Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Smart Summary

Strickland v. Strickland (Oregon Supreme Court, modified May 11, 1948)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Graeme H. Strickland and defendant Ruby Maymie Strickland were married in 1929 and had two daughters (born 1933 and 1935). While plaintiff was serving in the United States Naval Reserve, he instituted divorce proceedings on May 10, 1944. Defendant counterclaimed; on July 11, 1945 a decree was entered in accordance with defendant's counterclaim, awarding her custody of the two children, $50 per month for the support of each child, and $100 per month as permanent alimony.

On January 31, 1947 defendant moved to modify the decree, asking for $300 per month as permanent alimony and $90 per month for each child. Plaintiff resisted the motion except that he admitted the allowances for the daughters should be increased. After hearing, the trial court entered an order increasing the allowance for each child from $50 to $80 per month and denying any increase in allowance to the defendant. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court modified the trial court's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the divorce decree should be modified to increase permanent alimony to the defendant from $100 to $300 per month as requested in her motion.
  2. Whether the decree should be modified to increase the allowance for each of the two minor children from $50 per month to $90 per month as requested in the motion.
  3. What considerations and income calculations the court should apply in determining appropriate allowances for child support and alimony on modification.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
<i>Blake v. Blake</i>, 147 Or. 43, 53, 31 P.2d 768 That each case depends on its own facts; the amount of alimony rests largely in the trial court's discretion and appellate courts should not disturb such decisions except for clear abuse. The court relied on this principle to affirm that alimony and support determinations rest in trial court discretion and to review whether the trial court's allowance was an abuse of discretion.
<i>Kraunz v. Kraunz</i>, 293 N.Y. 152, 56 N.E.2d 90 That income taxes should be taken into account in fixing alimony. The court cited this authority in concluding that income taxes of the parties ought to be considered when fixing alimony.
<i>Armour v. Armour</i>, 135 N.J. Eq. 47, 37 A.2d 29 That income taxes should be taken into account in fixing alimony. The court cited this case alongside Kraunz as supporting consideration of income taxes in alimony determinations.
<i>Hogan v. Hogan</i>, 196 Ga. 822, 28 S.E.2d 74 That social standing, comforts, and luxuries likely to have been enjoyed but for the divorce may be considered in determining allowances for support and children. The court relied on this principle in considering appropriate allowances for the wife and children, including their probable standard of living.
<i>Adams v. Adams</i>, 17 N.J. Misc. 234, 8 A.2d 214 That social standing and accustomed comforts of life are proper considerations in determining support and allowances. The court cited this authority for the proposition that such considerations are proper in fixing allowances.
<i>Packard v. Packard</i>, 34 Kan. 53, 7 P. 628 That social standing and the comforts of life are relevant in determining support and allowance amounts. The court cited this as additional authority for considering social standing and accustomed comforts in awarding support.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the undisputed factual record, the prior property settlement approved by the court, the parties' respective financial situations, and the statutory and case law principles governing modification of alimony and child-support awards.

Key factual and financial points considered by the court:

  • There had been a material change in circumstances since entry of the decree: plaintiff was discharged from military service and returned to his medical practice, earning substantially more than his naval pay.
  • The property settlement (June 1945) transferred various assets and monthly payments to defendant (including $100 per month for her maintenance and $100 per month for the children) and provided life-insurance and other security; defendant used much of the settlement to build a home and has no income except amounts received from plaintiff.
  • Plaintiff's 1946 gross income was shown to be $16,964. The court identified and allowed specific deductions from gross income (listed in the opinion) totaling $3,195.37 to approximate plaintiff's net income before income taxes; the court calculated net income before taxes of $13,768.63 and net after federal and state income taxes of $10,262.48.
  • The court considered additional evidence of income from the partnership in early 1947 and an unclosed devise of a remainder interest in business property (recently inherited by plaintiff) though no income yet received from that inheritance.

