Morris v. Grant, Supreme Court of Georgia (Oct. 8, 1943)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a habeas-corpus contest, heard in the Savannah city court on June 17, 1943, between a parent (Morris, the plaintiff) and third parties (Grant et al., the respondents) over custody of minor children following the death of the children's mother. The record shows that the children's aunt, Anna Ruth Grant, with the plaintiff's consent, took the children to Savannah and they lived with Horton Grant. After the grandmother's death, Anna Ruth returned to Greenville, South Carolina, and testified that she and the plaintiff agreed she would keep the children unless the father later could provide a better home. The father disputed this account. The trial judge awarded custody to the respondents; the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the parent (the father) had lost or relinquished parental control under the statutory provisions (Code, §§ 74-108 et seq., § 74-109, § 74-110) so that custody could be awarded to third parties.
Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding custody to the respondents when there was an issue of fact about relinquishment of parental control.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Bond v. Norwood, 195 Ga. 383 (24 S.E.2d 289)	Supports the proposition that the court's discretion under Code § 50-121 applies only when parental control has been lost under statutory grounds.	Used to state the limitation on judicial discretion: custody awarded to a nonparent only if parental control has been parted with under statutory provisions.
Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479 (2 Am. St. R. 48)	Authority concerning parental custody principles (cited with other cases to define limits on awarding custody to third parties).	Relied on as part of the body of authority establishing that a parent's custody remains unless lost under statutory grounds.
Carter v. Brett, 116 Ga. 114 (42 S.E. 348)	Authority concerning parental custody principles (cited among cases delineating when parental control is lost).	Applied as part of the supporting authority for the court's legal standard on parental control and custody.
Sloan v. Jones, 130 Ga. 836 (62 S.E. 21)	Authority concerning parental custody principles and, in a later citation (130 Ga. 836, 849), the requirement for clarity in contracts depriving a father of control.	Used both to support the statutory-limits principle and, with a pinpoint cite, to show the rule that agreements to deprive a father of control must be clear and unambiguous; the court nonetheless upheld the judge's factual finding of relinquishment.
Harwell v. Gay, 186 Ga. 80 (196 S.E. 758)	Authority concerning parental custody principles (cited among cases defining circumstances where parental control may be lost).	Included in the line of precedents supporting the court's statement of legal standards on parental control.
Butler v. Ross, 188 Ga. 329 (4 S.E.2d 21)	Authority concerning parental custody principles (cited among cases defining circumstances where parental control may be lost).	Included in the group of cases that the court cited to delineate when custody may be awarded to nonparents.
Looney v. Martin, 123 Ga. 209, 51 S.E. 304	Rule that terms of a contract to deprive a father of his control must be clear, definite, and unambiguous.	Cited to state the legal standard for agreements affecting parental control; the court nonetheless found the judge did not err in concluding relinquishment on the evidence presented.
Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 75 S.E. 477, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1013	Rule that agreements depriving a father of control must be clear and unambiguous.	Cited for that requirement; despite this standard, the court upheld the judge's factual conclusion of relinquishment.
Richards v. McHan, 129 Ga. 275, 58 S.E. 839	Rule that agreements affecting a father's custody must be clear, definite, and unambiguous.	Cited to describe the legal requirement for contracts affecting parental control; the court nevertheless affirmed the factual finding of relinquishment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the threshold legal question: whether the parent had lost parental control. It stated that parental control may be alienated only by the grounds enumerated in Code § 74-108, by cruel treatment under § 74-109, or for children under twelve who are destitute or reared under immoral influences under § 74-110. The court explained that, absent loss of parental control under those provisions, custody should be awarded to the parent; Code § 50-121's grant of discretion to the court applies only where parental control has been lost.

Turning to the facts, the court noted evidence that Anna Ruth Grant, with the plaintiff's consent, took the children to Savannah; that after the grandmother's death Anna Ruth and the plaintiff discussed custody in Greenville, and Anna Ruth testified to an agreement to keep the children unless the father later could provide a better home. A sister corroborated the substance of that conversation. The father denied the agreement, creating an issue of fact for the trial judge. The court acknowledged precedents requiring clear, definite, and unambiguous terms for any contract depriving a father of control, but held that, upon hearing the testimony about the conduct of the father since the mother's death and the Greenville conversation/agreement, the trial judge did not err in finding that the father had relinquished parental control.

Accordingly, the court concluded the trial judge was authorized by the evidence to award custody to the respondents.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed; custody awarded to the respondents (Grant et al.).

