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Attorney(S)

Gerald D. Prather, for appellant. F. Joseph Thomas, for appellee.

Judges

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE BELL, June 26, 1950:

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Smart Summary

Martin Estate — Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (June 26, 1950)

Factual and Procedural Background

Mary Martin died leaving a will but no residuary clause, a surviving husband and no issue. The record does not contain a copy of the holographic will. The surviving husband elected to take against his wife's will and petitioned for an allowance of $10,000 and for appointment of appraisers, asserting he was entitled under the Intestate Act of 1947 to the first $10,000 and one-half of the balance of the estate of which his wife died intestate. The petition sought to have the $10,000 allowance set aside out of certain real estate that the decedent died intestate as to. Exceptions to the petition were filed by an heir at law; the Orphans' Court of Crawford County dismissed those exceptions. The heir at law appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court reversed the order below and directed entry of a conforming order; each party was to pay its own costs. (Oral argument April 10, 1950; decision June 26, 1950; reargument refused August 16, 1950.)

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a surviving spouse who elects to take against a will in a case of partial intestacy is entitled to the $10,000 allowance specified in § 2(3) of the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947.
Whether the Wills Act of April 24, 1947 or the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947 governs the disposition of all the decedent's property when the decedent dies wholly or partially testate and the surviving spouse elects to take against the will.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellee (Surviving Husband) — Arguments

The husband contended that the Intestate Act governs the disposition of property of the decedent that was not disposed of by will, and therefore he was entitled to the first $10,000 in value and one-half of the balance of the intestate portion of the estate under § 2(3) of the Intestate Act of 1947.
He argued that the Wills Act governs only property disposed of by will and does not determine descent of intestate property.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the opposing party's (the heir at law's) specific legal arguments beyond stating that exceptions were filed and subsequently dismissed by the Orphans' Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Phipps v. Kirk, 333 Pa. 478, 5 A.2d 143	Principle for statutory construction: when a statute is changed or replaced, legislative intent is ascertained by considering occasion, reason, necessity, circumstances, mischief to be remedied, object to be obtained, and the old law.	The Court invoked this principle in interpreting the 1947 Wills Act and Intestate Act to determine legislative intent regarding a spouse's election and allowance.
Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112	Same rule of statutory construction as in Phipps: use contextual factors to ascertain legislative intent when language is not explicit.	Used to support the approach of examining legislative history and prior law to harmonize the two 1947 Acts.
National Transit Company v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239	Permits consideration of legislative commission or committee reports in ascertaining meaning where obscurity or ambiguity exists (debate not relevant).	Cited to justify consulting the Joint State Government Commission comments on the 1947 Acts to resolve ambiguity about the spouse's allowance on election.
Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139	Same as National Transit Co.: committee reports may be considered when legislative intent is ambiguous.	Supported reliance on the Commission's comments explaining omissions and cross-references between the two Acts.
Lee's Appeal, 124 Pa. 74, 16 A. 514	Statement of the former law under the 1917 Intestate Act: the $5,000 (then) allowance applied only to actual intestacy and not where the surviving spouse elects to take against the will.	The Court used Lee's Appeal to show continuity of the basic rule that a spouse electing against a will did not receive the statutory allowance applicable to intestacy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory texts at issue. Section 8 of the Wills Act of 1947 grants a surviving spouse, upon election to take against the will when a married person "dies testate as to any part of his estate," a specified share: "one-half of the real and personal estate of the testator." The Intestate Act's Sections 1 and 2 provide for descent of property "not disposed of by will" and, in § 2(3), describe the surviving spouse's share where there is no issue as the first $10,000 and one-half of the balance.

The Court addressed the husband's contention that intestate property must descend under the Intestate Act (and thus fund the $10,000 allowance) by focusing on the nature of an election to take against the will. Because the husband was claiming by virtue of an election, the Court held that the Wills Act specifically governs that situation. The Court construed the Wills Act to apply not only to property passing under a will but also to the disposition of all of a decedent's property, wholly or partially testate, when the surviving spouse elects to take against the will. This interpretation harmonized the language of both Acts.

