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Attorney(S)

DeLancey S. Pelgrift, for the appellant (defendant Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc.). Frank Covello, for the appellant (defendant Weir). Jacob Schwolsky, with whom was Henry C. Stone, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Judges

JENNINGS, J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Arthur L. Griswold v. The Connecticut Company et al.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a passenger who boarded a Connecticut Company bus at the Hartford Railroad Station, was injured when the bus made a sudden stop shortly after leaving the station to avoid a collision with a car owned by Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and driven by Harold A. Weir, which made a right turn into Spruce Street in front of the bus. The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries in the Superior Court in Hartford County. The case was tried to a jury before Quinlan, J. The jury returned a verdict and judgment against Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Weir and in favor of the Connecticut Company. The defendants Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Weir appealed. Answers to interrogatories indicated that the jury found the injuries were due solely to the negligence of Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Weir.

Claims of proof and positions at trial included:

The plaintiff's claims: Weir was to the rear of the bus when it started, knew the bus route, gave no signal to turn, and the bus driver did not see Weir's car until it was a foot or two in front of him when a traffic officer shouted to stop.
The Connecticut Company's claim: its driver signalled his intention to turn out from the curb and first saw Weir's car cutting into his path a foot or two from his left front corner post.
Weir's claim: the bus driver gave no signal; he assumed the bus would fall in behind him; the bus was stationary at the curb when he passed it and then proceeded on his right without his knowledge; and he neither intended to nor did impede or obstruct traffic.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court's charge on the effect of an emergency was insufficient or erroneous, and whether any such error was prejudicial to the appealing defendants.
Whether the trial court's charge that a car passing a parked car must clear the rear of the parked car by twenty feet before returning to the right of the road was harmful error under the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Claims

Weir was behind the bus when it started and turned without signalling.
The bus driver did not see Weir's car until it was a foot or two in front of the bus, whereupon a traffic officer shouted to the driver to stop.

Connecticut Company's Position

The bus driver signalled his intention to turn out from the curb.
The driver first saw Weir's car cutting into the bus's path a foot or two from the left front corner post.

Weir's Position

The bus driver gave no signal; Weir assumed the bus would fall in behind him.
Weir passed the bus when it was stationary at the curb; the bus then proceeded on his right without his knowledge.
Weir asserted he did not intend to impede or obstruct traffic and did not do so.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Rose v. Heisler, 118 Conn. 632, 174 A. 66	The rule that where a plaintiff claims that the negligence of two or more defendants is the proximate cause of the injuries, one defendant cannot complain because the charge is too favorable to another defendant; if both are liable they are liable jointly and severally.	The court relied on this rule to hold that even if the trial court's charge on the effect of an emergency applied only to the conduct of the Connecticut Company (and was thus arguably erroneous), the appealing defendants (Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Weir) could not complain because both defendants could be jointly and severally liable.
Foote v. Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 70 A. 699	A principle urging appellate restraint: appellate courts should not seek errors by "microscopic processes" and should allow the jury system to operate within human limitations; avoid creating substance out of shadows.	The court quoted this case to support reading the charge as a whole, to decline to find reversible error in minor imperfections, and to uphold the jury's verdict where the charge and interrogatories, taken together, showed comprehension of the issues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by noting that there was no dispute as to the general situation and summarized the competing factual claims. It addressed the first assignment of error concerning the trial court's instruction on the effect of an emergency. The trial court's statement of that rule applied only to the conduct of the Connecticut Company (the bus owner). The appellate court observed that when a plaintiff alleges negligence by two or more defendants as proximate causes, one defendant cannot complain that the charge favored another because both may be jointly and severally liable. Citing Rose v. Heisler, the court concluded that even if the emergency instruction was erroneous in limiting its application to the Connecticut Company, the appealing defendants were not entitled to relief; moreover, the court noted that the rule had been applied earlier in the charge.

On the second assignment of error regarding the statute about passing a parked car (requiring clearing the rear by twenty feet before returning to the right), the court found no harmful error. It explained that the trial judge had immediately qualified the statutory instruction by telling the jury that the statute would not be applicable if the bus was stopped when Weir passed and there was no indication it was about to start. That qualification, and its later application to the facts elsewhere in the charge, meant the subsequent, more indefinite statement could not have harmed the appealing defendants.

