WRIGHT v. FARM JOURNAL

Factual and Procedural Background

Archie Wright brought an action against Farm Journal, Inc., and another defendant to recover damages for an alleged libelous publication. The publication appeared in the October 1944 issue of Farm Journal and Farmer's Wife magazine and contained statements accusing Wright, President of the New York State Farmers Union, of being a Communist Party member and a participant in Communist activities. The article included a photograph of Wright labeled as a Communist Party member and was titled "Communist Beachhead in Agriculture." Wright alleged these statements were false, defamatory, and intended to impugn his loyalty and fitness to hold his office. The defendants admitted publication but denied the material allegations, asserting truth, lack of malice, and fair comment as defenses. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and Wright appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the charge of communism against Wright in the publication constituted libel per se, thereby making it defamatory as a matter of law.

Whether the trial court erred in leaving the question of whether the publication was libelous to the jury instead of deciding it as a matter of law.

Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction that statements injuring a person in their occupation or profession are libelous per se if untrue.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

The publication falsely accused Wright of Communist Party membership and activities, which damaged his reputation and fitness to hold office.

The trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that statements injuring a person in their occupation or profession are libelous per se if untrue.

The jury should not have been left to decide whether the charge of communism was libelous, as it was defamatory as a matter of law.

Defendant-Appellee's Arguments

Admitted publication but denied the defamatory nature of the statements.

Asserted defenses of truth, absence of malice, and that the publication was fair comment on a matter of public interest.

Argued that damage to a labor union official’s reputation is distinguishable from damage to a lawyer’s reputation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Williams v. Powers, 6 Cir., 135 F.2d 153, 156	Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 46 on objections and exceptions	Supported the adequacy of plaintiff's objection despite technicalities in timing and form.
Lynch v. New York Times Co., 171 App. Div. 399, 157 N.Y.S. 392	New York rule on reversal when verdict may be induced by court error	Established that verdicts influenced by erroneous jury instructions should be reversed.
Throckmorton v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 35 App. Div. 396, 54 N.Y.S. 887	New York rule on nominal damages and reversal	Discussed limits on reversal when only nominal damages are at issue.
Funk v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 76 Hun 497, 27 N.Y.S. 1089, affirmed 152 N.Y. 619, 46 N.E. 292	New York law on libel and reversal standards	Supported reversal when jury improperly instructed on libel per se issues.
Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620	Determination of libelous per se as a question of law for the court	Held that unambiguous defamatory statements are libelous per se and should be decided by the court.
Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N.Y. 327, 150 N.E. 132, 43 A.L.R. 880	Analogous principle on court's role in determining libelous nature of statements	Supported reversal where jury improperly determined libelous nature instead of the court.
Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 904, 907	Libelous per se is a question of law for the court	Reinforced that clear defamatory language must be ruled on by the court, not jury.
Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N.Y. 624, 42 N.E. 270	Libelous per se determination by the court	Affirmed court’s authority to decide libel per se questions.
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 733	Defamatory nature of communist accusations under New York law	Held that calling a lawyer a communist agent is libelous per se; analogous here.
Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35 N.Y.S.2d 760	Support for libelous per se determinations	Confirmed the principle that defamatory statements about political affiliations are libelous.
Sack v. New York Times Co., 270 App. Div. 401, 59 N.Y.S.2d 888	Libelous per se under New York law	Supported court’s role in deciding libel per se questions.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Williams v. Powers, 6 Cir., 135 F.2d 153, 156

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 46 on objections and exceptions

Supported the adequacy of plaintiff's objection despite technicalities in timing and form.

Lynch v. New York Times Co., 171 App. Div. 399, 157 N.Y.S. 392

New York rule on reversal when verdict may be induced by court error

Established that verdicts influenced by erroneous jury instructions should be reversed.

Throckmorton v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 35 App. Div. 396, 54 N.Y.S. 887

New York rule on nominal damages and reversal

Discussed limits on reversal when only nominal damages are at issue.

Funk v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 76 Hun 497, 27 N.Y.S. 1089, affirmed 152 N.Y. 619, 46 N.E. 292

New York law on libel and reversal standards

Supported reversal when jury improperly instructed on libel per se issues.

Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620

Determination of libelous per se as a question of law for the court

Held that unambiguous defamatory statements are libelous per se and should be decided by the court.

Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N.Y. 327, 150 N.E. 132, 43 A.L.R. 880

Analogous principle on court's role in determining libelous nature of statements

Supported reversal where jury improperly determined libelous nature instead of the court.

Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 904, 907

Libelous per se is a question of law for the court

Reinforced that clear defamatory language must be ruled on by the court, not jury.

Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N.Y. 624, 42 N.E. 270

Libelous per se determination by the court

Affirmed court’s authority to decide libel per se questions.

Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 733

Defamatory nature of communist accusations under New York law

Held that calling a lawyer a communist agent is libelous per se; analogous here.

Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35 N.Y.S.2d 760

Support for libelous per se determinations

Confirmed the principle that defamatory statements about political affiliations are libelous.

Sack v. New York Times Co., 270 App. Div. 401, 59 N.Y.S.2d 888

Libelous per se under New York law

Supported court’s role in deciding libel per se questions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the trial judge erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether the publication was libelous per se. The court noted that libelous per se involves statements that are defamatory on their face, particularly those injurious to a person's occupation or profession. The plaintiff requested a jury instruction that such statements are libelous per se if untrue, but the trial judge refused, expressing uncertainty about the jury’s understanding of the term. The appellate court found this refusal erroneous, emphasizing that the question of libelous per se is typically one of law for the court, especially when the language is unambiguous.

The court referenced New York precedents holding that accusations of communist affiliation are inherently defamatory and damaging, whether the subject is a lawyer or a labor union official. The court also discussed procedural rules regarding objections and jury instructions, concluding that the plaintiff’s objection was sufficient and that the trial court’s failure to instruct properly was a reversible error. Because it was unclear whether the jury found the publication not libelous or simply awarded negligible damages, the court could not uphold the verdict.

Accordingly, the court held that on retrial, the jury should be instructed that if the publication is false, it is libelous per se, and the jury’s sole remaining task is to determine damages.

Holding and Implications

The court REVERSED the judgment entered for the defendant.

This decision directs that on retrial, the jury must be instructed that the defamatory statements, if found untrue, constitute libel per se. The jury should then assess damages only. The ruling clarifies that questions of libel per se are generally legal questions for the court, not factual questions for the jury. The opinion does not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming existing New York law principles, but it emphasizes the court’s duty to properly instruct juries on libel per se in defamation cases involving occupational harm.

WRIGHT v. FARM JOURNAL, Inc., et al.

AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Archie Wright, from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant, Farm Journal, Inc., in an action to recover damages arising from the publication by the latter in its magazine entitled Farm Journal and Farmer's Wife of alleged defamatory matter in respect to the plaintiff.

The complaint alleges that in the issue of the magazine for the month of October, 1944, defendant McManus maliciously wrote and defendant Farm Journal Inc. maliciously published an article concerning the plaintiff in which the following false and defamatory matter was printed:

"The President of the New York State Farmers Union is Archie Wright, who was a chief figure in the New York milk strikes of a decade ago. He was also a foremost member of the Communist Party. In 1936, he made a speech at the Party's Convention in St. Nicholas Arena, New York City, on the work he was doing among the farmers."

The complaint further alleges that at the head of the same article the defendant printed a photograph of the plaintiff with the legend "Archie Wright, left, head of the New York Farmers Union and Communist Party Member." The title of the article in which the defamatory matter appeared was "Communist Beachhead in Agriculture."

The complaint alleges in some detail that these charges are false and defamatory and that it was the intention of the defendant in publishing the aforesaid article to impugn the plaintiff's loyalty as an American citizen and his fitness to hold the office of President of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union, Northeastern Division.

The answer admits publication but in substance denies the material allegations of the complaint and alleges as affirmative defenses that plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted; that the publication was without malice and that the statements therein contained are true; and that the matter published was one of public interest and the publication was fair comment thereon.

There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the plaintiff was a member of the Communist Party and whether he was present at the convention of that party in the St. Nicholas Arena but the jury resolved this issue by finding a verdict for the defendant Farm Journal Inc. The plaintiff asserts that the trial judge erred in leaving to the jury the question whether the charge of communism was libelous per se. Plaintiff argues that the publication necessarily affected him adversely in his occupation or profession as President of the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, Northeastern Division.

