GREENLEE v. STATE

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Docket Number

No. 34017.

Attorney(S)

John Horan, of Water Valley, for appellant. The circuit judge could not postpone the July Term of the Circuit Court of Grenada County and hold the term on the third Monday of September, at a time fixed by law for holding the Circuit Court in Attala County in the same circuit district held by the same judge; and all judgments and orders entered thereat are void. Arbour v. Y. M.V.R.R. Co., 98 Miss. 714, 54 So. 158; Williams v. State, 156 Miss. 346, 126 So. 40; 15 C.J., page 881, sec. 230, and page 891, sec. 245; Walton v. State, 147 Miss. 851, 112 So. 790; Stevenson v. McLeod Lbr. Co., 120 Miss. 65, 81 So. 788. The corpus delicti must be proved by evidence aliunde confession of the accused. And the corroborate evidence must relate to some fact or circumstance which is material to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused; or, as it has otherwise been expressed, the corroboration must be proof of substantial facts tending to incriminate the accused. The corpus delicti consists of two substantial fundamental facts: (1) The fact of the act or deed, that is, the result; (2) the fact of the existence of criminal agency as the cause of the death, or burning, or other deed. The first of these constituents is always required to be proved, either by direct testimony or by presumptive evidence of the strongest kind. And the second of these constituents becomes a proper subject of presumptive reasoning upon all the facts and circumstances of the case. As a matter of law confessions are entitled to very little weight. Anderson v. State, 184 Miss. 892, 186 So. 836; Richardson v. State, 80 Miss. 115, 31 So. 544; Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 So. 166; Bolden v. State, 98 Miss. 727, 54 So. 241; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; Raybourn v. State, 115 Miss. 730, 76 So. 639; Butler v. State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3; Williams v. State, 129 Miss. 469, 92 So. 584; Miller v. State, 129 Miss. 774, 93 So. 2; Floyd v. State, 138 Miss. 697, 103 So. 368; Keither v. State, 18 Miss. 192; 16 C.J. 704, sec. 1437. W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for appellee. As to the right of the circuit judge to pretermit a regular term of court, we think that that matter has already been settled by the court in Ivey v. State (Miss.), 119 So. 507, wherein the court held that there was no authority to pretermit court terms. In the light of this decision, we may concede that the regular term was improperly pretermitted. However, Section 731 of the Code of 1930 specifically provides for special terms of circuit court to be held whenever the business of such court requires it and provides that an order calling such special term shall be entered on the minutes of the special term. It is provided that the term shall not be held in a shorter time than twenty days from the date of the order, and the clerk of the court is directed to give such notice; but the statute then provides that a failure or irregularity in giving such notice shall not affect the validity of any judgment or proceeding given or had at such special term. The order of the circuit judge which was entered on the minutes of the court appears to comply with the requirements of this statute, even though the judge, in his order, referred to it as "a special adjourned term". This order was made more than twenty days, required by law, preceding the first day of this special term of court. Whether the clerk actually gave the notice required by law or not appears to be immaterial in the light of the statute above referred to. The court is thoroughly committed to the proposition that where a confession is relied on, it is only necessary to show that an offense has probably been committed and that when this proof, coupled with the confession, establishes the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, such showing is sufficient. The corpus delicti in such case need only be shown to the extent that the mind is satisfied that a real rather than an imaginary crime has been committed. Nichols v. State, 165 Miss. 114, 145 So. 903; Walker v. State, 127 Miss. 246, 89 So. 921; Patterson v. State, 127 Miss. 256, 90 So. 2; Garner v. State, 132 Miss. 815, 96 So. 743; Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545. In the case at bar, we think that the proof was sufficient in the light of the rule above referred to and that there is nothing on this score of which appellant can complain.

Judges

Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

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GREENLEE v. STATE.

1. COURTS.

Where special term of court was regularly called in manner provided by statute, fact that provision was made therefor in prior order made in vacation pretermitting the July term was immaterial (Code 1930, sec. 731).

2. COURTS.

The validity of special terms of court called under section of the Code depends only on whether such section is complied with by the judge in making the call therefor, and whether the holding of a special term interfered with other duties of the judge would not be inquired into (Code 1930, sec. 731).

3. CRIMINAL LAW.

Proof that several pocketknives disappeared from a mercantile establishment under circumstances indicating that they might have been stolen, that a window of the building had been broken and the glass removed therefrom sufficiently to permit a person to enter the building through it, and that defendant after confessing showed the sheriff how he entered the building, sufficiently proved the "corpus delicti" aliunde defendant's confession.

4. CRIMINAL LAW.

Where there has been a confession by the accused, much slighter proof is required to establish the corpus delicti than would be necessary in absence of confession, and any corroborative proof in such a case will be sufficient which satisfies the mind that it is a real and not an imaginary crime which the accused has confessed.

Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant was convicted of burglary at a special term of the court below called by the judge thereof under Section 731, Code of 1930. The July, 1939, Term of Court was pretermitted by an order of the judge in vacation, reciting that the term "be and the same is hereby postponed to be held beginning the third Monday and 18th day of September, 1939, for the reasons stated above. It is further ordered that in due time the Court will issue an order providing for said term of Court to be held at said time, and that all parties at interest and witnesses take due notice hereof and be governed accordingly".

On August 24th thereafter, in vacation, the judge of the Court made an order convening a special term thereof to begin on the third Monday, the 18th day of September, 1939. Appellant says that this special term of Court was illegal for two reasons: (1) The judge was without the power to postpone the July term of court by an order therefor in vacation to a day beyond the time provided therefor by law; and (2) Monday, the 18th day of September, was the beginning of the third week provided by the statute for the holdings of the circuit judge of Attala county. The validity of this special term of court in nowise depends on the provision therefor in the order of the circuit judge pretermitting the July Term for it was thereafter regularly called in the manner provided by Section 731, Code of 1930. Insofar as this record discloses, the September term of the Attala County Court may have been held, and the court adjourned before the third Monday of September, but aside from that the validity of special terms of court called under Section 731 of the Code depends only on whether that Section was complied with by the judge in making the call therefor. That the holding of such a special term may interfere with other duties of the judge will not be inquired into. To permit the validity of a special term to be determined by evidence as to whether or not it interfered with other duties of the judge, or with the holding of other terms of court, would cause judgments and decrees entered at the special term to rest on an insecure foundation not contemplated by Section 731 of the Code.

Another of the appellant's complaints is that the corpus delicti of the offense with which he was charged — burglary — was not sufficiently proven aliunde a confession made by him and introduced in evidence.

The evidence discloses the disappearance of several pocketknives from a mercantile establishment under circumstances indicating that they might have been stolen, and, in addition, that a window of the building had been broken and the glass therein removed sufficiently to permit a person to enter the building through it. The appellant was suspected of having stolen the knives, was arrested, and thereafter confessed that he entered the building and stole the knives. He also showed the sheriff how he entered the building. "Where there has been a confession by the accused, much slighter proof is required to establish the corpus delicti than would be necessary where the State must make out the entire case, unaided by a confession. Any corroborative proof in such a case will be held sufficient which satisfies the mind that it is a real and not an imaginary crime which the accused has confessed, and the fact that he was the guilty party may be found by the jury, on proof much slighter than that ordinarily essential." Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545. This holding has been several times approved by this Court, the latest of its cases applying it, though not citing the Heard case, being Nichols v. State, 165 Miss. 114, 145 So. 903. The evidence here is well within this rule.

Affirmed.

GREENLEE v. STATE.

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