The court disposed of the remaining assignments summarily as without merit. It emphasized the unusual traffic situation, that excessive speed was not alleged, and that, read as a whole, the charge adequately described the general situation. The consistent answers to five interrogatories indicated the jury understood the intricate issues. The court invoked Foote v. Brown to justify appellate restraint and to refuse to find reversible error based on minor imperfections in the charge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court found no error in the trial court's charge as a basis for reversal. The verdict and judgment against Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Harold A. Weir were upheld.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendants' appeal was denied and the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against Diamond Ginger Ale, Inc. and Weir stands. The opinion applied existing precedent (Rose v. Heisler) and emphasized appellate restraint (Foote v. Brown); it did not announce a new legal rule or broader doctrinal change beyond the application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

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ARTHUR L. GRISWOLD v. THE CONNECTICUT COMPANY ET AL.

Where a plaintiff claims that the negligence of two or more defendants is the proximate cause of the injuries suffered, one defendant cannot complain because the charge is too favorable to another defendant, since, if both are liable, they are liable jointly and severally. Where the plaintiff, a passenger on a bus, was injured because of the sudden stopping of the bus to avoid a collision with a car, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the bus owner and against the car owner and driver, even if the charge was erroneous in failing to apply the rule as to the effect of an emergency on the conduct of the bus driver, the appealing defendants could not complain. Reading the charge as a whole, it described the general situation to the jury and their answers to the interrogatories showed good comprehension of the somewhat intricate issues.

JENNINGS, J.

The plaintiff was injured because of the sudden stopping of a Connecticut Company bus which he had boarded at the Hartford Railroad Station. The bus was stopped by its operator shortly after leaving the station to avoid a collision with a car belonging to the defendant Diamond Ginger Ale Company and driven by the defendant Weir when it made a right turn into Spruce Street in front of the bus. The jury found in favor of the Connecticut Company and against the other defendants. Answers to interrogatories showed that the injuries were found to be due solely to the negligence of the latter. The only errors assigned are directed to the charge as delivered.

There was no dispute about the general situation as outlined above. Additional claims of proof of the plaintiff were that Weir was to the rear of the bus when it started, that he knew that the bus route was west on Asylum Street, that he gave no signal of his intention to turn and that the bus driver did not see Weir's car until it was a foot or two in front of him, when a traffic officer shouted to him to stop. The Connecticut Company claimed that its driver signalled his intention to turn out from the curb and then for the first time saw the Weir car cutting into his path a foot or two from his left front corner post. Weir claimed that the bus driver gave no signal and he assumed that the bus would fall in behind him; that the bus was stationary at the curb when he passed it; and that, unknown to him, it proceeded on his right. He also claimed that he neither intended to nor did impede or obstruct traffic.

The appealing defendants complain that the charge on the effect of an emergency was not sufficiently explicit. This stated the rule applicable only to the conduct of the Connecticut Company. Where a plaintiff claims that the negligence of two or more defendants is the proximate cause of the injuries suffered, one defendant cannot complain because the charge was too favorable to another defendant, since, if both are liable, they are liable jointly and severally. Rose v. Heisler, 118 Conn. 632, 174 A. 66. It follows that, even if the charge was erroneous in this respect, the appealing defendants cannot complain. The rule was applied to the facts in an earlier portion of the charge.

The second assignment of error is directed to a charge that a car passing a parked car must, under the statute, clear the rear of the parked car by twenty feet before returning again to the right of the road. This cannot be held harmful error. The Connecticut Company claimed Weir passed the bus when it was moving; Weir claimed that the bus was parked. In the preceding sentence, the court said: "I would say to you that if the bus was stopped as Weir came abreast of it, and there was no indication that it was about to start out from the curb, then the statute would not be applicable." In view of this clear statement, amplified and applied to the facts in another part of the charge, the appealing defendants cannot have been harmed by the somewhat indefinite charge which followed.

The other assignments are without merit. The traffic situation was rather unusual. No question of excessive speed was involved. Reading the charge as a whole, it described the general situation to the jury and their answers to the five interrogatories were consistent and showed good comprehension of the somewhat intricate issues. "If our jury system is to continue to be a practical, working one, and productive of reasonably satisfactory results, it must be given a chance to operate within human limitations as respects both judge and jury, and have reasonable presumptions applied to its operation. Substantial errors will be committed for which a remedy must be given, but an appellate court ought not to be expected to create substance out of shadows, to conjure up errors out of trifles, or to seek for judicial irregularity by microscopic processes, speculative imaginings, or refined reasoning." Foote v. Brown, 81 Conn. 218, 227, 70 A. 699.

GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT CO