Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Docket Number

No. 2404.

Attorney(S)

Vickers, Leigh Thornton, of Mobile, Ala., for libelant. Pillans, Cowley, Reams Tappan, of Mobile, Ala., for respondent.

Judges

Robert Tait Ervin

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Robinson v. United States (S.D. Ala., Jan. 16, 1948) — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an admiralty libel by George H. Robinson (libelant) against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq., and the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1291. The case was heard on January 7, 1948, and was submitted on the pleadings, an agreed statement of facts with exhibits, and testimony taken in open court. Counsel for the parties argued the case; the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for the libelant.

Key facts found by the court:

Libelant was employed as steward aboard the steamship "American Fisher," operated by the respondent (the United States, via War Shipping Administration operations).
On October 27, 1945, while engaged in ship service, libelant was struck in the right rear lower chest by a 300-pound block of ice, sustaining a painful blow and developing pleurisy; he was hospitalized beginning November 3, 1945, and discharged December 21, 1945.
At discharge and thereafter, libelant manifested arteriosclerosis resulting in arteriosclerotic heart disease and auricular fibrillation; libelant continued as an outpatient at the United States Marine Hospital in Mobile through the date of trial.
The court found the present condition incurable as to arteriosclerotic heart disease, although improvement in the auricular fibrillation might be expected with continued treatment.
The court found the injury aggravated a pre-existing latent condition and set in motion a chain of events that hastened the disability's manifestation.
Libelant had been paid maintenance and cure through October 1, 1946; libelant's administrative claim under the Clarification Act had been disallowed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether libelant was suffering from an incurable disability (as alleged by respondent).
Whether libelant's present physical condition resulted from the injury sustained on October 27, 1945, while in ship service (causation/relationship between injury and disability).
Whether libelant had received all improvement reasonably to be expected from medical treatment such that no further maintenance and cure would be due.
Whether an administrative regulation of the War Shipping Administration (Operations Regulation No. 108) could limit or fix the shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure.

Arguments of the Parties

Libelant's Arguments

Libelant contended that maintenance and cure were owed regardless of whether the disability was directly caused by the injury, citing Calmar S.S. Corporation v. Taylor (the Calmar case) to support the general obligation of maintenance and cure.
Libelant testified that the reasonable cost of maintenance and cure in line with his former position as steward was $50 per week.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent argued (1) that libelant was suffering an incurable disability, (2) that libelant's present condition did not result from any injury received while in service of the ship, and (3) that all reasonably possible improvement from medical treatment had already occurred before the period covered by the libel.
Respondent further argued that the court should be bound by Operations Regulation No. 108 of the War Shipping Administration in fixing the allowance for maintenance and cure, and that that regulation limited the shipowner's liability as to maintenance payments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Calmar S.S. Corporation v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 58 S.Ct. 651, 82 L.Ed. 993	The opinion contains a dictum (Justice Stone) discussing maintenance and cure — specifically language noted by the parties bearing on whether incapacity caused by employment should be treated differently and the concept that "cure is care."	The court treated the Calmar dictum as relevant to the causation and cure questions but concluded that it need not decide the broader rule posed by the parties. Instead, the court relied on the admitted events and expert testimony to find that the blow aggravated a latent condition, and emphasized the concept that "cure" includes care when discussing the obligation to provide continued treatment (e.g., digitalis for auricular fibrillation).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from its factual findings and the legal status of the United States in this suit:

Jurisdiction and waiver: The court found the case within admiralty jurisdiction and that the respondent had consented to be sued under the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Clarification Act; therefore the government was to be treated as an ordinary shipowner for purposes of the suit.
Causation: Although respondent's expert witnesses testified that the injury did not cause the disability, the court considered the total record — including that a blow to the chest might cause pleurisy and pleurisy might place strain on the heart, plus medical text excerpts admitted in evidence. The court concluded that the October 27, 1945 blow set up a chain of events that aggravated a pre-existing (possibly latent) heart condition and caused the disability to manifest earlier than it otherwise would have. Consequently, respondent's contention of no causal connection was not sustained.
Extent of recoverable maintenance and cure (cure vs. care): The court observed that experts agreed the arteriosclerotic heart disease was incurable but that auricular fibrillation could be ameliorated by continued treatment (digitalis). The court noted authority (including language from Calmar) describing "'cure' is care," and used this to reject respondent's argument that only permanent improvement justifies continued maintenance and cure — continued care to preserve life or improve treatable manifestations remains part of the obligation.
Validity of administrative regulation: The court held that because the government, by statute, assumed the status of an ordinary shipowner and the duty of maintenance and cure is a law imposed by Admiralty Courts on shipowners, an internal regulation (Operations Regulation No. 108) purporting to limit the ship's liability for maintenance was void to the extent it sought to limit that duty. The court reasoned an ordinary owner could not abrogate judicially imposed duties through unilateral regulations.
Remedy and computation: Having found the respondent liable for maintenance and cure from October 1, 1946 through the date of trial, January 7, 1948, the court fixed the sum due at $2,500.00 (libelant had been paid maintenance and cure only through October 1, 1946).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Judgment for libelant. The court held that the respondent (United States) is liable to libelant for maintenance and cure from October 1, 1946, to January 7, 1948, in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 ($2,500.00) Dollars.

