In 1947, appellant pleaded guilty to eleven counts of an indictment charging varying counts of arson and burglary and was sentenced on each of four of the counts to an indeterminate period of not less than five or more than ten years, said sentences to run consecutively. He also pleaded guilty to two counts of another indictment charging burglary and grand larceny and was sentenced to serve five to ten years, said sentence to run concurrently with the sentences under the first indictment. In his petition, appellant claims: (1) he should have been represented by counsel at the time of his arraignment and (2) that the four sentences under the first indictment should run concurrently and not consecutively. Appellant does not assert that he was not advised of his right to counsel, but states that "petitioner did not have the assistance of counsel at any stage of the proceedings against him" and "Counsel should have been appointed by the Court". The official records of the clerk of the court made at the time of arraignment contain the statement that the appellant "was asked by the Court whether or not he had an attorney or desired counsel and was informed that he was entitled to the benefit of counsel at all stages of this proceeding. The defendant replied that he had no attorney and waived his right to counsel". It thus appears from the court records that appellant was duly informed of his right to counsel. He asserts nothing to the contrary in his petition. It also appears from the court records that he waived his right to counsel. Appellant does not deny this or assert facts to show that he lacked any understanding of the proceedings. There appears to be no illegality in the passing of the sentence. Order unanimously affirmed.