CHAPMAN, Justice.
The plaintiff-appellee, as a real estate broker, was awarded a judgment below in the sum of $4,640.00 for services rendered in procuring lessees ready, able and willing to enter into a 99 year lease embracing described real estate situated in Dade County, Florida, owned by the estate of Charles Hedley Lyne. The case was submitted to a jury on issues made by two common counts of a declaration and a bill of particulars attached, and three pleas of the several defendants thereto. Dr. John W. Shisler was administrator of the Charles Hedley Lyne Estate.
Plaintiffs-appellants' second amended declaration, with bill of particulars attached, is viz.:
"Second Amended Declaration.
"Comes Now the Plaintiff, Frances O. Warriner, a real estate broker duly registered and licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, by and through her undersigned attorneys, and sues the defendants jointly and severally for that:
"1. The said defendants are indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of Eleven Thousand Six hundred sixty-six and 66/100 ($11,666.66) for money payable by defendants to plaintiff for services as a real estate broker done and rendered by plaintiff for defendants at their request.
"2. And in a like sum for work done and material furnished by plaintiff for defendants at their request."
The defendants, other than Dr. Shisler, filed three pleas to the declaration, supra: (1) defendants never promised as alleged; (2) defendants denied that any services as a real estate broker were done and rendered by plaintiff for defendants at their request; (3) defendants were never indebted as alleged. Dr. Shisler plead to the amended declaration, supra; (1) he never promised as alleged; (2) that any services as a real estate broker were not done and rendered by plaintiff at his request; and the third plea was the Statutes of Fraud. The verdict and judgment thereon was against the appellants-defendants and an appeal therefrom has been perfected here.
Counsel for appellants-defendants assign as reversible error: (1) the several adverse rulings of the trial court in settling the issues made by the pleadings; (2) the trial court's adverse ruling on the motion of the appellants-defendants for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff-appellee's case; (3) the trial court's adverse ruling on motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of receipt of all the testimony; (4) insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence for various reasons to sustain the verdict and judgment; (5) as to Dr. Shisler the testimony was contrary to the probative weight of the testimony; (6) the amended declaration was legally insufficient to support the verdict and judgment entered below. The several adverse rulings are set out and argued in the briefs and have been heard at the bar of the Court under nine separate questions. The several questions have been consolidated for the purpose of argument.
It is contended by the defendants-appellants that an individual verdict and judgment against John Shisler cannot legally be sustained on this record. Numerous authorities are cited in support of the contention. On this point charges 10 to 12, inclusive, of the trial court here pertinent are viz.:
"10. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that whenever it appears expedient and for the best interest of an estate of a decedent to leave any real property, land, of the estate, the Administrator of the estate may lease the real property, land, by private sale, provided that the lease is confirmed after it is made by order of the County Judge upon notice being first given to all persons interested in the estate, or that the County Judge authorizes the lease before it is made upon notice being first given to all persons interested in the estate.
"11. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that under the laws of the State of Florida, the title to real estate vests in the heirs at law immediately upon the death of the owner, but the real estate is an asset in the hands of the Administrator for the payment of debts, family allowance, inheritance taxes, claims against the estate, and other charges and expenses of administration, and for distribution.
"12. I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that an Administrator of an estate may be sued in his individual capacity on contracts made by him for payment for services of a real estate broker, and any amount recovered against the Administrator in his individual capacity, if the same was a matter properly chargeable to the estate — that is to say, a matter about which an Administrator was empowered to contract for the benefit of the estate — may be allowed to the Administrator by the Probate Court in the settlement of his accounts."