To resolve any ambiguity, the Court examined (1) the pre-existing law, which excluded the allowance in cases of election against a will, and (2) the comments of the Joint State Government Commission that drafted the new Acts. The Commission's comments explicitly stated that Section 8 of the Wills Act was written to make clear that a spouse taking against the will does not receive the $10,000 allowance and explained that the omission of the proviso in the Intestate Act was intentional because the election situation was covered by the Wills Act. The Court relied on established principles allowing resort to prior law and committee reports (as supported by cited precedents) to ascertain legislative intent.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the surviving husband's election to take against his wife's will entitled him to the share prescribed by Section 8 of the Wills Act (one-half of the real and personal estate), and not to a separate $10,000 allowance under the Intestate Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree of the Orphans' Court was REVERSED. The Court held that a surviving spouse who elects to take against a will is not entitled to the $10,000 allowance under § 2(3) of the Intestate Act of 1947; instead, the surviving spouse taking against the will is entitled to one-half of the decedent's real and personal estate as provided in Section 8 of the Wills Act of 1947.

Implications: The direct effect is that the surviving husband's claim to the first $10,000 plus one-half of the intestate residue was denied; his entitlement is limited to one-half of the estate under the Wills Act as a result of his election. The Court grounded this result in the interpretation of the 1947 Wills and Intestate Acts together with the Joint State Government Commission's explanatory comments and earlier controlling authority. The Court directed the entry of a conforming order and allocated costs so that each party pay its own costs.

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Martin Estate.

Wills — Partial intestacy — Surviving spouse — Election to take against will — Wills Act of 1947 — Intestate Act of 1947.

1. Where a partial intestacy exists, a surviving spouse who elects to take against the will is not entitled to the $10,000 allowance under § 2(3) of the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 80. [280-5]

2. The Wills Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 89, governs the disposition of all of the property of a decedent who dies wholly or partially testate, as to a surviving spouse who elects to take against the will. [282-3]

Statutes — Construction — Legislative intention — New statute — Necessity for law — Circumstances — Object — Report of legislative commission or committee.

3. When an act is changed or repealed and a new or similar act enacted to take its place, and when the words or meaning of such statute are not explicit or clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered not only by a consideration of the new act but also by examining the occasion, reason or necessity for the law; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief, if any, to be remedied; the object to be obtained; and the old law upon the subject. [283]

4. In ascertaining the legislative meaning, the report of a legislative commission or a Senate or House committee may, if obscurity or ambiguity exists, be considered. [283]

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE BELL, June 26, 1950:

Mary Martin died testate, leaving a surviving husband but no issue. The Record does not contain a copy of her home drawn will but the will did not contain a residuary clause. The husband elected to take against the will and thereafter claimed that he was entitled, under the Intestate Laws, to $10,000 and one-half (1/2) of the balance of the estate of which his wife died intestate. In pursuance of his said right, the husband petitioned to have his allowance of $10,000 set aside to him out of certain real estate of which the decedent died intestate.

These facts raise a narrow but close question: Does the Wills Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 89, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 180.1 et seq., or the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, P. L. 80, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 1.1 et seq., govern?

Section 8 of the Wills Act of 1947 provides as follows: "(a) Right of Election. When a married person dies testate as to any part of his estate, the surviving spouse while living shall have a right of election under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated. (b) Share of Estate. The surviving spouse, upon an election to take against the will, shall be entitled . . . to one-half of the real and personal estate of the testator."

Italics throughout, ours.

This language is clear and specifically covers the instant case where the married woman died testate as to part of her estate and the surviving spouse elected to take against the will. At first blush it would therefore seem to clearly and specifically apply to and rule the instant case. However, Sections 1 and 2 of the Intestate Act of 1947 provide: Sec. 1 "The real and personal estate of a decedent, whether male or female, subject to payment of debts and charges, and not disposed of by will or otherwise, shall descend as hereinafter provided." Sec. 2 "The surviving spouse shall be entitled to the following share or shares: . . . (3) No Issue. The first ten thousand dollars in value and one-half of the balance of the estate, if the decedent is survived by no issue. . . ."

