WILLIAMS v. STERN ET AL, Pa. Super. Ct., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Paul H. Ferguson, with him G. Mason Owlett, for appellants. John Francis Williams, for appellee.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, John H. Williams, filed a trespass suit seeking recovery for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a collision between his automobile and the defendants' truck at the intersection of Berks and 16th Streets in Philadelphia. The incident occurred around 3 a.m. on April 5, 1943. Williams was driving east on Berks Street, stopped at a stop sign on the west side of 16th Street, and then proceeded slowly across the intersection. Before reaching the middle of the street, he observed the defendants' truck approaching without lights and attempted to avoid a collision by turning northward, but was struck on the right side. The trial court awarded a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $850. The defendants appealed from this judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court should have held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

The plaintiff's testimony demonstrates contributory negligence because he allegedly failed to discharge his full duty by taking only one look before crossing the intersection.
Relying on the rule restated in Mellott v. Tuckey, the plaintiff was required to continue looking as he advanced across the intersection but did not do so.

Appellee's Arguments

The plaintiff testified that he looked both before and after starting to cross, though his statements were not perfectly clear or consistent.
It was the jury's responsibility, not the trial judge's, to reconcile any contradictory or inconsistent statements made by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff proceeded only a short distance before seeing the defendants' truck and took evasive action, indicating he did not act heedlessly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mellott v. Tuckey, 350 Pa. 74, 38 A.2d 40	Requirement that a driver must continue looking while advancing across an intersection.	The court distinguished this case from the present facts, noting that Mellott involved a plaintiff who failed to look again after an initial observation, unlike here.
Korenkiewicz v. York Motor Express Company, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 210, 10 A.2d 864	Jury's duty to reconcile contradictory or inconsistent statements by a plaintiff.	Supported the principle that the trial judge should not declare contributory negligence as a matter of law when statements conflict.
Ingram v. Pittsburgh, 350 Pa. 344, 39 A.2d 49	Same as above regarding jury's role in resolving conflicting evidence.	Reinforced the court's conclusion that contributory negligence was a question for the jury.
Lewis v. Hermann, 112 Pa. Super. 338, 171 A. 109	A driver at intersections must be alert to vehicles in his path and to his left and right.	Established the duty of care required at intersections, which the court applied to assess plaintiff's conduct.
Lochhead v. Nierenberg, 143 Pa. Super. 507, 18 A.2d 472	Same as above regarding a driver's duty to be alert at intersections.	Supported the court's articulation of the standard of care at intersections.
Barton v. Franklin, 309 Pa. 243, 163 A. 521	Same duty of vigilance at intersections.	Reinforced the principle that failure to be alert constitutes negligence.
Pessolano et ux. v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 349 Pa. 73, 36 A.2d 497	Contributory negligence may only be declared by the trial judge where it is so clear that reasonable persons cannot differ.	Supported the court's refusal to declare contributory negligence as a matter of law in this case.
Naugle v. Reading Company, 145 Pa. Super. 341, 21 A.2d 109	Same as above regarding the threshold for declaring contributory negligence as a matter of law.	Confirmed the court's standard for when contributory negligence may be decided by the judge.
Shapiro et ux. v. Grabosky, 320 Pa. 556, 184 A. 83	Failure to look again after an initial observation may constitute contributory negligence.	Distinguished from the present case because the plaintiff here did look again after starting to cross.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. It acknowledged the plaintiff's duty to remain alert at intersections, including looking to the left and right. The plaintiff testified that he looked before and after starting to cross, though his testimony was somewhat inconsistent. The court emphasized that resolving such inconsistencies is the jury's function, not the trial judge's. The evidence showed that the plaintiff had not proceeded far into the intersection before seeing the defendants' truck and attempting to turn to avoid collision, indicating he was not acting heedlessly. The court distinguished this case from precedents where plaintiffs failed to look again after an initial observation. Given the jury found in favor of the plaintiff after proper instructions, and no objections were raised, the court declined to overturn the verdict.

Holding and Implications

Judgment Affirmed.

The court held that the trial court correctly refused to declare the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The verdict for the plaintiff stands, and the defendants' appeal is denied. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the plaintiff's recovery but does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles regarding contributory negligence and the jury's role in resolving factual inconsistencies.

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Williams v. Stern et al., Appellants.

Negligence — Automobiles — Intersection — Duty to look — Contributory negligence — Evidence — Declaration as a matter of law — Conflicting statements.

1. An automobile driver at intersections must be alert to vehicles in the path he is pursuing, as well as to his left and right.

2. It is only in those cases where contributory negligence is so clearly shown that fair and reasonable individuals cannot disagree as to its existence that it may be declared by the trial judge.