The case of Brickell v. McCaskill, 90 Fla. 441, 106 So. 470, 472, was a suit on the common counts, similar in many respects to the suit at bar, to recover an attorney fee for services rendered the decedent prior to her death and the representatives of the estate continued the services of the attorneys after decedent's death. We, in part, said:
"The services were to be performed in and about the transfer of certain of her real estate, located in and near the City of Miami, and the procuring of the passage of a city ordinance abandoning part of a certain street and quitclaiming the land to her. When she died, these lands descended to her heirs, not to her executors. It does not appear that the personal property of the estate was insufficient to pay the debts of the deceased, nor the legatees under her will. The continuation of the employment of the attorneys by the executors in relation to a matter for the benefit of the heirs of Mrs. Brickell, in whom the title to her lands vested upon her demise, does not appear to be such an agreement as the executors were empowered to make for the estate. Therefore so much of the plaintiffs' claim as had been earned by them before the death of Mrs. Brickell was properly the subject of an action against her legal representatives; but so much of it as was earned by service after her death upon the request of the defendants, if such was the fact, is the subject of an action against the defendants in their individual capacity, for which judgment may be recovered de bonis propriis.
"Any amount so recovered against the defendants in their individual capacity, if the same was a matter properly chargeable to the estate — that is to say, a matter about which they, as executors, were empowered to contract for the benefit of the estate — may be allowed to them by the probate court in the settlement of their accounts. * * *"
It is our conclusion that the rule enunciated in Brickell v. McCaskill, supra, is here controlling.
It appears from the record that the plaintiff personally contacted the defendants-appellants about a 99 year lease on the property and considerable time was consumed in working out the terms and conditions of the proposed lease. The defendants-appellants wanted higher annual rentals each time a lessee was obtained. It appears that neither Dr. Shisler nor the other appellants ever signed an instrument of writing about the 99 year lease, but checks were sent to Dr. Shisler on the lease. He returned the same through his attorney. Subsequent negotiations were held in an attorney's office, which were attended by the appellants and other interested parties. The terms and conditions of the 99 year lease were agreed upon by the parties, and the instrument then, according to the agreement, was to be retyped and signed by the parties as a finished product. The amount of the broker's commission was calculated and she was requested to get the lessee to assume $5,000.00 of the commission. This was agreed to by the lessees. Exhibits in writing used by the parties at the meeting were made a part of the record.
It is true that the plaintiff-appellee and her witnesses gave testimony as to what occurred at the meeting in the attorney's office, but the defendants-appellants testified to a different set of facts as testified to by the plaintiff-appellee and her witnesses. The plaintiff-appellee's direct testimony covers about forty pages and her testimony on cross-examination covers around eighty pages. The plaintiff's testimony was strongly corroborated by the testimony of the lessees and attorney Roth. It was the prerogative of the jury to decide which set of witnesses it would believe. The jury by its verdict elected to believe the testimony of the plaintiff-appellee and her witnesses and refused or declined to accept the testimony of the defendants-appellants. We find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the verdict for the plaintiff as found by the jury. Errors by the trial court on its instructions to the jury have not been clearly made to appear.
Further contentions asserted are viz.: (1) the two counts of the amended declaration failed to state a cause of action; (2) that no agreement in writing about the property was signed by John W. Shisler; (3) the two counts of the amended declaration as submitted should have been against Shisler in a representative and not in an individual capacity; (4) the terms and conditions of the proposed 99 year lease were, as a matter of law, subject to the approval of the heirs; (5) the terms and conditions of the proposed lease were not acceptable to the defendants-appellants for the reason the commission was not earned; (6) it appears from all the evidence that the broker failed to produce persons ready, able and willing to enter into the proposed 99 year lease as prepared in the attorney's office; (7) the terms of the broker's employment were for a lease of the property and not to produce a person ready, able and willing to lease the property according to the terms of the lease prepared in the attorney's office.
The answer to the contentions, supra, is found in the disputes and conflicts in the testimony when considered in its entirety. If the defendants-appellants' testimony is believed, then a verdict in their behalf must be entered. If the testimony of the plaintiff-appellee is believed, then the verdict must be in her behalf. We find in the record nothing more or less than disputes and conflicts in the evidence to be decided by a jury under appropriate instructions. We fail to find error in the record.
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.