The surviving husband claims that the real estate of his deceased wife which was not disposed of by will shall descend in such manner that he is entitled to the first $10,000 in value and one-half of the balance of the estate not disposed of by his wife's will. The husband contends that the Wills Act governs only property disposed of by will and that therefore all property of which the decedent died intestate must descend under the Intestate Act. The vice of this argument which, at first blush, is persuasive, is that the husband is claiming by virtue of an election to take against the will. The 1947 Intestate Act does not contain a provision covering such an election, but that situation is clearly and specifically covered by the 1947 Wills Act. The 1947 Wills Act deals not only with property passing under a will, but also deals clearly and specifically with the disposition of all of the property of a decedent who dies wholly or partially testate, in the event that the surviving spouse elects to take against the will. This construction gives effect to the language of both Acts and harmonizes the provisions of both the Wills Act and the Intestate Act.

That this is the correct construction is further evident from an examination of the former law and of the comments of the Commission which drafted the aforesaid Acts.

When an act is changed or repealed and a new or similar act enacted to take its place, or when the words or meaning of a statute are not explicit or clear, the intention of the legislature is to be gathered not only by a consideration of the new act but also by examining the occasion, reason or necessity for the law; the circumstances under which it was enacted; the mischief, if any, to be remedied; the object to be obtained; and the old law upon the subject: Phipps v. Kirk, 333 Pa. 478, 5 A.2d 143; Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 66, 155 A. 112.

Moreover, in ascertaining the legislative meaning, while what is said in debate is not relevant, the report of a legislative commission or a Senate or House committee may, if obscurity or ambiguity exists, be considered: National Transit Company v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239; Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139.

In the light of these clearly established principles, we have no doubt that the Wills Act applies to the instant case. Under the law prior to the aforesaid Acts, the $10,000 allowance was awardable and applied "only to cases of actual intestacy, . . . and not to cases where the surviving spouse shall elect to take against the will of the deceased spouse." Intestate Act, Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 429, 431; § 2(a); as amended by Act of July 11, 1917, P. L. 755, § 1; 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 11. Lee's Appeal, 124 Pa. 74, 16 A. 514.

The new Wills Act and the new Intestate Act were not intended to make any change in this basic law. The comments of the Joint State Government Commission pertaining to the point here involved, under Section 8 of the Wills Act of April 24, 1947, are as follows: "Subsecs. (a) and (b) The exact share of the surviving spouse upon election to take against the will has been set forth in brief language in this section. This is necessary in order to make it clear that a spouse taking against the will does not receive the $10,000 allowance. The definition of the share of the spouse is in accordance with the language of section 2 of the Intestate Act of 1947."

These comments are clear and unambiguous and show that the drafters of the new Act clearly intended that a spouse taking against the will was not entitled to receive the $10,000 allowance.

When we turn to Section 2 of the new Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, the Commission's Comments thereunder fortify our conclusion: "1. The $5000 allowance is increased to $10,000 because of the greatly decreased value of money. . . ." "3. The proviso in section 2 (a) of the 1917 act, . . . to the effect that the allowance does not apply upon an election to take against the will has been omitted" ( not because there was an intention or an attempt to change the law, but) "because it is not properly in this act. . . . The situation is now covered by section 8 (b) of the Wills Act of 1947. . . ."

When we review once again Section 8 (b) of the Wills Act of 1947, we find that the exact and specific situation in the instant case has been clearly and specifically covered and entitles the surviving spouse, not to a $10,000 allowance plus other interests, but merely to one-half of the real and personal estate of the testator.

Considering, therefore, the old law and the new law, as well as the intention of the Joint State Government Commission on the questions involved herein, it is clear that the surviving husband's election to take against his wife's will entitles him, not to the first $10,000 allowance as in cases of actual intestacy, but merely to one-half of her estate as specifically provided in Section 8 of the Wills Act of 1947.

The order of the court below is reversed with directions to enter a proper order pursuant to and in accordance with this opinion; each party to pay its own costs.

MARTIN ESTATE