Legal principles applied:

  • The court acknowledged that determinations of alimony and child-support depend on individual facts and rest in the sound discretion of the trial court (citing Blake v. Blake).
  • The court held that income taxes should be taken into account when fixing alimony, citing Kraunz v. Kraunz and Armour v. Armour, and noting that since October 21, 1942 alimony is taxable income to the recipient and deductible by the payer (26 U.S.C.A., Int. Rev. Code, § 22(k)).
  • The court stated it is proper to consider the social standing, comforts, and probable life the wife and children would have enjoyed but for the divorce in determining allowances (citing Hogan v. Hogan, Adams v. Adams, Packard v. Packard).

Applying those principles to the computed income figures, the property's prior settlement, the children's increased needs due to age and cost of living, and the defendant's lack of other income, the court concluded the trial court's order should be modified to increase both the alimony and child-support allowances beyond the amounts entered by the trial court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The trial court's order is modified: plaintiff is required to pay defendant $200 per month as permanent alimony and $90 per month for the support of each of the two minor children.

Additional directives and immediate effects:

  • The increased allowances for the children are ordered to commence on or before July 1, 1947 (consistent with the trial court's prior schedule), and the opinion states the increased allowances awarded by the Supreme Court should commence on that date.
  • Defendant is allowed her costs in this court.
  • Justice Hay did not participate in the decision.

Implications:

The decision directly modifies the parties' financial obligations under the divorce decree and increases the periodic payments required of plaintiff. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying recognized principles (trial-court discretion in alimony, consideration of income taxes, and consideration of social standing and changed circumstances) to the facts of this case.

STRICKLAND v. STRICKLAND

Action for divorce by Graeme H. Strickland against Ruby Maymie Strickland, who counterclaimed for divorce, wherein there was a decree in accordance with the prayer of defendant's counterclaim and the defendant was granted $50 per month for the support of each of two children and $100 per month as permanent alimony. From an order modifying the decree by increasing the allowance for each of the two children from $50 to $80 per month and denying any increase in allowance to the defendant, the defendant appeals.

MODIFIED.

BAILEY, J.

Plaintiff, Graeme H. Strickland, and defendant, Ruby Maymie Strickland, were married on June 7, 1929. Two daughters, Diane, born October 5, 1933, and Suzzanne, born February 20, 1935, are the issue of this marriage. In December, 1942, plaintiff, Dr. Strickland, entered the armed forces as lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve. While he was in the service, and on May 10, 1944, he instituted divorce proceedings in Multnomah County against the defendant. Defendant's answer contained a general denial of the charges of cruel and inhuman treatment, of which she was accused by plaintiff, and a counterclaim in which she asked that she be granted a decree of divorce, that she be awarded the care, custody and control of the two minor children, and that the plaintiff be required to pay to her the sum of $50 per month for the support of each of the two children, and $100 per month as permanent alimony. On July 11, 1945, a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of defendant's counterclaim.

Defendant, on January 31, 1947, filed a motion for an order modifying the decree by requiring the plaintiff to pay to her $300 per month for her maintenance and support, as permanent alimony, and $90 per month for each of their two daughters for their support, nurture, and maintenance. This motion was resisted by the plaintiff, except that he admitted the allowances for the daughters should be increased. After a hearing the court entered an order which modified the decree by increasing the allowance of each of the two children from $50 to $80 per month and which denied any increase of the allowance to the defendant. From this order the defendant has appealed.

