Anderson v. United States, No. 11092 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 1946)

Factual and Procedural Background

Maude Anderson was convicted for causing the transportation of a 17 year old girl from Seattle to Sitka, Alaska, for employment as a prostitute in a house of prostitution of which Anderson was the proprietress, in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, § 2, 18 U.S.C.A. § 398. The conviction followed testimony principally from prostitutes; the principal witness was a procuress and former half partner of appellant who testified she had been employed by appellant to procure girls in the United States to be transported to Sitka and that three girls started from Seattle, all reaching Alaska, with only the girl charged in the indictment becoming employed in appellant's house. That procuress witness had been convicted under the White Slave Traffic Act in connection with transportation of the same girl and was awaiting sentence when she testified. Anderson appealed the conviction to the Ninth Circuit. The district court judge was Geo. F. Alexander. The judgment of the district court was reversed by the Ninth Circuit.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial court was required, under the Alaska statute adopted from Oregon (Section 4263, C.L.A. 1933), to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust.
2. Whether the appellant preserved an adequate exception to the trial court's failure to give such an instruction.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a continuance to hear testimony from witnesses concerning the declared hostility of the procuress witness.
4. Whether, because Congress adopted the Oregon statute, this court is bound by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Oregon construing that statute.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The trial court was required to instruct the jury that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust under the Alaska statute (Section 4263, C.L.A. 1933) copied from Oregon, and the failure to give such an instruction was mandatory error on these facts (the procuress witness had participated in the offense, been convicted, and was awaiting sentence).
• The court's refusal to continue the trial to allow testimony from claimed reputable witnesses about the procuress' declared hostility was erroneous and an abuse of discretion (asserted strongly at trial).

Appellee's Arguments

• Appellee contended there was no adequate exception preserved to the failure to give the accomplice instruction.
• Appellee argued that because Congress adopted the Oregon statute, this court is bound by Oregon Supreme Court decisions (citing State v. Edmondson and State v. Keelen) that hold it is not error to fail to give the instruction unless the matter is called to the court's attention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first found there was evidence supporting the jury's verdict, noting the prosecution's primary testimony came from prostitutes and that the principal witness was a procuress who had been a half partner of appellant and who had been convicted in connection with transportation of the same girl and was awaiting sentence when she testified.

The court then analyzed the applicable Alaska statute enacted by Congress (copied from Oregon), Section 4263, C.L.A. 1933, which directs that juries be instructed, on proper occasions, that "the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust." The trial court did not give such an instruction nor an equivalent instruction.

The Ninth Circuit held that, on these facts, it was mandatory for the trial court to give the accomplice-distrust instruction because the procuress' testimony presented a "proper occasion" for doing so. The court therefore agreed with appellant that the instruction should have been given.

Regarding preservation of error, the court rejected appellee's contention that no adequate exception had been taken; instead, the court treated appellant's contention as within the principles established in Ninth Circuit authorities (Giles and Marco).

Appellee's argument that adoption of the Oregon statute bound the court to subsequent Oregon decisions construing that statute (citing State v. Edmondson and State v. Keelen) was addressed by recalling Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority (New York Alaska Gold Dredging Co. v. Walbridge and Stutsman County v. Wallace) holding that this circuit is not bound by state decisions rendered after the statute's adoption for Alaska. The court therefore did not accept appellee's reliance on the later Oregon cases as controlling.

The court noted another assignment of error (refusal to continue the trial to hear testimony about the procuress' hostility) and acknowledged a strong argument of abuse of discretion, but declined to decide that issue because reversal was required on the accomplice-instruction ground. Other assignments were deemed without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court judgment. The court's disposition is stated succinctly: REVERSED.

Implications: The direct consequence stated in the opinion is the reversal of the district court judgment against appellant. The opinion bases reversal on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to view accomplice testimony with distrust under Section 4263, C.L.A. 1933, in circumstances where the principal witness was an accomplice awaiting sentence. The opinion does not state broader legal consequences or announce a new rule beyond application of the cited authorities and reaffirmation that this circuit is not bound by subsequent state (Oregon) decisions interpreting statutes copied from the state.