Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (Jan. 7, 1946)

Factual and Procedural Background

Hazel E. Briggs, a Pennsylvania resident, brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51–59) as administratrix of the goods, chattels, and credits of Ralph Briggs, her husband and a Pennsylvania resident, who was killed while employed by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The suit was brought in New York. The plaintiff originally sued without ancillary letters granted in New York; she later obtained ancillary letters based on a petition that did not allege any personal property in New York other than the present cause of action.

At trial the defendant admitted liability but contested the plaintiff's capacity to sue both as a domiciliary administratrix and as an ancillary administratrix. The defendant argued (1) that a court of another state will not recognize a domiciliary administrator who has not secured ancillary letters there, and (2) that the Surrogate of New York County who appointed the plaintiff had no jurisdiction under § 45(3) of the New York Surrogate's Act. The trial judge sustained both objections, yet a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; the judge nevertheless directed judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a domiciliary administrator may sue upon the right of action created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the court of a state other than the domicil.
Whether the capacity-to-sue question should be resolved by reference to state law decisions (as in diversity cases) or by interpretation of the federal statute creating the right.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant urged reversal based on the Court of Appeals' decision in Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355.
Implicitly, the appellant contended that the plaintiff (as domiciliary administratrix) had capacity to sue in a New York court on the FELA cause of action.

Appellee's Arguments

The appellee contended that Cooper was founded upon a mistaken interpretation of New York law and that the judgment should be affirmed.
The appellee challenged the plaintiff's capacity to sue: arguing she lacked capacity as a domiciliary administratrix because a court of another state will not recognize a domiciliary administrator who has not secured ancillary letters there; and arguing that the ancillary letters, insofar as they were relied upon, were void because the appointing Surrogate lacked jurisdiction under New York law (Surrogate's Act § 45(3)).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355	Relied on by appellant as authority for capacity to sue in another state.	The court distinguished Cooper because that case involved jurisdiction based on diversity and thus capacity to sue depended on New York law under Rule 17(b); Cooper therefore was not dispositive for a federal right created by Congress.
Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., 168 U.S. 445, 18 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed. 537	Treatment of a statutory right of action (created by state law) as devolving upon the decedent's representative like other assets.	The court noted Stewart spoke as though a right created by a state statute devolved like other assets, but distinguished Stewart because §51 of Title 45 creates a federal right that the court considered not to be so regarded.
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417	Adopted the English view of Lord Campbell's Act: that the act created a new right for the benefit of prescribed beneficiaries.	The court cited Vreeland as adopting the view that a statutory wrongful-death right is a new right for beneficiaries, supporting the proposition that §51 creates a new statutory right not to be treated as ordinary decedent property.
Anderson v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 210 F. 689	Recognition of the capacity of an ancillary administrator to sue under §51 (in that instance where domiciliary administrator had consented).	The court treated Anderson as establishing that an ancillary administrator may sue under §51 and relied on its rationale (beyond mere consent) as persuasive authority.
Southern Railway Co. v. Moore, 158 S.Car. 446, 155 S.E. 740	Support for the authority of ancillary administrators to sue under §51.	The court cited Moore as being in accord with Anderson and thus supportive of ancillary-administrator capacity under §51.
Willgues v. Pennsylvania, 318 Mo. 28, 29 S.W. 817	Permitted an ancillary administrator to sue even where the domiciliary administrator apparently had not consented.	The court cited Willgues as further support that ancillary administrators may sue under §51.
Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Jones, 215 Ky. 774, 286 S.W. 1071	Held that an ancillary administrator's prior recovery elsewhere could bar a domiciliary administrator's suit in the domicil.	The court relied on Jones as authority that ancillary actions may have preclusive effect against domiciliary suits.
Brown v. Boston Maine R. Co., 283 Mass. 192, 186 N.E. 59	Refusal by an appellate court to entertain a suit brought by a domiciliary administrator in another state.	The court cited Brown as an example of appellate authority refusing to allow a domiciliary administrator to sue in another state.
Rejsenhoff v. Colonial Navigation Co., D.C., 35 F. Supp. 577	Trial court refusal to sustain a domiciliary administrator suing in another state.	The court cited Rejsenhoff (Judge Clancy) as following Brown in refusing to entertain such a suit.
Kleckner v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C., 36 F. Supp. 600	Trial court sustaining a domiciliary administrator's suit, based on the view that the suit could have been brought in New York.	The court noted Kleckner as a decision sustaining a domiciliary administrator, but observed the decision rested on the view that a New York court would have jurisdiction.
Willis v. Pan American Refining Co., D.C., 26 F. Supp. 990	Trial court decision supporting the capacity of a domiciliary administrator to sue in another state.	The court cited Willis (Judge Chesnut) as a direct decision allowing the domiciliary administrator to sue.
Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 A. 395	State supreme court decision supporting a domiciliary administrator's capacity under a Massachusetts statute.	The court cited Ghilain as an example where a state supreme court upheld domiciliary-administrator capacity under similar statutory circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court of Appeals limited the appeal to the single question whether a domiciliary administratrix may sue upon the right created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act in the courts of a state other than the decedent's domicil. It declined to rest its decision on whether the New York ancillary letters were valid under New York law because the plaintiff did not rely on that ground on appeal.

