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Attorney(S)

J. Leon Rabben, for appellant. Herman J. Tahl, for appellee.

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Schwartz Estate — Superior Court of Pennsylvania (March 14, 1950)

Factual and Procedural Background

Ferdinand Schwartz died March 20, 1948, leaving a holographic will that named his daughter Rose Weinberg and her husband Samuel as executors. Samuel renounced; Rose did not. The will referred throughout to the testator's "executor" in the singular. Gizella Schwartz, the widow, obtained letters c.t.a. and operated the decedent's small retail store during administration. Rose Weinberg agreed to or did not protest the continued operation of the store while Gizella lived. Gizella died August 26, 1948. After her death, Rose petitioned to revoke the letters previously issued to the widow and subsequently became executrix c.t.a. Julius Blum obtained letters testamentary under Gizella's will and filed an account purporting to state the account of Gizella as administratrix c.t.a., as presented by Blum as executor of Gizella.

The Orphans' Court audited the account; objections by Rose Weinberg (twelve main objections with numerous subdivisions) were passed upon, many determined against her, and a final decree was entered. The executrix appealed (Appeal No. 259, Oct. T., 1949) from the decree of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County, record remitted to the Superior Court. In the audit account Blum charged himself with assets set up in the appraisement of the Ferdinand Schwartz estate totaling $925.00 and noted they had been turned over to Rose Weinberg; by agreement of the parties and the judge such delivery was to be treated as though no assets had been delivered to the executrix for purposes of the audit.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a widow's lump-sum deduction listed in a return and affidavit for state transfer inheritance tax, without claiming specific goods or having them set aside, is a sufficient claim for the widow's exemption.
What presumption governs ownership of household goods between husband and wife — specifically, whether household goods are presumed to belong to the husband or to the spouses as tenants by the entireties under the married women's property acts.
Whether an executor of a deceased fiduciary is personally liable for assets of the deceased fiduciary and, if so, the extent of that personal liability.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Catanzaritti v. Bianco, 131 Pa. Super. 207, 198 A. 806	Executor of deceased fiduciary personally liable only for assets which come into his possession from the deceased fiduciary.	Applied to state that Blum, as executor of the deceased fiduciary, was personally liable only for assets coming into his possession.
Wagner's Estate, 227 Pa. 460, 76 A. 215	Executor of deceased fiduciary personally liable only for assets which come into his possession from the deceased fiduciary.	Applied alongside Catanzaritti v. Bianco to support the rule limiting personal liability of an executor of a deceased fiduciary.
Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 18, 63 A.2d 477	Presumption regarding ownership of household goods (held that household goods are presumed to belong to the husband); authority on sufficiency of widow's claim.	Followed by the court: the presumption that household goods belong to the husband is adhered to; cited in support of disallowing the widow's lump-sum exemption claim as insufficient.
Davies' Estate, 146 Pa. Super. 7, 21 A.2d 517	Authority on sufficiency of widow's claim for exemption.	Applied to support the court's conclusion that the widow's lump-sum deduction without claiming specific goods or having them set aside is insufficient.
Bell's Estate, 139 Pa. Super. 11, 10 A.2d 835	Explains the purpose of the widow's exemption statute: to make immediate provision for the wants of the family.	Quoted to show the statutory exemption's purpose and to justify disallowing the widow's lump-sum claim when no immediate provision was evidenced.
Hunter's Commonplace Book, page 1390	Cited as authority on the insufficiency of the widow's claim.	Relied upon by the court in concluding the widow's lump-sum claim was insufficient.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the audit and the extensive testimony and determined that the Orphans' Court adjudication was "manifestly correct" except in two respects treated expressly in the opinion.

First, regarding the widow's exemption: while acting as administratrix c.t.a., Gizella Schwartz in a return and affidavit for state transfer inheritance tax listed a widow's exemption as a deduction but only as a lumping charge. At her death she had never claimed any specific goods nor had any goods set aside to her. The court applied prior authorities (Matheny Estate; Davies' Estate; Bell's Estate; Hunter's Commonplace Book) to conclude that such a lumping, unspecified claim is legally insufficient. Bell's Estate was cited for the proposition that the purpose of the widow's exemption statute is to make immediate provision for the family; the court found no evidence that Gizella was prevented by illness or other cause from making a proper, specific claim and therefore disallowed the exemption.

Second, concerning ownership of household goods: the auditing judge had held that, because of the married women's property acts, there is a presumption that household goods are owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. The Superior Court adhered to Matheny Estate and held instead that the presumption is that household goods belong to the husband. The court grounded this presumption on the husband's duty to provide his wife with a home, which includes household goods, and stated that this duty is unaffected by the married women's property acts.

On the procedural and executor-liability point, the court observed that Julius Blum, as executor of the deceased fiduciary, is personally liable only for assets which came into his possession from the deceased fiduciary (citing Catanzaritti v. Bianco and Wagner's Estate). Blum had charged himself with assets amounting to $925.00, noting they had been turned over to Rose Weinberg; the auditing judge found that charging delivery prior to audit was improper and could be refused. By agreement to save costs, the parties and judge treated the matter as if no assets had been delivered to the executrix for the purposes of the audit.

Finally, because the record contained extensive testimony and some questions remained about ownership of household goods, the Superior Court remitted the record to the court below to take additional testimony limited to ownership of the household goods and then to restate its adjudication in accordance with the opinion. Costs were assessed against the estate.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the Orphans' Court adjudication generally but (1) disallowed the widow's lump-sum exemption claim as legally insufficient; (2) held that the presumption is that household goods belong to the husband (not that they are owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties); (3) reaffirmed that an executor of a deceased fiduciary is personally liable only for assets that came into his possession; and (4) remitted the record to the court below for additional testimony limited to ownership of household goods and for restatement of its adjudication. Costs were to be paid by the estate.

