BASSETT v. BASSETT

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 10613.

Attorney(S)

Clyde D. Souter, of Reno, Nev., for appellant. E.F. Lunsford and Platt Sinai, all of Reno, Nev., for appellee.

Judges

Albert Lee Stephens

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Margaret Helen Bassett sued William I. Bassett to recover on two New York judgments for accrued alimony totaling $4,670.65 plus interest. The parties were married and residing in New York in August 1934, when William Bassett left New York and established residence in Nevada. Margaret Bassett obtained a separate maintenance judgment in New York, which was later modified, and two judgments for unpaid support were entered in 1941.

In 1939, William Bassett obtained an absolute divorce from Margaret Bassett in Nevada. Service was effected by delivering summons and complaint to Margaret in New York, but she did not appear. The Nevada decree released William Bassett from further obligation to support Margaret and discharged him from the New York judgments for support.

Margaret brought an action in the federal district court in Nevada to recover the amounts due under the New York judgments. William Bassett pleaded the Nevada divorce decree as a defense. The district court dismissed the action, holding the Nevada decree controlling under the full faith and credit doctrine. Margaret Bassett appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Nevada divorce decree, which discharged the husband's obligation under New York judgments for alimony, is entitled to full faith and credit and thus bars enforcement of those New York judgments.
Whether the New York judgments for accrued alimony can be set aside or affected by a divorce decree issued by a court of another state.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The New York judgments for separate maintenance and accrued alimony are valid and enforceable judgments obtained by a court with jurisdiction over both parties.
The Nevada divorce decree cannot set aside or discharge valid New York judgments for support, as such judgments were entered after the New York court acquired jurisdiction and were never challenged there.
The precedent in Durlacher v. Durlacher supports the position that a judgment from one state cannot be invalidated by a decree from another state.

Appellee's Arguments

The Nevada divorce decree, entered after substituted service on the wife, released the husband from further obligation to support the wife under the New York judgments.
The district court relied on the full faith and credit clause to give controlling effect to the Nevada decree, dismissing the action to recover on the New York judgments.
Appellee's counsel argued that the Durlacher precedent was undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. North Carolina, which purportedly overruled the legal theory in Haddock v. Haddock underlying Durlacher.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Durlacher v. Durlacher, 123 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.)	Validity and finality of New York separate maintenance judgments; a judgment from one state cannot be set aside by a decree from another state.	Used as controlling precedent to affirm the validity of the New York judgments and reject the Nevada decree's attempt to discharge them.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906)	Legal theory supporting the finality of judgments in divorce and maintenance cases.	Referenced as the basis for the Durlacher decision; the court noted it was not overruled in a way that affects Durlacher's applicability.
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942)	Addressed jurisdictional issues in divorce decrees and residency requirements.	The court held that Williams did not affect the result in Durlacher and was not relevant to the issue of whether a Nevada decree could discharge New York judgments for support.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court emphasized that the New York Supreme Court had proper jurisdiction over both parties in the original separate maintenance action and retained jurisdiction through the proceedings that led to the two judgments for unpaid support. William Bassett had the opportunity to appear and defend himself in those proceedings but did not do so. The court reasoned that once a valid judgment for support is entered by a state court with jurisdiction, it cannot be nullified or set aside by a decree of another state. The Nevada divorce decree, which purported to release Bassett from obligations under the New York judgments, effectively attempted to set aside those judgments. The court found this to be impermissible under the full faith and credit doctrine. The court also rejected appellee's argument that the precedent in Durlacher was undermined by Williams v. North Carolina, explaining that Williams dealt with different issues and did not affect the validity or enforceability of the New York judgments. Consequently, the dismissal of the action by the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the recognition of the New York judgments.

Holding and Implications

Reversed and remanded.

The court held that the Nevada divorce decree could not discharge the husband's obligation under valid New York judgments for accrued alimony. The New York judgments remained enforceable, and the district court erred in dismissing the action based on the Nevada decree. The decision directly affects the parties by allowing the plaintiff to proceed to recover on the New York judgments. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming the principle that a valid judgment from one state cannot be set aside by a decree from another state.

Show full summary ...

BASSETT v. BASSETT.

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff brought an action to recover on two judgments. The district court ordered that the action be dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.

During the month of August, 1934, defendant William Bassett and plaintiff Margaret Bassett were husband and wife residing in the State of New York. It appears that the husband left that state during August, 1934, and established his residence in the State of Nevada. Thereafter, on August 30, 1934, the wife sued the husband in the New York Supreme Court (trial court) for separate maintenance and subsequently obtained a judgment which provided for a monthly payment to her for her support and maintenance. The judgment was subsequently modified by reducing the amount of the monthly payment. On April 5, 1941, a judgment was entered in the New York court for unpaid support or alimony in the sum of $3,900.00, and, on August 1, 1941, a similar judgment was entered in the sum of $760.65 and $10.00 costs.

An absolute divorce from Margaret Bassett was granted to William Bassett by a competent court of the State of Nevada on June 5, 1939. Substituted service on Margaret Bassett according to the Nevada law was accomplished by delivering a summons and certified copy of the complaint to her in New York and she made no appearance. The Nevada decree provided: "(3) That the plaintiff be, and he is hereby, released from any further obligation to support and maintain the defendant, and he is discharged and released from the duties and obligations to support the said defendant under that certain judgment entered against him by the Supreme Court of Nassau County, State of New York, entered on or about the 26th day of April, 1935, and thereafter modified on or about the 16th day of April, 1937, or otherwise."

Margaret Bassett brought the instant action in the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada for the recovery of the sum of the two New York judgments, or $4,670.65, with interest at six per cent per annum since the dates of the respective judgments. William Bassett pleads the Nevada divorce decree as a defense. The district court determined that the said decree was controlling under the full faith and credit doctrine and dismissed the action.

In the case of Durlacher v. Durlacher, 9 Cir., 123 F.2d 70, we reviewed the procedure of the New York court in circumstances substantially identical to those herein and held that since the judgment entered in the New York court was in all respects a valid judgment, it could not be set aside or affected by a judgment of a court of another state. Counsel argue that the Durlacher case was decided upon the theory of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1, that the Haddock case was reversed by Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273, and therefore that the Durlacher case is not a precedent upon which a decision in the instant case can be rested.

We believe that the Williams case does not affect the result reached in the Durlacher case. The State of New York had acquired jurisdiction over both parties to this appeal in the original separate maintenance action and, according to its law, retained jurisdiction throughout the proceedings leading to the two judgments questioned herein. In those proceedings William Bassett could have appeared and pleaded any defense that he may have had, but this he failed to do. Had he appeared in the New York proceedings subsequent to the granting of the original decree and been unsuccessful, his recourse would have been in the appellate courts of New York and in the Supreme Court of the United States.

The New York law was briefly outlined in the Durlacher opinion.

As here presented we are asked to accept the decree of a Nevada State Court which, in effect, attempts to set aside decrees or judgments of a court of New York. This is the point in this appeal, and Williams v. North Carolina, supra, has absolutely nothing to do with it.

Reversed and remanded.