Implications and immediate effects:

Direct effect: The United States (respondent) must pay libelant $2,500 for maintenance and cure covering the stated period; libelant had already been paid maintenance and cure through October 1, 1946.
Legal posture of the government: The court emphasized that when the government waives immunity under the cited statutes it is bound to the same extent as an ordinary shipowner with respect to duties imposed by admiralty law (here, maintenance and cure).
Administrative regulation: The court declared the War Shipping Administration regulation void insofar as it attempted to limit a shipowner's admiralty-imposed duty of care and cure to seamen.
Broader precedent: The opinion articulates and applies principles concerning causation, the scope of "cure" as including ongoing care, and the inability of administrative regulation to limit admiralty duties. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel rule of law beyond the court's application of these principles to the facts before it.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the opinion provided and does not include information beyond that opinion.

Show full summary ...

ROBINSON v. UNITED STATES

In Admiralty. Libel by George H. Robinson against the United States.

Judgment for libelant.

ERVIN, District Judge.

This cause coming on for hearing on the 7th day of January, 1948, and being submitted by the parties on the pleadings, the agreed statement of facts with the exhibits attached thereto, and on the testimony taken in open court, and the cause being argued by the proctors for the parties and being considered and understood by the court, the court finds the following:

Finding of Facts.

1. The libellant resides within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.

2. The respondent consented to be sued herein under the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq., and the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1291.

3. The Steamship "American Fisher" was operated by respondent as a merchant vessel; and libellant was employed by respondent as steward thereon.

4. On the 27th day of October, 1945, while the libellant was engaged in the service of said vessel, and at a time when libellant was in apparent good health, libellant was injured by being struck with a 300 pound block of ice, in the right rear lower chest; as a result of which libellant contracted pleurisy with which libellant was made dangerously ill and for which libellant was hospitalized on November 3, 1945. Libellant remained as a patient in the hospital until December 21, 1945, at which time libellant had recovered from pleurisy, but was then suffering from arteriosclerosis, generally, resulting in arteriosclerotic heart disease and auricular fibrillation, which had not been manifest prior to time libellant signed on the Steamship "American Fisher." Thereafter, and up to and including the time of the trial in this cause, libellant has been under outpatient treatment at the United States Marine Hospital in Mobile, Alabama.

5. Libellant is still suffering from arteriosclerosis, generally, resulting in arteriosclerotic heart disease and auricular fibrillation.

6. Libellant's condition is incurable but improvement may be expected from further treatment for auricular fibrillation so long as the present treatment continues. No improvement may be expected from further treatment for arteriosclerotic heart disease.

7. Regardless of whether libellant's present condition was latent prior to the time of the injury, nevertheless the court finds that the present condition of libellant manifested itself during the period of libellant's service on the ship and that at least the injury sustained by libellant aggravated such pre-existent condition.

8. Libellant has been paid for maintenance and cure from November 3, 1945 through October 1, 1946.

9. Libellant has made written claim with respondent under the provisions of the Clarification Act and the claim has been administratively disallowed.

Conclusions of Law.

1. This cause is within the Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction of this court.

2. The respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of this court.

3. In this case the government waived its immunity from suit and, by legislative act, assumed the status of an ordinary ship owner and operator. So it is bound in a suit against it to the same extent as an ordinary owner. Could an ordinary owner limit its liability for care, or responsibility for the cure of a sailor who was injured while serving on its ship?

If so, such an owner could free himself completely by the regulations he imposed on his employees.

The duty of care and cure of a sailor is a law imposed on the ship by the Admiralty Courts.

So the regulation in this cause, respondent's Exhibit No. A, was void, so far as it undertook to limit the liability of the ship for care of its seamen.

4. The respondent is liable to libellant for the maintenance and cure from October 1, 1946, to the date of this trial, namely, January 7, 1948, in the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 ($2,500.00) Dollars.

Opinion.

I have decided to add an opinion to the Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law.

