The decedent had been employed for many years as a custodian and janitor at the firehouse. His duties included keeping the building clean, taking all fire-alarm calls, cleaning fire apparatus, preparing meeting rooms and later cleaning them up after meetings. He was required to live at the firehouse and he was on duty twenty-four hours a day. The decedent was not required to attend fires and he did not attend them. Prior to 1943, the decedent was concededly an employee of the fire district and the district carried a workmen's compensation policy covering him. In the latter part of 1942, the decedent's position was placed under civil service regulation. The decedent was drawing a pension from the City of New York as a retired fireman. He could not draw this pension while holding a civil service position in the State. It was therefore agreed by the decedent and the board of fire commissioners that the decedent and his wife would be retained as "independent contractors" to carry on substantially the same work which the decedent had theretofore performed as an employee. A formal contract was accordingly drawn up and executed, covering the year 1943, and similar contracts were executed each year thereafter. The board found that, notwithstanding the formal contracts, the relationship between the parties was that of employer and employee. This finding was clearly supported by the evidence. The formal terminology used by the parties is, of course, not controlling ( Matter of Gordon v. New York Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 652). The appellant's further contention that, if the decedent is found to be an employee, he should be held to be a volunteer fireman covered by the insurance policy issued by the respondent Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company is also without merit. Although the decedent was regarded as an honorary member of the fire department, he was not in any sense a volunteer fireman; he performed custodial duties at the firehouse for which he was paid and he did not attend any fires. Decision and award of the Workmen's Compensation Board unanimously affirmed, with a single bill of costs against the appellant to be divided between the board and the respondent insurance company.