his truck on one of the streets, presumably on the signal of a customer, took out an ice cream product he was vending, and sold it to the customer. Held, that prosecutor, in so stopping for purpose of a sale, did "park" his truck for the purpose of selling and delivering therefrom, within the intendment of the Traffic act and of the ordinance, and was therefore guilty of violation of the ordinance in question.
2. Held, further, that the ordinance under review is not a special ordinance within the intendment of section 39:4-198 of the Traffic act, requiring due public notice of such special ordinance by placing signs briefing its provisions at the places where it is effective; and held, also, that it is not invalid, as being unreasonable and arbitrary.
PER CURIAM.
The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Parker in the Supreme Court.
For affirmance — THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, CASE, BODINE, DONGES, PERSKIE, PORTER, HETFIELD, DEAR, WELLS, WOLFSKEIL, HAGUE, JJ. 12.
For reversal — HEHER, RAFFERTY, JJ. 2.