Plaintiff and defendant, on or about June 23, 1945, entered into a property settlement agreement which was approved by the court in the divorce proceedings. By the terms of that agreement plaintiff (1) turned over to defendant all the household furniture and furnishings, estimated by plaintiff to be of the value of $4000 and by the defendant of $2000; (2) assigned to defendant the balance due from the sale of their home, amounting to $3200; (3) assigned to the defendant one-half of his interest in a trust estate created by the will of his deceased father, the interest so assigned being of an indefinite value, but estimated by plaintiff to be of the value of $5000; (4) paid to the defendant $2000 in cash; (5) agreed to keep their two children as beneficiaries in a family income policy in the sum of $4000 and to pay the premiums thereon; (6) agreed to make and retain the defendant as beneficiary of two life insurance policies aggregating $15,000, so long as she shall remain unmarried, and to pay the premiums thereon; (7) agreed to pay $100 a month toward the maintenance of the defendant, and $100 a month toward the nurture and education of the two minor children; and (8) waived any claim in the automobile standing in the name of the defendant. In addition thereto plaintiff turned over to defendant his automobile which she sold for $300.

This agreement further provides that in the event of a divorce between the husband and wife the amount of monthly payments therein provided for the support and maintenance of the wife and children "shall be subject to the statutory right of the Court decreeing the divorce or other Court of appropriate jurisdiction to modify the same whether by way of increase or decrease in the usual manner for the usual causes, and this right of the Court to so modify any future alimony payments to the wife or payments to her for the care, support and education of the children is of the essence."

Defendant applied most of the money which she received in the settlement toward the building of a home for herself and daughters. The balance of the construction cost is being paid by her in monthly installments. All her time is required in providing a home for her daughters. Her only income is what she receives from the plaintiff.

In January, 1946, plaintiff remarried and has one child by that marriage. He was discharged from the navy early in 1946, and on February 16 of that year resumed the practice of medicine with his brother in Oregon City. Dr. Strickland has practiced his profession since 1933. At the time of the hearing on the motion he was 40, and the defendant 39, years of age.

During the time Dr. Strickland was in the service he was receiving $332 a month, and he paid to his wife, under the terms of the divorce decree, $200 a month. For the part of the year 1946 that Dr. Strickland was associated with his brother he received as his one-half share of the income of the partnership, after payment of partnership expenses, the sum of $16,564. In addition to that amount he received during the year 1946 the sum of $400 from the United States Navy.

In October, 1945, Dr. Strickland purchased a 1938 Plymouth automobile for $750 to be used in his private practice. In November, 1946, he purchased a 1946 Chrysler automobile and was allowed on the purchase price thereof the sum of $350 for the Plymouth. He testified that the Chrysler cost him "around $2400".

Plaintiff, in his brief, has compiled a list of the items which he claims should be deducted from his 1946 gross income in order to arrive at his net income for that year. One of them is $955.62 for gas, oil, and repairs. According to the income tax statements (1946 federal and state) filed by Dr. Strickland, this $955.62 includes $583.12 for gas, oil, and repairs, $250 for depreciation ($100 on the Plymouth and $150 on the Chrysler) and $122.50 for medical books and dues. This latter amount is also set forth as a separate item in the tabulation. The Chrysler car is listed at $2590. The income tax returns show $150 depreciation on this automobile for the months of November and December, 1946, i.e., a depreciation at the rate of $75 per month. There are included in the list $1800 for a one-half interest in X-ray machine and $300 for a one-half interest in heart machine. This equipment is necessary for plaintiff's practice. It lasts about ten years and should be depreciated over a ten-year period. Dr. Strickland has also included in deductible items $3153.15 and $353 as federal and state income taxes for 1946, and the sum of $466 for state taxes during the period that plaintiff was in the navy. The total amount which plaintiff contends should be deducted from the gross income adds up to $13,555.52.