3. In determining whether or not a plaintiff was contributorily negligent, it is the duty of the jury, not the trial judge, to reconcile any contradictory or inconsistent statements made by the plaintiff.

Argued October 25, 1944.

OPINION BY BALDRIGE, J., December 13, 1944:

The plaintiff brought this suit to recover for personal injuries and property damage resulting from a collision of his automobile and defendants' truck at the intersection of Berks and 16th Streets, Philadelphia. He recovered a verdict, hence this appeal.

The only question before us is: Should the court below have held as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence? Our answer is in the negative.

Plaintiff was driving east on Berks Street about 3 o'clock on the morning of April 5, 1943. When he reached the west side of 16th Street he stopped in obedience to a stop sign. As he saw no vehicles approaching he started slowly across the intersection. He had not reached the middle of 16th Street, which he fixed at about 30 feet wide, (at the argument it was stated to be 26 feet) when he saw defendants' truck, without lights, approaching to his right on 16th Street. He quickly turned toward the north, the direction the truck was going, in an unsuccessful endeavor to avoid a collision. His car was hit on the right side with such force that it turned around, ran across the pavement at the northwest corner of the intersection and went through a "steel rod" fence. The plaintiff testified as follows: "Q. And you made your next observation when the truck was right on you. Is that right? A. After looking — before starting, I looked and I also looked after starting. Q. And at that time the truck was on top of you. Is that correct. A. When I saw the truck it was right upon me. By the Court. Q. That is not the question. (The stenographer read the pending question.) A. That is right. At the time that I got middle way of the street."

The appellants contend that the appellee's testimony convicts him of being guilty of contributory negligence in that it shows that he did not discharge his full duty in taking but one look; that in accordance with the well recognized rule recently restated in Mellott v. Tuckey, 350 Pa. 74, 77, 38 A.2d 40, he was required to continue looking as he advanced across the intersection. While the plaintiff's testimony is not as clear and consistent as desirable, he did say that he looked before, and after, starting to cross. It was the duty of the jury, not the trial judge, to reconcile any contradictory or inconsistent statements made by the plaintiff: Korenkiewicz v. York Motor Express Company, Inc., 138 Pa. Super. 210, 10 A.2d 864; Ingram v. Pittsburgh, 350 Pa. 344, 39 A.2d 49. It is apparent that the plaintiff proceeded but a short distance after entering the intersection when he saw the defendants' truck and attempted to turn in the direction it was going, so that it can be reasonably inferred that he did not go heedlessly forward without taking precaution to look.

The truck driver, in a signed statement taken by a police officer, said that he was proceeding northward, his truck straddling the west rail of the tracks on 16th Street. The learned court below aptly said: "It is obvious that, in order to make that turn, plaintiff must have started to turn when his front wheels were less than half way out in the space between the west curb of 16th Street and the west rail of the car tracks. That would mean he started to turn when only a few feet out into 16th Street and he must have looked and have seen the truck at least a fraction of a second before that in order for his mind or his reflexes to put the turning process into effect." It was the duty of the plaintiff to keep looking, but where? That depends somewhat on the circumstances. He was not necessarily required every instant to look to the right. One at intersections must be alert to vehicles in the path he is pursuing, as well as to his left and right. If he fails to do so he is negligent: Lewis v. Hermann, 112 Pa. Super. 338, 341, 171 A. 109; Lochhead v. Nierenberg, 143 Pa. Super. 507, 18 A.2d 472; Barton v. Franklin, 309 Pa. 243, 163 A. 521. It is only in those cases where contributory negligence is so clearly shown that fair and reasonable individuals cannot disagree as to its existence, that it may be declared by the trial judge: Pessolano et ux. v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 349 Pa. 73, 36, A.2d 497; Naugle v. Reading Company, 145 Pa. Super. 341, 21 A.2d 109. In the case at bar no evidence was offered of the lighting conditions at the intersection, other than the truck driver said he did not see the plaintiff's car until the collision "because it is not very well lighted there."

In Mellott v. Tuckey, supra, cited by the appellants, the plaintiff saw the defendant's motor vehicle coming at a high rate of speed 365 feet away. Notwithstanding he was put on notice of impending danger he proceeded without looking to his right again because he thought his first observation was sufficient. In Shapiro et ux. v. Grabosky, 320 Pa. 556, 184 A. 83, the plaintiff did not look after he had passed the house line. "After I looked the first time and blew my horn, I did not look again. I did not think it was necessary." Those cases and the others that were cited by the appellants are not similar in their facts and do not control this case.

The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff after receiving proper instructions from the court, to which no objections were raised in this appeal, we are not warranted in interfering with the finding.

Judgment is affirmed.

WILLIAMS v. STERN ET AL