Summary of Opinion: Montgomery Adoption Case (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Nov. 14, 1950)

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 28, 1946, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia entered a decree by which George William Montgomery became the adopted child of William B. Montgomery and Mary R. Montgomery. The child's natural parents were married; the mother was a sister of the adopting mother, and the father was a brother of the adopting father. The adoption petition contained the consent of the natural parents. At the time of adoption the child was about two years old and had lived with the adopting parents for some time.

On May 4, 1950, the natural parents filed a petition to set aside the decree of adoption, alleging that the adoptive parents were not husband and wife and had never been legally married. The judge who had signed the adoption decree heard the petition to vacate and entered an order vacating the decree of adoption. The adopting parents appealed; the Superior Court affirmed the order vacating the adoption decree.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the lower court's finding that the adopting parents' relationship was a bigamous marriage and that fraud was committed upon the court in obtaining the adoption decree.
What is the proper scope of appellate review on appeal from an order vacating an adoption decree (i.e., whether the appellate court must determine if there was evidence sufficient to support the findings of the court below).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132	Standard of appellate review in adoption-vacatur cases: determine whether there was evidence sufficient to support the findings of the court below.	The court cited Susko as authority for the proposition that on appeal it must determine whether evidence supports the lower court's findings and relied on that standard in affirming the vacatur.
In re Adoption of Margaret Nolan, 113 Pa. Super. 198, 172 A. 477	Support for the stated standard of review in this class of cases (see "See also").	Cited as additional authority for the appellate review standard applied to the case before the court.
Weinbach's Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500	Support for the stated standard of review in adoption-vacatur matters.	Referenced as further precedent consistent with the court's articulation of the standard for appellate review.
Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa. 579, 46 A.2d 252	Support for the appellate review principle applied in adoption-vacatur proceedings.	Listed among authorities supporting the court's determination of the scope of review and reliance on the lower court's findings where evidence supports them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the facts presented to the Municipal Court and the testimony taken on the petition to vacate. The evidence showed that Mary R. Montgomery had never been divorced from her prior husband, John G. MacDowell, despite representing otherwise when she applied for a marriage license to marry William B. Montgomery (she answered that she was single and that it would be her first marriage, and gave her former name). In the adoption petition she also averred she had never been divorced and had no children—statements the opinion describes as untrue. The natural parents alleged that she represented she had been divorced and had married William B. Montgomery; the opinion notes that the natural father was a witness at the marriage to his brother.

Based on that testimony, the court below found that the adopting parents' relation was that of a bigamous marriage and that fraud had been committed upon the court by patently false testimony relied upon in entering the adoption decree. The Superior Court stated the applicable appellate standard (citing authorities) — that on appeal from an order vacating an adoption decree the appellate court must determine whether there was evidence sufficient to support the findings of the court below — and concluded that the evidence supported the lower court's findings. The lower court also explicitly stated it was not deciding custody in the vacatur proceeding; custody was to be determined later according to the child's welfare.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Municipal Court vacating the decree of adoption.

Implications: The direct effect is that the adoption decree was vacated and the question of custody remains to be determined subsequently in accordance with the welfare of the child. The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new rule of law beyond applying established precedent regarding the standard of appellate review in adoption-vacatur cases. The opinion also notes that the adoption statute requires petitioners to set forth the marital status of adopting parents.

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Montgomery Adoption Case.

Appeals — Review — Scope — Evidence — Findings — Orders vacating adoption decree.

On appeal from an order vacating a decree of adoption, the scope of review by the appellate court is to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to support the findings of the court below.

Argued October 2, 1950.

OPINION BY ARNOLD, J., November 14, 1950:

This is an appeal from an order vacating a decree of adoption.

On October 28, 1946, the Municipal Court of Philadelphia made a decree of adoption by which George William Montgomery became the adopted child of William B. Montgomery and Mary R. Montgomery. The parents of said child were married and the mother was a sister of Mary R. Montgomery and the father of said child was the brother of William B. Montgomery, the proposed adopting father. The petition for adoption contained consent of the parents. At the time of the adoption the child was some two years of age but had lived with the adopting parents for some time.

On May 4, 1950, the natural parents filed a petition to set aside the decree of adoption on the ground that the adoptive parents were not husband and wife and had never been legally married. The judge who signed the adoption decree heard the petition to vacate. Clearly under the testimony Mary R. Montgomery had never been divorced from her husband, John G. MacDowell, to whom she was married in 1925. When she made application for a license to marry William [B.] Montgomery, in answer to the question whether she was single, widowed or divorced, she stated she was single, and also stated that this was her first marriage. The natural parents averred that she represented she had been divorced and had married William B. Montgomery. In fact, George W. Montgomery, the natural parent of the child, was a witness of the marriage to his brother. When she applied for a marriage license she gave her name as Mary R. Neal, which was her name before she married MacDowell.

In the petition for the adoption she averred that she had never been divorced and had no children. Both of these statements were untrue and she palpably did not divulge the true status at the hearing.

The lower court correctly found that the relation of the adopting parents is that of a bigamous marriage, and that a fraud had been committed upon the court which had entered a decree in reliance upon the truthfulness of testimony which was patently false.

The scope of our review in this class of cases is to determine whether there was evidence sufficient to support the findings of the court below: Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132. See also In re: Adoption of Margaret Nolan, 113 Pa. Super. 198, 172 A. 477; Weinbach's Appeal, 316 Pa. 333, 175 A. 500; Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa. 579, 46 A.2d 252. It may be noted that the adoption statute requires the petitioners for adoption to set forth the marital status of the adopting parents.

Act of 1925, P.L. 127, as amended, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1 et seq.

The court below, at the conclusion of the testimony correctly stated: "I want to make it very plain, that I am not acting in this matter on the question of custody." That matter must hereafter be determined as the welfare of the child may require.

The order of the court below is affirmed.

MONTGOMERY ADOPTION CASE