Implications: The direct effects are (a) the widow's lump-sum deduction is disallowed when no specific goods are claimed or set aside, (b) the presumption of ownership of household goods runs in favor of the husband, and (c) an executor of a deceased fiduciary's personal liability is limited to assets that actually came into his possession. The opinion applies and follows existing Pennsylvania authorities (including Matheny Estate) and does not announce a new legal doctrine beyond those applications.

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Schwartz Estate.

Executors and administrators — Executor of deceased fiduciary — Liability — Decedents' estates — Widow's exemption — Sufficiency of claim.

1. The executor of a deceased fiduciary is personally liable only for assets which come into his possession from the deceased fiduciary.

2. Where it appeared that a widow, acting as administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of her deceased husband, in a return and affidavit for state transfer inheritance tax, set up a widow's exemption as a deduction, but only as a lumping charge; and that when she had died she had never claimed any specific goods nor had them set aside to her; it was Held that the claim by the widow was insufficient.

Evidence — Presumptions — Ownership of household goods — Husband and wife.

3. The presumption is that household goods belong to the husband.

4. Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 18, followed.

Argued October 6, 1949.

OPINION BY ARNOLD, J., March 14, 1950:

Ferdinand Schwartz died March 20, 1948, testate, appointing as his "Executor" his daughter by a former marriage, Rose Weinberg, and her husband, Samuel. The latter renounced, but the daughter did not. The holographic will of the testator referred throughout to the testator's "executor" (singular number), and Gizella Schwartz, his widow (apparently believing that Samuel Weinberg was the only executor), obtained letters c. t. a. in the estate of Ferdinand Schwartz. She continued to operate decedent's small store, which carried some tobacco but principally a stock of goods attractive to children, such as candy and toys. Harmonious relations existed between the widow and her step-daughter until Gizella Schwartz died August 26, 1948. During the lifetime of Gizella Schwartz Mrs. Weinberg agreed to, or did not protest against, the continued operation of the store by Gizella Schwartz, the purpose being to have it sold as a going concern. Thereafter difficulties arose between Julius Blum, the brother of Gizella Schwartz, and Rose Weinberg.

After the death of Gizella Schwartz, Mrs. Weinberg petitioned to revoke the letters issued to the widow. Further proceedings were involved, and not in accordance with proper practice, but Rose Weinberg became executrix c. t. a. of Ferdinand Schwartz. Julius Blum obtained letters testamentary under the will of Gizella Schwartz and filed "an account of Gizella Schwartz, Administratrix c. t. a. . . . as stated by Julius Blum, Executor . . . of Gizella Schwartz."

Blum, the executor of the deceased fiduciary, was personally liable only for assets which came into his possession from the deceased fiduciary: Catanzaritti v. Bianco, 131 Pa. Super. 207, 198 A. 806; Wagner's Estate, 227 Pa. 460, 76 A. 215. Blum, in this account, charged himself with the assets set up in the appraisement of the Ferdinand Schwartz estate amounting to $925.00, with a notation that the same had been turned over to Rose Weinberg, executrix of Ferdinand Schwartz. As the auditing judge stated, this was not proper and audit could be refused, since the turning over was prior to the audit of the account. In order to save costs, the parties and the judge agreed that it be treated as though no assets had been delivered to the executrix of Ferdinand Schwartz.

With great patience the auditing judge permitted 199 pages of testimony to be taken, — most of which was of dubious relevancy but admitted in order that no possible injustice be done. The objections of Rose Weinberg, the present appellant, (also a legatee of Ferdinand Schwartz) were then passed upon. These consisted of twelve main objections with numerous subdivisions under each objection. Many of these questions were determined against the exceptant, and she appealed.

We do not propose to discuss in detail all of the questions raised in the orphans' court, for the judge's adjudication was manifestly correct, and his duty discharged with wisdom and in accordance with law, except in two instances.

I. While acting as administratrix c. t. a. of Ferdinand Schwartz, Gizella Schwartz, widow, on June 15, 1948, in a return and affidavit for state transfer inheritance tax, set up a widow's exemption as a deduction, but only as a lumping charge. When she died on August 26, 1948, she had never claimed any specific goods nor had them set aside to her. Under all of the cases this is an insufficient claim by the widow: Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 18, 63 A.2d 477; Davies' Estate, 146 Pa. Super. 7, 21 A.2d 517; Hunter's Commonplace Book, page 1390. In Bell's Estate, 139 Pa. Super. 11, 10 A.2d 835, it was held that the purpose of the widow's exemption statute was to make immediate provision for the wants of the family. In the instant case there is no evidence that the widow was prevented by illness or otherwise from making a proper claim. She knew the provisions of the will and of her appointment as fiduciary. The exemption must be disallowed.

II. The auditing judge held that because of the married women's property acts there is a presumption that household goods are owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. In Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 18, 63 A.2d 477, we held that the presumption was that the household goods belong to the husband. To this rule we adhere. It was based upon the duty of a husband to provide his wife with a home, which, of course, means household goods and not merely roof and walls. This duty of the husband is unaffected by the married women's property acts.

The record is remitted to the court below to take additional testimony, limiting it to the ownership of the household goods, and then to restate its adjudication in accordance with this opinion; costs to be paid by the estate.

SCHWARTZ ESTATE