The foregoing question of law was raised by the refusal of the judge "to charge the jury that anything stated of a person which concerns his occupation or profession, which injures him in his occupation or profession is libelous per se."

It may be said that even if the court erred in leaving the question whether the publication was libelous to the jury that point was not properly raised by the request because it did not embody the necessary condition that the charge must be untrue in order to be defamatory. But such an interpretation of the request which was made after the completion of the charge is unduly technical. The court had already told the jury that truth would be a defense and the request must be read with that limitation which no one did or could dispute. We think the court was sufficiently warned of the point of law which, if sound, went to the very heart of the plaintiff's claim. The judge certainly did not avoid the issue by remarking as a ground for his refusal: "I do not know whether the jury knows what `libelous per se' means." His doubt should have been resolved by explanation.

The request for a further instruction was in essence equivalent to an objection to the charge, which had left to the jury the question as formulated by the judge whether the words "used in the article were or were not libelous." Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 46, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c: "Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore been necessary it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; * * *." So far as Rule 51 requiring written requests to be submitted at the close of the evidence might have any pertinency to the case at bar it must be construed in the light of Rule 46. Williams v. Powers, 6 Cir., 135 F.2d 153, 156.

The instruction in the charge that left to the jury the question whether the publication was libelous was erroneous. The instruction as given being erroneous, the failure to correct it will require a reversal, irrespective of whether the request was submitted in writing. No objection could be plainer than the request for an instruction diametrically opposed to the one given in the court's charge. In our opinion the situation which had developed called upon the judge to inform the jury that the article was libelous if the statements therein were found to be untrue and that in such event the only matters for further consideration would be the amount of the plaintiff's damages. Assuming that the jury found the publication to be false — as they might have done if they believed the plaintiff's evidence — it is impossible to say whether they returned the verdict for the defendant because they thought the publication was not libelous or because the damages were negligible. If the verdict can be said to have been rendered for the latter reason it might be argued that it should stand, since the New York decisions hold that a judgment will not be reversed merely to enable a plaintiff to recover a verdict for nominal damages. Lynch v. New York Times Co., 171 App. Div. 399, 157 N.Y.S. 392; Throckmorton v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 35 App. Div. 396, 54 N.Y.S. 887; Funk v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 76 Hun 497, 27 N.Y.S. 1089, affirmed 152 N.Y. 619, 46 N.E. 292. But the rule is otherwise in cases where a verdict may have been induced through an error on the part of the court. That such is the New York rule appears from the language of the decisions in Lynch v. New York Times Co., 171 App. Div. 399, 157 N YS. 392; Funk v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 76 Hun 497, 27 N.Y.S. 1089, affirmed 152 N.Y. 619, 46 N.E. 292, and Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620. Indeed, in the decision last referred to the court reversed a judgment for the defendant because the jury had been permitted to determine the question whether a publication was libelous when it was libelous as a matter of law. The application of an analogous principle seems to have been involved in Abell v. Cornwall Industrial Corp., 241 N.Y. 327, 150 N.E. 132, 43 A.L.R. 880.

If the language of a publication is unambiguous the question whether it is libelous per se is for the court. Sweeney v. United Feature Syndicate, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 904, 907; Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N.Y. 624, 42 N.E. 270; Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620. This court has recently held that it is libelous under the New York law to write of a lawyer that he has acted as agent of the communist party and is a believer in its aims and methods. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 733. The New York decisions in Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35 N.Y.S.2d 760; Szalay v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N.Y.S.2d 620, and Sack v. New York Times Co., 270 App. Div. 401, 59 N.Y.S.2d 888, entirely justify such a pronouncement. The attempted distinction of defendant's counsel between damage to the reputation of a lawyer and damage to the reputation of an official of a labor union seems without basis. The charge of membership in the communist party would naturally be damaging to reputation in the minds of people opposed to communism and might affect a labor leader quite as much as a lawyer.

We do not suggest that the plaintiff, if the publication was untrue, has suffered more than nominal damages. The extent of his damages is for the jury. We simply hold that upon a new trial the jury should be instructed that the publication was libelous per se and if they find it to be false they should then determine the sole remaining question as to the damages the plaintiff has suffered.

For the error of leaving to the jury the question of whether the publication if untrue was libelous the judgment is reversed.