We think that by deducting the following items from Dr. Strickland's 1946 gross income we shall arrive at his approximate net income for that year before payment of income taxes:

Gas, oil, repairs (automobile) _______________ $ 583.12 Medical dues and books _______________________ 122.50 Loss on sale of Plymouth automobile __________ 400.00 Depreciation on Chrysler automobile, 2 months at $75 per month ____________________ 150.00 Depreciation on 1/2 interest in X-ray machine, at 10% per annum __________________ 180.00 Depreciation on 1/2 interest in heart machine, at 10% per annum ___________________________ 30.00 1/2 interest in bookkeeping system ___________ 150.00 Alimony, $100 per month ______________________ 1200.00 Insurance premiums on policies where defendant and children are beneficiaries _____________ 379.75 _________ $3195.37

Dr. Strickland's gross income for 1946 was, as hereinbefore stated, $16,964. Subtracting therefrom the amount of the deductible items, $3195.37, we find that Dr. Strickland had a net income, before payment of income taxes, of $13,768.63, and a net income of $10,262.48 after payment of $3153.15 federal, and $353 state, income taxes.

The record discloses that Dr. Strickland contributed in 1946 toward the support of his two daughters $485.50 in excess of the amount required by the decree, or a total of $1685.50. This expenditure is not deductible from his gross income in ascertaining his net income. It is in the same category as family disbursements.

A certified public accountant presented a statement of income and expense of the partnership for the first three months of 1947. It showed a net income before payment of income taxes of $7795.65, one-half of which, $3897.82, belonged to plaintiff. At that rate Dr. Strickland's income from the partnership for 1947 would amount to $15,591.28. Since there are certain deductible items which he, and not the partnership, is entitled to, this amount does not represent his net income.

Approximately a year prior to the hearing on defendant's motion plaintiff was devised a three-sevenths interest in business property located in Portland, the appraised value of the entire property being about $27,000. The estate had not been closed at the time of the hearing and he had not received any income from his inheritance.

In considering the allowance for the support of minor children and for alimony, each case must depend, to a great extent, upon its own facts. Blake v. Blake, 147 Or. 43, 53, 31 P.2d 768. That there has been a material change in the circumstances of plaintiff, defendant, and their two daughters since the entry of the decree of divorce, it is obvious. Plaintiff has been discharged from the armed forces and is engaged in the practice of his profession where his gross income is four times greater than was his pay in the navy. The cost of clothing, maintaining, and educating the daughters is much greater now than it was at that time, due to their ages and the increased cost of living. And defendant also is confronted with the increased cost of living.

The facts are not in dispute. The amount of Dr. Strickland's income is computed from his own evidence. In fixing alimony to be paid by plaintiff the court should take into account the income taxes which he and defendant probably will be compelled to pay. Kraunz v. Kraunz, 293 N.Y. 152, 56 N.E.2d 90; Armour v. Armour, 135 N.J. Eq. 47, 37 A.2d 29. Since October 21, 1942, alimony is taxable income to the recipient and is deductible by the one who pays it. 26 U.S.C.A., Int. Rev. Code, § 22 (k); 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, 1947 Cum. Pocket Supp., § 8.16, p. 163.

There is no defined standard by which the amount to be paid as alimony can be determined by precise mathematical calculations. The amount of alimony to be awarded rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and its decision relative thereto should not be disturbed on appeal except in case of clear abuse. Blake v. Blake, supra. In determining the allowances to a divorced wife for her support and maintenance and for the care, custody and education of the minor children, it is proper to take into consideration the social standing, comforts, and luxuries of life which she and her children probably would have enjoyed but for the divorce. Hogan v. Hogan, 196 Ga. 822, 28 S.E.2d 74; Adams v. Adams, 17 N.J. Misc. 234, 8 A.2d 214; Packard v. Packard, 34 Kan. 53, 7 P. 628.

After a careful examination of all the evidence we are of the opinion that Dr. Strickland should be and hereby is required to pay to defendant as alimony the sum of $200 a month, and for the care, custody and support of the children $90 a month for each child. The order appealed from is dated June 18, 1947, and provides that the first monthly payment of $80 to each child should be made on or before the first day of July, 1947, and we think that the increased allowances herein awarded should commence on that date, and it is so ordered. Defendant is allowed her costs in this court.

HAY, J., did not participate in this decision.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.

Comments

STRICKLAND v. STRICKLAND
(May 11, 1948)