The court analyzed the issue in light of precedent and statutory interpretation:

It distinguished cases like Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., because Cooper arose in a diversity context where the capacity to sue was governed by state law (Rule 17(b)); by contrast, the present suit is founded upon a federal statute creating the right of action, so the meaning of the federal statute, not state court decisions, controls.
It observed that Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co. treated a state-created right as devolving upon the decedent's representative like other assets, but the court considered the federal right under §51 to be different in character.
The court invoked Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland to support the proposition that wrongful-death statutes (and analogously §51) create a new right for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries rather than a mere asset of the decedent.
Recognizing an established body of authority that ancillary administrators may sue under §51, the court surveyed decisions both permitting and denying suits by domiciliary administrators in other states. It concluded the authorities were mixed on domiciliary administrators suing elsewhere.
The court found policy and practical considerations persuasive: a domiciliary administrator might be unable to secure ancillary letters in the state where jurisdiction over the defendant exists or where it is most convenient to sue; the limitation would be particularly burdensome given that the FELA had been extended to seamen and similar situations.
Conceptually, the court offered two rationales supporting the domiciliary administrator's capacity: (a) if §51 creates a new right for beneficiaries, it could be regarded as vested in the "representative" of their domicil who might sue anywhere (analogous to a trustee); (b) if the "representative" is merely a nominal plaintiff (as characterized in Stewart), there is likewise no reason to exclude the domiciliary administrator.
The court acknowledged possible conflicts when both domiciliary and ancillary administrators are appointed, but observed that such potential conflicts were not presented in this case and would be subject to ordinary resolution.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Judgment reversed; judgment to be entered for the plaintiff on the verdict.

Implications:

Direct effect: The plaintiff (Hazel E. Briggs, domiciliary administratrix) is entitled to judgment on the jury verdict notwithstanding the trial court's ruling that she lacked capacity; the Court of Appeals ordered judgment entered for the plaintiff on the verdict.
Interpretive consequence: The court recognized that, as to a right created by Congress under §51 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the domiciliary administrator's capacity to sue in another state's courts cannot be conclusively denied on the basis of the traditional rule treating decedent assets as devolving upon the representative; the opinion reasons that such federal statutory rights may be treated differently and that there is no sufficient reason to reject the domiciliary administrator.
Limitations and unresolved issues: The court expressly did not decide the validity of the New York ancillary letters under New York law, and it did not resolve potential conflicts that might arise when both domiciliary and ancillary administrators have been appointed; those matters remain open for resolution in appropriate cases.

Show full summary ...

BRIGGS v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

L. HAND, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as administratrix appointed in that state of one, Briggs, her husband, likewise a resident of Pennsylvania, who was killed while in the defendant's employ. She originally sued without ancillary letters granted in New York; but she later secured these based upon a petition which did not however allege that Briggs had had any personal property in that state other than the cause of action here in suit. At the trial the defendant admitted liability, but challenged the plaintiff's capacity to sue either as domiciliary, or as ancillary, administratrix. As to the first, it invoked the usual doctrine that the court of another state will not recognize a domiciliary administrator who has not secured ancillary letters; as to the second, it alleged that the Surrogate of New York County who had appointed the plaintiff, had had no jurisdiction. § 45(3) of the New York Surrogate's Act. The judge sustained both these objections, but took a verdict for the plaintiff, and then directed judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff does not seek to sustain her appeal upon the theory that her ancillary letters were valid under New York law, and for that reason alone we shall not consider whether it was proper to disregard those letters; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the only question debated: i.e., whether a domiciliary administrator may sue upon the right of action created by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, in the court of a state other than that of domicil.

