Case Summary: Charles L. Cummings et al. v. Gerrish Murchison et al.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter was presented to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine by way of a real action certified on a report on an agreed statement of facts by consent of the parties.

On August 26, 1930, Charles L. Cummings conveyed certain real estate in Lincoln, Maine, to his wife, Carrie M. Cummings, by warranty deed. After describing the property, the deed contained the following provision:

"It is agreed and understood that any of the above property that may belong to said Carrie M. Cummings at the time of her death shall go to the children of the said Charles L. Cummings. This property is not to be sold by Mrs. Carrie M. Cummings."

Both the grantor (Charles L. Cummings) and the grantee (Carrie M. Cummings) are now deceased. The children of Charles L. Cummings (the demandants) assert a right to the premises under the quoted provision of their father's deed, claiming the property should pass to them upon the wife's death. The defendants are in possession of the property as tenants of the sole heir of the wife. The certified issue submitted to the court was whether the demandants have the better title to the lands in controversy upon a proper construction of the grantor's deed.

Counsel of record: Fellows Fellows, for plaintiffs; E. A. Atherton and C. J. O'Leary, for defendants.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, upon proper construction of the 1930 warranty deed from Charles L. Cummings to his wife Carrie M. Cummings, the provision that the property "shall go to the children of the said Charles L. Cummings" at the wife's death gives the children (demandants) a better title than the defendants who are in possession as tenants of the wife's heir.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Inhabitants of Canton v. Trust Company, 136 Me. 103, 3 A.2d 429	The rule that "a grantor cannot destroy his own grant," i.e., after once granting an estate, a later clause in the deed cannot nullify that granted estate.	The court cites this decision as a recent restatement of the controlling rule and applies that rule to the present deed, concluding the deed falls within that rule and that the defendants must prevail.
Shepherd Company v. Shibles, 100 Me. 314, 61 A. 700	Support for the same principle that a grantor cannot nullify an estate previously granted by a deed through a subsequent clause.	Listed by the court as supporting authority for the rule it applied to the deed at issue; used to justify the conclusion that the later provision cannot destroy the grant.
Maker v. Lazell, 83 Me. 562, 22 A. 474	Another Maine authority cited as consistent with the principle that a grantor cannot destroy his own grant by a subsequent clause in the deed.	Referenced by the court as additional supporting precedent for applying the rule to the facts of this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis is concise. It begins from the established principle (as restated in cited authorities) that a grantor may not destroy his own grant: once an estate has been granted by deed, a subsequent clause—even if contained within the same deed—cannot operate to nullify the estate already granted.

Applying that rule to the agreed facts and the 1930 warranty deed at issue, the majority concluded that the deed "falls within the rule"—meaning the provision which purported to cause the property "that may belong to said Carrie M. Cummings at the time of her death" to go to the grantor's children could not be given effect to override or defeat the estate previously granted by the deed. On that basis the Court determined that the defendants have the superior title.

The opinion does not elaborate further factual or legal distinctions, nor does it set out a multipronged analysis beyond applying the cited rule to the deed language as reflected in the agreed statement of facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The majority held that the defendants must prevail and ordered the case remanded to the Trial Court for entry of judgment for the defendants.

Implications: The direct and immediate effect of the decision is that judgment is to be entered for the defendants (i.e., the plaintiffs' demand for the premises under the deed provision is denied). The opinion applies existing Maine authorities to the facts and does not announce or discuss any broader new rule beyond the established principle that a grantor cannot destroy his own grant.

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CHARLES L. CUMMINGS ET AL. vs. GERRISH MURCHISON ET AL.

Real action certified on report on an agreed statement of facts by consent of the parties.

The case shows that on August 26, 1930, Charles L. Cummings of Lincoln, Maine, gave to his wife, Carrie M. Cummings, certain real estate in Lincoln of which he was then seized. The conveyance was made by a warranty deed in the usual form containing, after a description of the real estate, the following provision:

"It is agreed and understood that any of the above property that may belong to said Carrie M. Cummings at the time of her death shall go to the children of the said Charles L. Cummings. This property is not to be sold by Mrs. Carrie M. Cummings."

Both the grantor and grantee in this deed are now dead. The children of Charles L. Cummings demand the premises conveyed by their father to his wife under the provision of his deed that on her death the property should go to them. The defendants are in possession of the property as tenants of the sole heir of the wife. The issue is whether the demandants have the better title to the lands in controversy upon a proper construction of the grantor's deed.

The majority of the Court are of the opinion that the defendants must prevail. The deed before the Court falls within the rule that a grantor cannot destroy his own grant, and having once granted an estate in his deed, no subsequent clause, even in the deed itself, can operate to nullify it. This rule has been recently restated in Inhabitants of Canton v. Trust Company, 136 Me. 103, 106, 3 A.2d 429; See Shepherd Company v. Shibles, 100 Me. 314, 61 A. 700; Maker v. Lazell, 83 Me. 562, 22 A. 474.

The case must be remanded to the Trial Court in which the report originated for entry of judgment for the defendants. So ordered. Fellows Fellows, for plaintiffs. E. A. Atherton, C. J. O'Leary, for defendants.

CUMMINGS ET AL. v. MURCHISON ET AL