This is a libel by George H. Robinson against the United States under the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 741 et seq., and the Clarification Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1291, for maintenance and cure. The answer admits the jurisdictional averments in the libel but raises the issues that, (1) libellant is suffering from an incurable disability, (2) libellant's present physical condition in no way resulted from any injury received while libellant was in the service of the ship, and (3) all improvement in libellant's condition as reasonably might be expected to result from medical treatment has been had prior to the time for which this libel was brought.

The case was submitted on the pleadings, an agreed statement of facts and oral testimony taken in open court.

From the agreed statement of facts it appears that libellant, a steward in the Merchant Marine, received a physical examination on August 25, 1945 at the Marine Hospital in New Orleans and he was passed on as fit for duty. On October 27, 1945 libellant signed on the ship American Fisher operated by Tankers Company, Inc., for War Shipping Administration for a trip to Puerto Rico and return. That afternoon while engaged in the service of this vessel and while on board, libellant was struck by a three hundred pound block of ice in the right rear lower chest which was painful and knocked the breath out of libellant, but after a few minutes rest, libellant continued about his work. That night after retiring libellant awakened suffering severe pain in his chest. Libellant developed pleurisy and was ultimately hospitalized therefor, first at Guantanamo, Cuba, and then at Key West, Florida. Libellant was discharged from the hospital at Key West on December 21, 1945, at which time he was suffering from arteriosclerosis and auricular fibrillation. On January 23, 1946 libellant reported to the Marine Hospital at Mobile for out-patient treatment, where he has remained as an out-patient to the date of the trial. Libellant was paid for maintenance and cure up to October 1, 1946.

On the trial of this case the parties submitted the agreed statement of facts. Libellant was then called as a witness and he testified orally in open court that the reasonable cost of his maintenance and cure in line with his former position as a steward was $50 a week.

Two physicians testified as experts on the issues presented by respondent's answer, and respondent offered in evidence a certified copy of Operations Regulation No. 108 promulgated by the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Ship Operations for War Shipping Administration effective August 1, 1945, which purported to set a schedule for maintenance for licensed and unlicensed seamen on vessels operated for War Shipping Administration.

The first issue presented, namely, whether libellant is suffering from an incurable disease, seems not to be controverted.

The second issue, namely, whether libellant's present condition resulted from the injury, presents more difficulty. It seems to be conceded by the parties that the pertinence of this issue arises from the dictum of Mr. Justice Stone in Calmar S.S. Corporation v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 530, 58 S.Ct. 651, 654, 82 L.Ed. 993, where he says: "* * * we lay to one side those cases (for maintenance and cure) where the incapacity is caused by the employment. As to them considerations not present here may apply, which might be thought to require a more liberal application of the rule than we think is called for in this case." Based on this statement, respondent insists that since libellant's condition was not brought about by the injury, respondent is not liable for maintenance and cure in this case. Libellant argues that regardless of whether the injury caused the disability, the obligation of maintenance and cure is present, citing the Calmar case. It does not seem to me that a decision is called for on either of these issues.

Two physicians testified as experts for the respondent and both testified that the injury did not cause the disability. However, both testified that a blow to the chest might cause pleurisy and pleurisy might cause a strain on the heart. Furthermore excerpts from two medical texts were read in evidence without objection which might be opposed to the testimony of the experts. Be that as it may, it seems to me that by reason of the admitted happening of events even if libellant had a latent heart disorder which was undisclosed in the examination at the Marine Hospital in New Orleans on August 25, 1945, the blow suffered by him on October 27, 1945, set up a chain of events which aggravated this condition and the disability occurred sooner than it would have developed but for the injury sustained. Therefore, respondent's premise that there was no causal connection between the injury and the disability is not sustained, hence, the conclusion argued from this premise is not relevant.

The third issue raised by respondent is that no further improvement may be expected in libellant's condition from further medical treatment and therefore no further liability for maintenance and cure is due from respondent to libellant. Libellant argues that this conclusion does not follow from this premise.

Again, it does not seem that the legal issue is presented for decision, for though the expert witnesses testified that libellant could expect no further improvement in his arteriosclerotic heart condition, digitalis would improve the auricular fibrillation; in fact, if libellant ceases to take digitalis his life will probably be shortened.

Respondent argues that the improvement must be permanent in order to satisfy the obligation of maintenance and cure, citing the Calmar case, supra. But the opinion in the Calmar case itself says "`cure' is care," and this concept seems to be borne out by the authorities generally.

Finally, respondent argues that this court is bound by the administrative rule or regulation of War Shipping Administration offered in evidence in fixing the amount to be allowed for maintenance and cure.

In this case the government waived its immunity from suit and, by legislative act, assumed the status of an ordinary ship owner and operator. So it is bound in a suit against it to the same extent as an ordinary owner. Could an ordinary owner limit its liability for care, or responsibility for the cure of a sailor who was injured while serving on its ship?