TERRELL, Justice.
The City of Oldsmar brought a suit for declaratory decree against appellees, the purpose of which was to invalidate a certain tax compromise made by it February 19, 1947 with Girard Trust Company as Trustee. There was an answer and a counterclaim to the bill of complaint and on final hearing there was a decree for the defendants from which this appeal was prosecuted.
The direct question presented has to do with the validity of a tax compromise between the parties to this cause, but ancillary to and directly bearing on it is the validity of a tax compromise policy indulged in by the city over a period of twenty years or longer.
On the overall question the chancellor spotted the issue quite clearly in his finding from the pleadings that from 1927 to 1947, a period of twenty years, the city had frequently made tax compromises and discharged its tax claim for less than the full amount due, that more than two-thirds of the lands in the city had benefitted by such compromises and that to permit the city at this time to set aside these compromises and enforce collection of the taxes originally due would create indescribable confusion in land titles and would impose hardships on the purchasers and other land owners within the city. For these and other good reasons the chancellor held that the compromise brought in question was no different from any of the others and that the city should be estopped to challenge the validity of any of them.
The city made no contention that it was legally authorized to compromise its taxes and the chancellor pointed out that he had been cited to no authority authorizing the compromise. In Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller, 102 Fla. 378, 136 So. 546, this court indicated the manner in which a municipality might compromise and dispose of its past due tax certificates, but that case has no application to the case at bar. There must be specific authorization by the legislature to support municipal tax compromises. St. Lucie Estates v. Ashley, 105 Fla. 534, 141 So. 738.
On account of the inequity that would otherwise be produced we think the decree appealed from should be affirmed. The City of Oldsmar is typical of many other governmental entities that for economic and other reasons made tax compromises at the time those brought in question were made. During the boom times of the early twenties the lands involved here and many others were assessed on the tax rolls at fictitious values that turned out to be greatly inflated. The Murphy Act, Acts 1937, c. 18296, the Futch Act, Acts 1933, c. 16252, and other measures were enacted by the legislature to remedy the situation. Tax compromises by counties, cities, drainage districts and other governmental units were the order of the day. It was the only way many of these units could secure funds to administer the duties imposed on them. It was a practical solution of a difficult problem. No fraud is charged and it produced a very beneficial result. The challenge to its validity comes too late. Daniell v. Sherrill, Fla., 48 So.2d 736.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
TERRELL, Justice.
On Petition for Rehearing.
TERRELL, Justice.
The predicate for this suit was a compromise of current and past due taxes for reasons detailed in an opinion filed August 14, 1951. We held in said opinion that appellant was estopped to question the validity of the compromise at this time. On petition for rehearing a majority of the Court has reached the conclusion that said opinion should be modified so as to hold that the City of Oldsmar had no authority to compromise or assign current taxes upon which the period of redemption had not expired. Ranger Realty Co. v. Miller, 102 Fla. 378, 136 So. 546, is the support for this holding. In all other respects our opinion is adhered to on rehearing.
The writer of this opinion does not agree with the modification. I think Richey v. Wells, 123 Fla. 284, 166 So. 817; State ex rel. Pringle v. Dykes, 127 Fla. 665, 173 So. 904; and Messer v. Lang, 129 Fla. 546, 176 So. 548, 113 A.L.R. 1073, clearly imply that all taxes, including current taxes, may be compromised on terms available to all taxpayers alike and the record in this case shows that the City of Oldsmar had made indiscriminate compromises of both delinquent and current taxes for many years. Numerous landowners availed themselves of such compromises and they are shown to have been in the public interest. It is also shown that part of the lands involved in this case have passed out of the hands of appellees, some of them were never owned by appellees, and some of them were not covered by the compromise in question. For these and other reasons more fully pointed out in the original opinion, I think the City of Oldsmar is estopped to assert the invalidity of the compromise.
Since the majority of the Court has reached a different view it follows that the opinion, August 14, 1951, is modified on rehearing so as to hold that the City of Oldsmar could challenge the validity of the tax compromise with appellees and that it was without authority to compromise or assign current taxes on which the period of redemption had not expired. In other respects the original opinion is adhered to on rehearing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part on rehearing.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN, THOMAS, HOBSON, JJ., and JONES, Associate Justice, concur.
ROBERTS, J., not participating.