THOMAS, Justice.
The lone challenge of the appellant is directed to the court's action in announcing at the conclusion of appellant's evidence that he would grant a motion for directed verdict thereby causing the appellant to take a nonsuit. This raises the question whether at that stage of the trial it was "apparent to the judge that no evidence [had] been submitted upon which the jury could lawfully find a verdict for the plaintiff * * *." Section 54.17, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A. As a preface to the digest of the testimony we may say the declaration alleged that the appellant's husband was killed when struck by the appellee's automobile while it was being driven by the appellee's son "in a reckless, careless and negligent manner, and at a high rate of speed at approximately 60 miles per hour, * * *."
As her principal witness the appellant introduced the driver himself and he gave this version of the mishap: He was driving along the city street when the appellant's husband stepped onto the pavement in the path of the car. The driver sounded his horn and applied his brakes whereupon the man took a step backward out of the way; then the driver accelerated the speed of the vehicle, and the man immediately stepped forward again and was struck and fatally injured. The car was traveling between 20 and 25 miles an hour in a part of the city where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour.
This is all the testimony from the only eyewitness. There is some testimony that the victim's leg was fractured and his face, or head, bruised; also that his body collided with the car near the radio aerial, but these circumstances could not supplement the other evidence to the extent that the whole would preponderate in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of a reckless, careless and negligent operation at a speed of about 60 miles an hour.
The motion for a directed verdict presented this point which the trial judge seemed to have ignored, basing his ruling on other grounds submitted with it. While we are not in full accord with the reasons given, we do approve the conclusion so the judgment is
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL, and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.