1. Complainant could, if successful, obtain the relief he seeks by a bill brought to set aside the transfers of the real estate here in question. The Declaratory Judgments Act is therefore not available to him.
2. Since the evidence does not establish that the defendant son occupied a dominant position in relation to his father, the complainant, the burden is upon the complainant in his attack upon the transfers, and the question of independent advice does not arise.
3. There is no substance in complainant's argument that he thought that he was retaining the power to sell the real estate; if that is so, there was no purpose to the transaction he now attacks. The deeds and agreements executed by the parties accurately set forth the intent and desire of the complainant. He wanted his son to have the title subject to his life estate, and that is what was accomplished. The transaction was entirely voluntary and was absolute in form. It cannot be revoked.
PER CURIAM.
The decree will be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Vice-Chancellor Grimshaw.
For affirmance — THE CHIEF-JUSTICE, BODINE, DONGES, HEHER, WACHENFELD, EASTWOOD, BURLING, JACOBS, WELLS, DILL, FREUND, McLEAN, SCHETTINO, JJ. 13.
For reversal — COLIE, J. 1.