The plaintiff asks us to reverse the judgment on the authority of our decision in Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355; the defendant asks us to affirm it because that decision was founded upon a mistaken interpretation of the law of New York. Neither position is well taken; the jurisdiction of the district court in that case was based upon diversity of citizenship, and the plaintiff's capacity to sue depended upon the law of New York. Rule 17(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Here the plaintiff sues upon a right created by an act of Congress, as to whose meaning the decisions of state courts are not authoritative, however inherently persuasive they may be. Although in Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., 168 U.S. 445, 449, 18 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed. 537, when dealing with a right of action created by a Maryland statute, the Supreme Court did speak, as though, like any other of the decedent's assets, it devolved upon his representative, the right granted by § 51 of Title 45, U.S.C.A., is not to be so regarded. In spite of the fact that § 59 speaks of "survival" the court in Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68, 70, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 176, adopted the view of the English courts as to Lord Campbell's Act: i.e., that it created a new right for the benefit of the prescribed beneficiaries. Hence, although it is undoubtedly true that by the term, "personal representative," Congress referred to one who receives authority of some sort from a state, there is no reason to think that it meant to take over the customary limitations upon the authority of an administrator or other "personal representative," when he sues upon a right of the decedent which has devolved upon him by operation of local law.

In Anderson v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 210 F. 689, the Sixth Circuit sustained the capacity to sue of an ancillary administrator of the decedent in spite of the fact that a domiciliary administrator had also been appointed. It is true that the domiciliary administrator had consented to the action — a circumstance on which the court in part relied — but the rationale went further, particularly in its reliance upon Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., supra, 168 U.S. 445, 18 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed. 537. Southern Railway Co. v. Moore, 158 S.Car. 446, 155 S.E. 740, 73 A.L.R. 582, is in accord; and in Willgues v. Pennsylvania, 318 Mo. 28, 29 S.W. 817, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed the ancillary administrator to sue when, so far as appears, the domiciliary administrator had not consented. Moreover, in Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Jones, 215 Ky. 774, 286 S.W. 1071, 53 A.L.R. 1255, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held it a good bar to a suit by the domiciliary administrator in a court of the domicil that an ancillary administrator had already recovered judgment upon the same cause of action elsewhere. We may take it therefore as established that an ancillary administrator may sue under § 51; but it must be owned that the decisions are not so clear as to a domiciliary administrator suing in another state. Indeed, the only appellate court which, so far as we have found, has passed upon such a suit, refused to entertain it. Brown v. Boston Maine R. Co., 283 Mass. 192, 186 N.E. 59. Judge Clancy did the same in Rejsenhoff v. Colonial Navigation Co., D.C., 35 F. Supp. 577; and although Judge Moscowitz sustained a domiciliary administrator in Kleckner v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., D.C., 36 F. Supp. 600, it was only because he thought that the suit would have lain in a New York court. In the only other decision directly in point which we have found — Willis v. Pan American Refining Co., D.C., 26 F. Supp. 990 — Judge Chesnut, however, held with the domiciliary administrator; and the Supreme Court of New Hampshire did the same under a Massachusetts statute. Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 A. 395, 65 A.L.R. 553.

Although the domiciliary administrator by taking out ancillary letters may sue in a court of the state which grants them, he may be unable, as in the case at bar, to secure them under the probate law of the only state where he can get jurisdiction over the defendant; or under the law of that state where he can most conveniently sue. Particularly, when we consider that the Federal Employers' Liability Act has been extended to seamen, the impediment of such a limitation upon his authority appears to be serious and unjust. Indeed, the authority of the domiciliary administrator to sue outside the domicil would seem, as a new question, to be quite as well grounded as that of an ancillary administrator to sue in his own state. If § 51 creates a new right for the benefit of those mentioned, it would seem that it might be deemed vested in the "representative" of their domicil, who might therefore sue anywhere, like a trustee. If, on the other hand, the "representative" is merely the "nominal plaintiff" as he was called in Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., supra, 168 U.S. 445, 18 S.Ct. 105, 42 L.Ed. 537 — and as was apparently the understanding of the court in Anderson v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., supra, 210 F. 689, 695 — there is certainly no reason to reject the domiciliary administrator. It is possible that, as Judge Chesnut suggested in Willis v. Pan American Refining Co., supra, 26 F. Supp. 990, conflicts may arise when both a domiciliary and an ancillary administrator have been appointed; but they will not be beyond just settlement, if they do; and whatever they may be, they are not before us in the case at bar.

Judgment reversed; judgment to be entered for the plaintiff on the verdict.

BRIGGS v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO