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  • Conner Nobles, of Jackson, for appellants. In asking this court to reverse the chancellor on his finding of fact, we are not unmindful of the fact that the court will not reverse the lower court unless it appears that the chancellor was manifestly wrong. However, we are persuaded that when the evidence offered in this case is laid alongside the yardstick prescribed for measuring the degree of proof required to show fraud, it will be found far short of meeting such requirements. The prima facie presumption is that all persons act honestly. Fraud is never presumed. He who alleges fraud must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. This is true, both in courts of law and courts of equity. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 152 Miss. 413, 118 So. 826; Parkhurst v. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134; Dunlap v. Fox (Miss.), 2 So. 169; Carter v. Eastman Gardner Co., 95 Miss. 651, 48 So. 615; Willoughby v. Pope, 101 Miss. 808, 58 So. 705; McCain et al. v. Cochran et al., 153 Miss. 237, 120 So. 823; Martin v. Gill, 182 Miss. 810, 181 So. 849; Grenada Auto Co. v. Waldrop, 188 Miss. 468, 195 So. 491. If the court should hold with the chancellor that the evidence in this record is sufficient to sustain the charge of fraud on the part of Homer P. Lee, Jr., and that the finding of the chancellor was correct as to that proposition, still this case cannot be affirmed as to the appellant, George H. Coates. No charge of fraud is made in the bill of complaint as to George H. Coates. Such a charge is not even hinted at in the bill of complaint. No allegation is made that would put him on notice or require him to inquire into or investigate the title to the land. No collusion between him and Lee is charged, but the bill only charges that Lee perpetrated the fraud and thereafter sold to Coates. There is no charge that the consideration paid by Coates was inadequate, or that Coates acted other than in good faith. Coates pleads that he is a purchaser for value without notice, paid a fair consideration and acted in good faith; that he bought on the strength of the recorded deed from Duncan to Lee. The evidence offered by the complainant does not touch on this question. No evidence was offered by the complainant remotely suggesting any fraud on Coates' part, or that he had any notice or knowledge that any had been perpetrated by Lee, or that he did not pay a fair consideration and did not buy in good faith. On the other hand, all the evidence in this record on the question of purchase for value without notice shows affirmatively and positively that Coates was such a purchaser. Hafter v. Strange, 65 Miss. 323, 3 So. 190; Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578; Atkinson v. Greaves et al., 70 Miss. 42, 11 So. 688; Hiller et al. v. Jones, 66 Miss. 636, 6 So. 465; Code of 1930, Secs. 2146, 2147; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Secs. 776, 777; Bispham's Principles of Equity, par. 259; 9 C.J. 1222, Sec. 123; 45 Am. Jur., Records and Recording Laws, Sec. 82; 27 R.C.L., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 457. Rawls Hathorn and Hall Hall, all of Columbia, for appellee. The evidence was sufficient to justify the chancellor's decree of fraud in the procurement of the mineral deed. 23 Am. Jur. 874, Sec. 96. The decree of the chancellor on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, Sec. 674. The burden was on Coates to show that he paid something of value for his conveyance from Homer P. Lee, Jr., and he failed to meet this burden. 26 R.C.L. 700, Sec. 464. There were sufficient circumstances to put Coates on notice or inquiry as to the defects in Lee's title. Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578. The appellees are not estopped, because Lee had transferred to Coates before they learned of the fraud. Because of the fraud committed in its procurement, the deed to Lee was void; it conveyed no title to Lee, and he, therefore, could not convey any title to his grantee, Coates. An alleged innocent purchaser for value does not obtain any title through a void conveyance to his grantor. 16 Am. Jur. 454, Sec. 30.
Judges
  • Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.
