Court Opinion Summary: City of Chelsea v. Richard T. Green Company (March 29, 1945)

Factual and Procedural Background

The City of Chelsea, as holder of tax titles, filed petitions in the Land Court under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 65 (as amended) to foreclose all rights of redemption in two parcels of registered land. Both parcels were taken on October 1, 1934, for nonpayment of the 1932 taxes. Although the validity of the takings was at first contested, that validity was later conceded; the remaining dispute concerned whether payment of taxes for the years 1933 through 1940, inclusive, should be a term of redemption.

The petitioner introduced evidence that its tax collector had certified to the city treasurer the taxes for the years 1934–1939 before September 1 of the year following assessment in conformity with statutory provisions (and that the 1933 taxes were certified on October 26, 1934). The Land Court judge, however, found instead that no certifications were made until late 1940 (after the decision in Boston v. Cable) and that those certifications were dated back to appear in conformity with the Cable decision. The certification for the year 1940 was made on November 1, 1940.

The judge below ruled that the certifications for the years 1933–1939 had "no force and effect" and were a nullity, and allowed redemption by the respondent upon payment of the original sum in the tax deed plus subsequent taxes and charges for later years. The city appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a certification of taxes made under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 61, as amended, which was made later than the statutorily specified date and after the commencement of a foreclosure proceeding in the Land Court, but which was made before the hearing in that proceeding and while the landowner had not tendered redemption and was contesting the validity of the tax title, is effective so that payment of those certified taxes may be required as a term of redemption.
Whether a decision of this court overruling an earlier decision (specifically, Boston v. Cable being overruled by Boston v. Barry) operates to change the law prospectively, or instead merely declares what the law had been, such that certifications made in the period after Cable but before Barry can be effective under the doctrine adopted in Barry.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Boston v. De Grasse, 317 Mass. 523	Cited in connection with petitions to the Land Court under G.L. c. 60, § 65 (statutory procedure for foreclosure of redemption rights).	Used as a citation supporting the statutory and procedural context for these Land Court petitions; it is referenced but not further analyzed in the opinion.
Boston v. Cable, 306 Mass. 124	Represented the earlier doctrine that the statutory time for certification was a controlling requirement such that late certifications could be regarded as ineffective.	The judge below had treated late or backdated certifications as invalid under the Cable doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court held that certifications which were made after Cable but before Barry could nonetheless be effective under the Barry doctrine; the judge below erred in declaring those backdated certifications invalid solely because they had been dated to conform with Cable.
Boston v. Barry, 315 Mass. 572	Established that the statutory requirement of certification on or before a specified date is merely directory (i.e., not strictly jurisdictional), overruling Boston v. Cable.	The court applied the Barry doctrine to hold that certifications made after the statutorily specified date but before hearing in the foreclosure proceeding and while respondent was contesting the takings were not too late and could be required as a term of redemption.
Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29 (pp. 31–32)	Used for the principle that an overruling decision does not change the law but declares what the law had been.	Cited to support the court's statement that Barry did not change the law but merely decided what the law had been even during the period when Cable was thought to state the law.
Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (pp. 364–366)	Cited as additional authority supporting the proposition concerning the effect of overruling decisions on the law.	Listed as a supporting authority ("See also") for the proposition that the overruling decision did not change the law but declared what had been the law.
Stockholders of the Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175 (p. 182)	Cited as another supporting authority on the legal effect of an appellate court overruling a prior decision.	Used as supporting authority for the court's characterization of Barry's effect — i.e., that Barry did not change the law but declared what the law had been.
Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Brookline, 268 Mass. 32	Mentioned in the opinion but not analyzed; the specific rule from this case is not recited in the opinion.	The court stated that it "need not consider" this case in the present decision.
New England Southern Corp. v. Assessors of Lowell, 1 B.T.A. (Mass.) 542	Mentioned but not explained in the opinion; the specific principle is not set out in the text.	The court indicated it need not consider this authority in resolving the present matter.
United States v. Five Acres of Land, 51 F. Supp. 117	Mentioned but not explained in the opinion; the text does not state the precise rule being advanced by this case.	The court said it need not consider this case in reaching its decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from the procedural posture that these were petitions to the Land Court under the statutory foreclosure provisions (citing G.L. c. 60, § 65 and Boston v. De Grasse). The factual dispute narrowed to whether certifications of taxes for years subsequent to 1932 had been made in a manner that would require the landowner to pay them as a condition of redemption.

The petitioner offered evidence that certifications for 1934–1939 had been made before the statutory cutoff date (and the 1933 certification was made October 26, 1934). The Land Court judge instead found that certifications were not made until late 1940, after the decision in Boston v. Cable, and that they had been dated back to appear to comply with Cable; the 1940 certification was made November 1, 1940, a date that would have been lawful under Cable.

The Supreme Judicial Court then addressed the legal effect of the intervening decision in Boston v. Barry, decided March 1, 1944, which overruled Cable and held that the statutory time requirement for certification was directory rather than mandatory. The court emphasized that in the present cases the certifications actually occurred a few months after the petitions were filed but before the Land Court hearings; at the time the respondent had not tendered redemption and was contesting the takings and had only asked to redeem if the tax lien were upheld.

