1. An action in Florida under the non-resident motor vehicle statute confers no jurisdiction on the Florida court over the defendant therein when the declaration does not allege that the defendant is a non-resident of Florida.
2. ( a) Under the facts of this case the insurance company was not authorized by the terms of the policy to procure counsel to file a plea for the insured, defendant in the court below, to the merits in an action in a foreign State which did not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, when such plea was filed for the sole purpose of protecting the interests of the insurance company until it could investigate and ascertain whether the injury sued for was covered by the policy issued by it to the insured.
This was a suit by Clarance P. Way against R. D. Turner, in the Civil Court of Fulton County, on a foreign judgment for $1500, plus interest and costs, rendered in a circuit court in the State of Florida, on August 31, 1948. An authenticated copy of the judgment sued on was attached to the plaintiff's petition.
The defendant in his answer denied that he was indebted to the plaintiff on the judgment sued on. He alleged that the court rendering the purported judgment had no jurisdiction of him, that he was not served with said suit, that he did not make an appearance in said cause nor did he authorize anyone to make an appearance therein for him, and that said judgment was void.
On the trial the plaintiff introduced the following documentary evidence. An authenticated copy of the judgment sued on; a copy of the plaintiff's declaration in the Florida suit; a copy of the summons, etc., showing service of the suit on the defendant as a non-resident; copies of papers relating to the steps taken to perfect service on the defendant as a nonresident under §§ 47.29 and 47.30 of the Florida Statutes of 1941 providing for service of process upon non-resident vehicle owners; a copy of "Praecipe for Appearance" filed with the clerk of the circuit court by McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette, and Bradford, a Miami firm of lawyers, requesting the clerk to enter their appearance as attorneys for the defendant; a copy of a plea to the merits of the suit filed in the circuit court in Florida by McKay, etc., as attorneys for the defendant, R. D. Turner; a copy of "Notice of Trial" addressed to R. D. Turner, 944 Rice Street, Atlanta, Georgia, advising him of the place and time of trial of the said case of Clarence P. Way against R. D. Turner in the Florida circuit court; a copy of §§ 47.29 and 47.30, Florida Statutes of 1941.
The defendant introduced the following documentary evidence: A contract between R. D. Turner, as lessor, and the Great Southern Trucking Company, as lessee, dated January 23, 1948, whereby Turner leased to the trucking company his White truck and trailer for a one-way trip from Atlanta, Georgia, to Miami, Florida, at $.15 per mile, one provision in this lease contract being that, "The lessee shall assume direction and control of the leased vehicle and full responsibility to the public, shippers, and consignees, for its operation, and will furnish insurance protection to the public as required by the Interstate Commerce Commission"; a motion for withdrawal by McKay, Dixon, DeJarnette, and Bradford, as attorneys for the defendant in the case of Clarence P. Way against R. D. Turner in the Florida circuit court; an order of the judge permitting the withdrawal of said attorneys, July 1, 1948; a copy of a letter, dated May 27, 1948, by said attorneys to R. D. Turner, addressed to him at 944 Rice Street, Atlanta, Georgia, advising him that they would withdraw as his attorneys in said case; an automobile insurance policy issued to R. D. Turner, 944 Rice Street, Atlanta, Georgia, by the Virginia Surety Company, covering a described White truck and trailer against public liability for (a) personal injuries, and (b) property damage, this policy providing in part. "As respects such insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this policy under coverages A and B, the company shall (a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the company"; and that "It is expressly understood and agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the policy for bodily injury liability and property damage liability does not apply in the event that the named insured shall rent, hire or lease any automobile, truck or tractor and trailer described in or covered by the policy to any other person, firm or corporation and such person, firm or corporation shall not be covered by the policy as an additional name insured"; a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida, Red Top Cab Baggage Co. v. Holt, 154 Fla. 77 ( 16 So.2d, 649), which in effect held that in a suit in Florida against a nonresident under the non-resident motor vehicle statute it was indispensable that the record show that the defendant was a nonresident at the time the cause of action against him accrued.
The defendant testified on trial of the case in the Civil Court of Fulton County that he was not on his truck when it was involved in the collision in Florida; that at the time his truck and his driver were leased to the Great Southern Trucking Company for a one-haul trip from Atlanta, Georgia, to Miami, Florida, at $.15 per mile; that the driver of the truck was, during said time, still carried on his payroll, was his regular employee, and was hauling a load on the truck to Miami for the Great Southern Trucking Company; that witness paid the driver for the trip; that after the driver unloaded the load for the Great Southern Trucking Company in Miami he loaded the same truck with a load of bananas for the defendant and brought them to Atlanta; that he paid the driver for the entire week; that the driver remained in his employ for some time thereafter; that witness learned about the collision the morning after it happened, but did not go to Florida; that he did not receive any notice of any suit and did not authorize anybody to file any appearance for him in the suit filed in Broward County, Florida, and did not employ the attorneys "who purportedly filed an appearance for him."
Upon conclusion of the evidence, on motion of counsel for the defendant, the trial judge directed a verdict for the defendant, and rendered judgment thereon. Counsel for the plaintiff moved for a new trial, and the exception is to the judgment overruling this motion, which includes an assignment of error upon the direction of the verdict.