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  • Conner Nobles, of Jackson, for appellants. In asking this court to reverse the chancellor on his finding of fact, we are not unmindful of the fact that the court will not reverse the lower court unless it appears that the chancellor was manifestly wrong. However, we are persuaded that when the evidence offered in this case is laid alongside the yardstick prescribed for measuring the degree of proof required to show fraud, it will be found far short of meeting such requirements. The prima facie presumption is that all persons act honestly. Fraud is never presumed. He who alleges fraud must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. This is true, both in courts of law and courts of equity. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 152 Miss. 413, 118 So. 826; Parkhurst v. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134; Dunlap v. Fox (Miss.), 2 So. 169; Carter v. Eastman Gardner Co., 95 Miss. 651, 48 So. 615; Willoughby v. Pope, 101 Miss. 808, 58 So. 705; McCain et al. v. Cochran et al., 153 Miss. 237, 120 So. 823; Martin v. Gill, 182 Miss. 810, 181 So. 849; Grenada Auto Co. v. Waldrop, 188 Miss. 468, 195 So. 491. If the court should hold with the chancellor that the evidence in this record is sufficient to sustain the charge of fraud on the part of Homer P. Lee, Jr., and that the finding of the chancellor was correct as to that proposition, still this case cannot be affirmed as to the appellant, George H. Coates. No charge of fraud is made in the bill of complaint as to George H. Coates. Such a charge is not even hinted at in the bill of complaint. No allegation is made that would put him on notice or require him to inquire into or investigate the title to the land. No collusion between him and Lee is charged, but the bill only charges that Lee perpetrated the fraud and thereafter sold to Coates. There is no charge that the consideration paid by Coates was inadequate, or that Coates acted other than in good faith. Coates pleads that he is a purchaser for value without notice, paid a fair consideration and acted in good faith; that he bought on the strength of the recorded deed from Duncan to Lee. The evidence offered by the complainant does not touch on this question. No evidence was offered by the complainant remotely suggesting any fraud on Coates' part, or that he had any notice or knowledge that any had been perpetrated by Lee, or that he did not pay a fair consideration and did not buy in good faith. On the other hand, all the evidence in this record on the question of purchase for value without notice shows affirmatively and positively that Coates was such a purchaser. Hafter v. Strange, 65 Miss. 323, 3 So. 190; Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578; Atkinson v. Greaves et al., 70 Miss. 42, 11 So. 688; Hiller et al. v. Jones, 66 Miss. 636, 6 So. 465; Code of 1930, Secs. 2146, 2147; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Secs. 776, 777; Bispham's Principles of Equity, par. 259; 9 C.J. 1222, Sec. 123; 45 Am. Jur., Records and Recording Laws, Sec. 82; 27 R.C.L., Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 457. Rawls Hathorn and Hall Hall, all of Columbia, for appellee. The evidence was sufficient to justify the chancellor's decree of fraud in the procurement of the mineral deed. 23 Am. Jur. 874, Sec. 96. The decree of the chancellor on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, Sec. 674. The burden was on Coates to show that he paid something of value for his conveyance from Homer P. Lee, Jr., and he failed to meet this burden. 26 R.C.L. 700, Sec. 464. There were sufficient circumstances to put Coates on notice or inquiry as to the defects in Lee's title. Baldwin v. Anderson, 103 Miss. 462, 60 So. 578. The appellees are not estopped, because Lee had transferred to Coates before they learned of the fraud. Because of the fraud committed in its procurement, the deed to Lee was void; it conveyed no title to Lee, and he, therefore, could not convey any title to his grantee, Coates. An alleged innocent purchaser for value does not obtain any title through a void conveyance to his grantor. 16 Am. Jur. 454, Sec. 30.
Judges
  • Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.
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Smart Summary

HOMER P. LEE, JR., et al., v. R.M. DUNCAN, EXECUTOR.

Smith, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The cause is controlled by the case of Homer P. Lee, Jr., et al., v. W.T. Boyd et al., 195 Miss. 794, 16 So.2d 30, this day decided, from which it follows that the appellant, Coates, must be held to be a bona fide purchaser for value of the property here involved, without notice of any defect in the title of his grantor thereto.

Affirmed as to Lee, but reversed and bill dismissed as to Coates.

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LEE, JR., v. DUNCAN
(Dec 20, 1943)