Applying the Barry doctrine, the court concluded that certifications made in the latter part of 1940 were not too late to be effective. The court also rejected the Land Court judge's conclusion that certifications which had been dated back to conform with Cable were invalid because of the motives of the public officer: the rights of the city could not be impaired by the motives of an independent public officer. The court further explained that Barry did not effect a change in the law but declared what the law had been, and cited Fleming and other authorities to support that proposition.

On that basis the Supreme Judicial Court found the Land Court in error for treating the dated-back certifications as nullities and reversed the Land Court's decisions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Land Court decisions were reversed. The court ordered that, as one of the terms of redemption, the respondent must pay all certified taxes subsequent to those of the year 1932, together with costs and interest.

Direct effect on the parties: The respondent is required, in order to redeem, to pay the certified taxes for the years after 1932 (the years in dispute), with costs and interest. The Land Court's rulings that those certifications were nullities were reversed.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes that the decision in Boston v. Barry did not "change the law" but rather declared what the law had been despite the prior understanding under Boston v. Cable. The court applied the Barry doctrine to permit certifications made after the statutory date but before hearing (and while the landowner was contesting the takings and had not tendered) to be effective. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel rule beyond that clarification and the direct application to the present cases.

So ordered.

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CITY OF CHELSEA vs. RICHARD T. GREEN COMPANY (and a companion case between the same parties).

Taxation, Real estate tax: redemption, certification. Supreme Judicial Court, Overruled decision.

Redemption by a landowner from a tax title, allowed in a proceeding in the Land Court by a city to foreclose the right of redemption, should include payment by the landowner of a tax, a certification of which under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 61, as amended by St. 1934, c. 48, although made later than September 1 of the year following the year of assessment and after the commencement of the foreclosure proceeding, was made before the hearing in such proceeding and at a time when the landowner had not made any tender in redemption and while he was contesting the validity of the tax title and was seeking to redeem only in the event that the tax title should be determined to be valid. A decision of this court overruling a previous decision does not change the law, but merely decides what has been the law notwithstanding the previous decision. A certification of a tax under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 61, as amended by St. 1934, c. 48, made after the decision in Boston v. Cable, 306 Mass. 124, and before the decision in Boston v. Barry, 315 Mass. 572, overruling the Cable case, was effectual if seasonably made according to the doctrine of the Barry case, even though made too late according to the doctrine of the Cable case.

LUMMUS, J.

These are petitions to the Land Court under G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 65, as amended by St. 1933, c. 325, § 12, and St. 1938, c. 305, by the city as holder of tax titles, for the foreclosure of all rights of redemption in two parcels of registered land. Boston v. De Grasse, 317 Mass. 523. Both parcels were taken on October 1, 1934, for the nonpayment of the taxes of 1932. The validity of the takings, though at first contested, is now conceded, and the only question relates to the payment of taxes for the years 1933 to 1940, inclusive, as one of the terms of redemption.

The petitioner introduced evidence tending to show that its tax collector, before September 1 of the year following the year of assessment, certified to himself as city treasurer the taxes for the years 1934 to 1939, inclusive, as provided in G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 61, as amended by St. 1933, c. 325, § 9, and St. 1934, c. 48, and as to the taxes for the year 1933 that such certification was duly made on October 26, 1934. The judge found, on the contrary, that no certifications had been made until the latter part of 1940, after the decision in Boston v. Cable, 306 Mass. 124, and that then they were dated back so as to make them appear in conformity with that decision. The certification of the taxes for the year 1940 was made on November 1, 1940, when it would be lawful under that decision.

On March 1, 1944, in the case of Boston v. Barry, 315 Mass. 572, this court overruled the Cable case, and held that the statutory requirement of certification on or before a specified date was merely directory. In the present cases certification actually took place a few months after the petitions were filed in the Land Court, and before they had been heard. No tender of any sum in redemption had been made, the respondent was contesting the validity of the takings, and no suggestion of redemption had been made except that in its answer the respondent declared that "if the court finds in favor of the validity of said tax lien, the said respondent asks leave to redeem said land from the said lien upon such terms as may be fixed by the court, and requests the court to determine the amount due." Evidently there was to be no redemption until by final decision the validity of the tax takings had been determined. We think that the certifications made in the latter part of 1940 were not too late under the doctrine of Boston v. Barry. Whether under other circumstances a time limit short of the final decision could be set, is not before us. We need not consider the cases of Commonwealth Investment Co. v. Brookline, 268 Mass. 32, New England Southern Corp. v. Assessors of Lowell, 1 B.T.A. (Mass.) 542, and United States v. Five Acres of Land, 51 F. Supp. 117.

The judge was in error in holding that certifications dated back for the purpose of appearing to comply with the Cable case were invalid. The rights of the city could not be impaired by the motives of an independent public officer. The Barry case did not change the law. It merely decided what had been the law all the time, even during the period when the Cable case was thought to state the law. Fleming v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29, 31, 32. See also Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil Refining Co. 287 U.S. 358, 364-366; Stockholders of the Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175, 182.

The decision of the Land Court in each case is reversed. The decree in each case is to make one of the terms of redemption the payment of all certified taxes subsequent to those of the year 1932, with costs and interest.

So ordered.

CHELSEA v. RICHARD T. GREEN CO