Young v. Young, No. 17,693 (Ct. App. of Ind. Dec. 19, 1947)

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Bill Young and appellee Lucille Young were married May 1, 1936. One child of the marriage was born in February 1944, and the parties separated shortly after the child's birth. On appellee's complaint the City Court of Mishawaka previously ordered appellant to support his wife and child.

Sometime prior to January 8, 1946, appellant filed a complaint for divorce against appellee in the St. Joseph Circuit Court. Appellee filed a cross-complaint for separation from bed and board alleging cruel and inhuman treatment. At the conclusion of the evidence in that action appellant, with the court's permission, dismissed his complaint; the Circuit Court denied appellee's cross-complaint for separate maintenance.

On or about June 17, 1946, appellant brought a new action for divorce against appellee, charging her with cruel and inhuman treatment. On or about March 20, 1947, appellee filed an answer and a cross-complaint for separation from bed and board alleging abandonment and desertion of appellee and the child and that appellant refused to live with appellee. After trial the trial court found against appellant on his complaint and for appellee on her cross-complaint, entering judgment granting appellee a separation from bed and board for a period of five years. From that judgment appellant appealed.

This appeal is from the St. Joseph Superior Court, No. 2 (Judge J. Elmer Peak). Counsel of record: George Sands for appellant; Leo Van Tilbury for appellee.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the judgment in the prior St. Joseph Circuit Court action bars appellee from obtaining the separation from bed and board awarded in the subsequent action (i.e., whether the prior adjudication precludes the later relief).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Appellant contended that the judgment of the St. Joseph Circuit Court in the first action precludes appellee from obtaining the relief she obtained in the later action (that the earlier adjudication bars the subsequent relief).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of appellee's legal arguments beyond the procedural and factual allegations set forth in her pleadings (answer and cross-complaint alleging abandonment and refusal to live with appellee).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the procedural history of two related actions between the parties: an earlier divorce action in the St. Joseph Circuit Court (in which appellant dismissed his complaint and the circuit court denied appellee's cross-complaint) and the later divorce action now on appeal (in which the trial court granted appellee a five-year separation from bed and board).

The court identified the sole question on appeal as whether the prior judgment barred appellee's recovery in the later action. The court noted that appellant did not plead or prove the prior judgment or former adjudication upon which he relied. Relying on established pleading authorities and precedent, the court concluded that failure to plead and prove such a defense results in waiver. Because appellant neither pleaded nor proved the former adjudication, the court found the contention waived and declined to bar the later judgment on that basis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect: The trial court's judgment granting appellee a separation from bed and board for a period of five years was affirmed. The court held that appellant waived his defense that a prior adjudication barred appellee's relief by failing to plead or prove that former judgment.

No broader implications or new precedent were announced beyond application of the established rule that a defense of former adjudication must be pleaded and proven or is waived; the opinion's effect is limited to the parties and the disposition of this appeal.