Implications: The direct effect is that custody of the children remains with the respondents until the father is able to furnish a better home than that provided by the respondents. The opinion applies existing statutory and case-law standards on loss of parental control and does not announce a new legal rule beyond their application to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

MORRIS v. GRANT et al.

In a habeas-corpus contest between a parent and a third party over the custody and control of a minor child, the first question to be determined is whether or not the parent, under the rules of law as provided in the Code, §§ 74-108 et seq., has lost parental control; and if he has not done so, the judge has no alternative except to award the child to the parent. There being an issue of fact as to whether the father released parental control, the judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding custody of the children to the respondents.

No. 14651. OCTOBER 8, 1943.

ATKINSON, Justice.

Where there is a contest between a parent and a third party over the custody of a minor child, the first question to be determined is whether or not parental control has been lost by the parent. This control may be alienated by any of the six grounds provided under the Code, § 74-108. It may be lost if the parent be guilty of cruel treatment of the child, under the proceedings provided in § 74-109. It may be lost as to a child under twelve years of age, if the child become destitute or is being reared under immoral influences, as provided in § 74-110. Unless the right of custody has been parted with under one of the foregoing provisions, then the child should be awarded to the parent. While the Code § 50-121, states that the court may exercise his discretion as to whom the custody shall be given, still this section can apply only where the parent has lost control by one of the methods stated above. Bond v. Norwood, 195 Ga. 383 ( 24 S.E.2d 289); Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479 (2 Am. St. R. 48); Carter v. Brett, 116 Ga. 114 ( 42 S.E. 348); Sloan v. Jones, 130 Ga. 836 ( 62 S.E. 21); Harwell v. Gay, 186 Ga. 80 ( 196 S.E. 758); Butler v. Ross, 188 Ga. 329 ( 4 S.E.2d 21).

There was an issue of fact as to whether the father had relinquished parental control of the children to their aunt, Anna Ruth Grant, after the death of their mother. The following appeared in evidence: Anna Ruth Grant then left Greenville, South Carolina, and with the plaintiff's consent took the children to Savannah, Georgia, where all of them made their home with the other respondent, Horton Grant. After the death of the grandmother, Anna Ruth Grant went to Greenville, South Carolina, and had a conversation with the plaintiff in reference to the children, about which she testified: "At that time he wanted the children, but I did not see fit for him to have them then. He had nothing to provide for them with. . . I told him if he ever made a home better and could give them more than I, and could support them better than I could, I would give them up, but until then I would keep the children. . . He asked if I would take care of the children if I ever decided to get married, and I said yes. . . I made that agreement because I did not think he could provide for them a home like I am doing, and I promised my mother I would take care of them. . . So we reached an agreement at that time. My understanding of the agreement is that if he ever made a better home, or could support the children better than I could, I would give them up."

In reference to the foregoing conversation, Miss Jane D. Grant, sister of respondents, testified: "The main point brought out was, first, the fact that the children were at that time being properly taken care of. . . Another thing was brought up, that Ruth, my sister, was very young to be taking care of two children, . . and it was agreed upon that she had proved . . she had done a much better job than many people married and older than she was. The fact was also brought up that she might marry, . . but she stated, regardless of what she ever did, she would take care of the children. Another thing brought up was, . . what would be done, provided the father became able to take care of the children better than she could. She said that was the only time she would be willing to give up the children. Otherwise she would take care of them as before. I think those are the main things discussed. . . [Plaintiff] agreed to that." While the father denied this, it presented an issue of fact for the judge to determine. While the law provides that the terms of a contract to deprive a father of his control must be clear, definite, and unambiguous ( Looney v. Martin, 123 Ga. 209, 51 S.E. 304; Wilkinson v. Lee, 138 Ga. 360, 75 S.E. 477, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1013; Richards v. McHan, 129 Ga. 275, 58 S.E. 839; Sloan v. Jones, 130 Ga. 836, 849, 62 S.E. 21), yet we cannot say that the judge, who heard the testimony relating to the conduct of the father since the death of the mother, and who heard the evidence in reference to the conversation and voluntary agreement between the father and Anna Ruth Grant at Greenville, South Carolina, erred in holding that the father had relinquished parental control of the children.

We are not unmindful that the law seeks to work in harmony with nature, and to continue those ties which bind man to his own flesh; and in approaching a solution to this case solemn consideration to this natural law has been borne in mind. But we are bound by the rules of law; and we hold that the judge was authorized by the evidence to award the custody of the children to the respondents until the father is in a position to furnish a better home for the children than they have with the respondents.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

MORRIS v. GRANT