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Docket Number

No. 10551.

Attorney(S)

Mr. Joseph A. McMenamin, Washington, D.C., with whom Mr. Robert I. Miller, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant. Mr. Arthur L. Willcher, Washington, D.C., with whom Mr. Sol Rothbard, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees.

Judges

Bennett Champ Clark

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Smart Summary

WIGGINS v. SMITH et al. — Summary of Opinion (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1950)

Court: United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Docket: No. 10551. Argued: May 11, 1950. Decided: June 15, 1950. Panel: CLARK, FAHY and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges. Opinion: CLARK, Circuit Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal by the caveatee challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict finding undue influence in the procurement of a will. The will at issue, executed December 9, 1947 (the night before the testatrix underwent amputation of her leg), left virtually everything to the caveatee except $25 bequests to the caveators, who are sisters of the caveatee. The caveatee had lived continuously with the testatrix for about fifteen years; the caveators had lived off and on with the testatrix. After the caveatee proved due execution of the will, the caveators produced evidence on undue influence. The district court submitted the matter to a jury, which returned a verdict finding undue influence; the caveatee appealed and assigned error also to the admission of a case read to the jury (an objection the record shows was waived).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether there was sufficient evidence of undue influence to sustain the jury's verdict.
Whether the trial court erred in permitting counsel for the caveators to read a case to the jury which the appellant contended was inapposite (the record shows any objection was waived).

Arguments of the Parties

Caveators' Evidence and Contentions

The caveatee occupied a confidential and fiduciary relation to the testatrix and handled all her affairs.
The caveatee participated in preparation of the will by engaging the attorney, giving instructions as to its contents, and arranging for the witnesses.
The caveatee gave the will to one of the witnesses who took it to the testatrix in the hospital the night it was executed and then immediately took it back to the caveatee.
The caveatee did not inform the caveators of the will's execution and there was known friction among the sisters.
The testatrix was sick, in great pain, elderly, had been given sedatives the day she executed the will, and had previously stated an intention to make a different disposition of her property.

Caveatee's Evidence and Contentions

The caveatee sought to explain or deny the facts and circumstances that gave rise to a presumption of undue influence.
Her witnesses testified to countervailing facts, but their testimony was impeached and the jury apparently disbelieved them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Barbour v. Moore, 1897, 10 App.D.C. 30, 46.	The proposition that "Undue influence ... is nearly always a matter of inference from facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence of the conditions and surroundings of the parties."	The court relied on this principle to conclude that, while many of the individual facts might be inadequate alone, the aggregate of the proven facts and circumstances supported a presumption that the will reflected the wishes of the principal beneficiary (the caveatee) rather than those of the testatrix, permitting the jury to infer undue influence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the sufficiency of evidence by first recounting the facts the caveators proved: the close, confidential, and fiduciary relationship between the caveatee and the testatrix; the caveatee's active role in procuring the will (engaging the attorney, instructing as to contents, arranging witnesses); the delivery of the executed will to the caveatee immediately after execution in the hospital; the caveatee's failure to inform her sisters of the will; friction among the sisters; and the testatrix's condition (sick, in pain, elderly, sedated on the day of execution) and prior statements indicating a different intended disposition.

Applying the cited legal principle that undue influence is "nearly always a matter of inference from facts and circumstances," the court concluded that, although any single fact might be insufficient standing alone, the cumulative weight of the facts—if believed by the triers of fact—gave rise to a presumption that the will was the product of the caveatee's influence rather than the independent intention of the testatrix.

The court then addressed the caveatee's efforts to rebut that presumption. The caveatee presented witnesses to explain or deny the facts and circumstances, but those witnesses' testimony was sufficiently impeached that credibility became for the jury to decide. Because the jury apparently rejected the caveatee's evidence and accepted the caveators' evidence, the jury's inference of undue influence was supported by the record.

Separately, the appellant had assigned error to the trial court's permitting counsel for the caveators to read an inapposite case to the jury; the record showed the appellant waived any objection to that conduct, so no reversible error was found on that point.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the court below is Affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the jury verdict finding undue influence was upheld and the lower-court judgment was affirmed. The court treated the aggregate factual circumstances as sufficient to permit a jury to infer undue influence and found that the caveatee's attempted explanations were for the jury to weigh. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal rule beyond application of existing precedent (Barbour v. Moore) and does not discuss broader doctrinal changes; it affirms the result based on the sufficiency of evidence and the jury's credibility determinations.

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WIGGINS v. SMITH et al.

CLARK, Circuit Judge.

This appeal by the caveatee presents the question of whether there was sufficient evidence of undue influence to sustain the verdict. Appellant assigns one other error to the proceedings below, stating that the court erred in permitting counsel for the caveators to read a case to the jury which was inapposite. The record reveals, however, that appellant waived any objection she may have had in this regard.

The caveators and the caveatee were sisters. The caveators had lived off and on with their mother, the testatrix, while the caveatee had lived with her continuously for some fifteen years up to the time when she died in January of 1949. The will in question was executed by the testatrix on the 9th of December 1947, the night before she was to undergo a serious operation for the amputation of her leg. In it everything was left to the caveatee except for bequests of $25 each to the caveators.

After the caveatee had proved the due execution of the will, the caveators came forward with their proof on the issue of undue influence. They showed that the caveatee and principal beneficiary under the will occupied a confidential and fiduciary relation to the testatrix and handled all her affairs; that she participated in the preparation of the will by engaging the attorney and by giving him the instructions as to the contents thereof and by arranging for the witnesses; that she gave it to one of the witnesses who took it to the testatrix in the hospital the night it was executed and immediately thereafter turned it over to the caveatee; that the caveatee never informed caveators of the execution of this will; that there was friction amongst the sisters; and that the caveatee continued in her confidential and fiduciary capacity with testatrix until her death. They further showed that the testatrix, both prior to and at the time of the execution of the will, was sick and in great pain; that during the day on which she executed the will she had been given sedatives; that she was an elderly woman; and that she had made statements on an earlier date that she intended to make a different disposition of her property than the one disclosed by the will.

As we have said, "`Undue influence * * * is nearly always a matter of inference from facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence of the conditions and surroundings of the parties * * *'" In the instant case, although any one of these facts or circumstances, standing alone, might be inadequate to give rise to a presumption of undue influence, when taken in the aggregate, and if believed by the triers of fact, they are undoubtedly sufficient to give rise to the presumption that the instant writing expressed the wishes of the principal beneficiary rather than those of the testatrix and was brought about by the former's influence over the latter.

Barbour v. Moore, 1897, 10 App.D.C. 30, 46.

The caveatee sought to countervail the presumption thus raised by explaining or denying the above mentioned facts and circumstances. The testimony of her witnesses, however, was sufficiently impeached so that the question of their credibility became a matter for the jury to decide. Apparently the jury chose to disbelieve the caveatee's evidence, and, believing that of the caveators, drew therefrom the legitimate inference that there was undue influence. That there was sufficient evidence to support the inference cannot be denied. The judgment of the court below is accordingly affirmed.

Affirmed.

WIGGINS v. SMITH