Other facts not stated in the foregoing statement of the case will be referred to in the opinion.
FELTON, J.
1. It was not alleged by the plaintiff in the declaration in the Florida suit that R. D. Turner, the defendant therein, was a non-resident of Florida at the time his truck and trailer collided with the plaintiff's automobile and as a result of which the plaintiff sustained personal injuries and property damage as alleged. Consequently, the purported service of that suit on the defendant by serving the Secretary of State of Florida, under the provisions of §§ 47.29 and 47.30 of the Florida Statutes of 1941, entitled "Service of Process on Non-resident Motor Vehicle Owners, etc.," was invalid, as it is indispensable in such a proceeding that the record show the non-resident status of the defendant at the time the cause of action accrued. Red Top Cab Baggage Co. v. Holt, 154 Fla. 77 (supra).
2. But the plaintiff in error contends that the defendant, by a personal appearance and a plea to the merits of the case, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Florida court and that the judgment rendered against the defendant in that case, this being the judgment sued on in the present case, is a valid judgment, and also that the defendant ratified the general appearance. The contract of insurance of the Virginia Surety Company with R. D. Turner, covering his White truck and trailer and insuring him against public liability for personal injuries and property damage caused by said truck, provided that "the company shall (a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the insured alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent: but the company shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the company." The affidavit of service made in the Florida case by an attorney for the plaintiff indicated that the two notices of the Florida action were sent by registered mail to the defendant and that they were received by him in person. The record shows, however, that the return receipts were signed by the defendant's wife and not by him. There is in the record a copy of a letter to the defendant from the plaintiff's Florida attorneys advising him that the case was set for trial at Fort Lauderdale on August 30, 1948, which bears a certification by a stenographer that she mailed a copy of the letter to the defendant. There is no competent evidence in the record that it was mailed. There is in the record a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1949, from the insurance company's attorneys to the defendant, advising him of their withdrawal from the case. There is no evidence that the original was mailed. The defendant testified that he did not notify the insurance company of the injury and claim or of the pendency of the action in Florida and that he did not receive either of the registered letters and that he did not receive either of the other two letters. The defendant also testified that he did not authorize anyone to file pleadings for him in the Florida suit and that he did not know anything about the suit in Florida. He stated that his wife gave the notices to the insurance company. The purpose of the stipulation in the insurance policy that the company would defend actions against the insured is a provision designed to benefit the insurance company primarily, but it can only help itself by bona fide helping the insured. It is not necessary for us to decide whether it was an unqualified appointment of the company as an agent to procure counsel to defend the case, and if so whether it carried with it the authority to waive the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant. But assuming that the provision did provide such authority, it did not authorize the insurance company to file a temporary and provisional defense to the action, in effect solely for its own protection. The record shows that the defense was filed by attorneys for the insurance company "until they could complete investigation of the accident." When investigation revealed to their satisfaction that their policy did not cover the accident, the attorneys got permission from the court to withdraw their names. The attorneys had filed a plea to the merits, thereby waiving the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the defendant, the petition not having alleged that the defendant was a non-resident of Florida. The order of the Florida court allowing the attorneys to withdraw from the case meant one of two things: it operated as a withdrawal of their names and also their provisional pleading or it permitted a withdrawal of the names and left in court what amounted to an unconditional pleading which subjected the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. If the policy provision authorized the insurance company lawyers to defend, it authorized only a bona fide, full, complete and irrevocable pleading in the defendant's behalf, and not a provisional defense solely in the insurance company's behalf. If the order allowing the attorneys' withdrawal operated to withdraw the pleadings, which it certainly should have done, under the facts revealed to the Florida court, the court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment against the defendant. If it did not have the effect of withdrawing the pleadings as well as the names of the attorneys, the order allowing the attorneys to withdraw from the case was void because it was rendered without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard and without his consent, even if he received the notice that the attorneys would withdraw their names. Whether this is true or not the facts upon which the Florida court evidently held that the pleadings were ratified were shown in the Georgia trial to be untrue. The evidence shows that there was no ratification of the filing of the pleadings for the defendant with the defendant's full knowledge of the facts. Even if the defendant had known all the facts there was no ratification because the pleading was not filed for him and in his behalf in the first instance but was filed solely for the insurance company until it decided whether in its opinion its policy covered the accident. The pleadings filed in the Florida court were not authorized by the provisions of the policy; they were not authorized by the defendant in any other way; and the defendant did not ratify them after full knowledge of the true facts, especially the fact that the original declaration in the case did not give the Florida court jurisdiction to render a judgment against him. Such a judgment is subject to attack. Anderson v. Crawford, 147 Ga. 460 ( 94 S.E. 574, L.R.A. 1918B, 894); 5 Am. Jur. 310, § 83; 34 C. J. 537, § 840, p. 1148, § 1625; 88 A.L.R. 36. The trial court was correct in directing a verdict for the defendant as no other verdict was possible under the evidence.
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre, P. J., and Gardner and Townsend, JJ., concur. Sutton, C. J., and Worrill, J., dissent.