In 1936, plaintiff, then a resident of Vienna, Austria, opened an account with defendant, a bank in London, England, with the deposit of over £ 4,000. Immediately following the German invasion of Austria in 1938, plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned by the German authorities, who apparently were aware of the existence of that account, and after severe maltreatment wrote to defendant requesting it to pay to the Reichsbank in Vienna the amount standing to his credit. Pursuant to such written authorization, the balance of his account, equivalent to $21,087.18, was transferred to the Reichsbank by the defendant. In this action plaintiff seeks to recover that amount on the grounds that defendant wrongfully divulged the existence of his account to the Germans and that, having knowledge of the fact that the letter requesting transfer of his funds was signed under duress, defendant acted wrongfully in making the payment. In answer to two written questions, the jury found (1) that defendant, without plaintiff's authority, disclosed the existence of plaintiff's account to the Nazis; and (2) that defendant, in paying over plaintiff's account to the Reichsbank, did not act in good faith, in a prudent manner and with active vigilance. Defendant appeals from the judgment in plaintiff's favor in the sum of $35,548.72, entered on the verdict, and also brings up for review an order entered June 8, 1949, striking out the second and third affirmative defenses in its answer, alleging that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Judgment reversed on the law and the facts, with costs, and the complaint dismissed on the law, with costs. In our opinion, while the record sufficiently shows that the German authorities knew of plaintiff's account in defendant's bank, there is a total absence of proof that they acquired that knowledge from the defendant or that defendant in any way disclosed that fact to them. (Cf. White v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 220 N.Y. 131, 135-136; Ruppert v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 154 N.Y. 90, 93-94.) Similarly, the evidence is insufficient to establish that defendant acted negligently or in bad faith in making the payment. Defendant's testimony that it acted in good faith is uncontradicted, is not opposed to the probabilities and is not in its nature surprising or suspicious; and there is no evidence to sustain the jury's finding to the contrary. (Cf. Hull v. Littauer, 162 N.Y. 569, 572.) If the complaint were not dismissed, a new trial would be required because the verdict, in our opinion, is contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. A new trial would also be granted because of the erroneous exclusion of proof that, prior to the payment here involved, other persons, whose accounts had been transferred under circumstances similar to plaintiff's, had thanked defendant for its help and had expressed no resentment that the payments had been made. That proof, tending to show on what information defendant continued its policy of honoring requests for transfers, was competent and material on the question of defendant's good faith, and did not violate the hearsay rule. ( Nowak v. Brotherhood of Amer. Yeomen, 249 N.Y. 78, 83; DuRoy Le Maistre, Inc., v. Gillmore, 246 App. Div. 37, affd. 272 N.Y. 454; 6 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.], § 1789.) Order of June 8, 1949, affirmed, without costs. ( Apton v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., 274 App. Div. 935.) Nolan, P.J., Carswell, Johnston, Adel and Sneed, JJ., concur.