A claim for attorney's fee was filed by Hugh F. Oldenburg in the county court of Dane county on March 11, 1952, against the estate of Amanda C. O'Brien, deceased. Objection thereto was filed by the executor on April 28, 1952. There is no bill of exceptions. What occurred thereafter and until March 6, 1955, is disclosed only by the contents of an order entered on May 6, 1955, by GEORGE KRONCKE, JR., the county judge, and which reads as follows:
"Claim having been filed by Hugh F. Oldenburg in the above estate, and objection having been made and the matter brought on for trial;
"And the matter having been tried before the court and testimony taken on June 9, 1952, and June 12, 1952; and on June 12, 1952, the court having orally rendered his decision for the claimant against the estate in the sum of $544.05; and no judgment having to this date been entered thereon; and both claimant and executor having discussed the matter with the court in person or by letter since such trial; and the court having re-examined the evidence presented and having concluded that his oral decision initially made was erroneous and that the same should either be corrected or a new trial had in the interests of justice;
"Now, therefore, on motion of the court;
"It is ordered that a new trial be had on the claim of Hugh F. Oldenburg against the above estate."
On the same day judge KRONCKE entered another order appointing L.L. DARLING, county judge of Jefferson county, to try and determine the issues in the proceeding. On July 1, 1955, Judge DARLING entered an order as follows:
"Hearings on objections to the claim of Hugh F. Oldenburg were had before this court on June 9 and 12, 1952, and the Honorable GEORGE KRONCKE, JR., judge of such court, on June 12th, 1952, rendered his decision directing that judgment be entered for the claimant for the amount of his claim. Thereafter, and on May 6, 1955, without notice or further hearing, said Honorable GEORGE KRONCKE JR., entered an order that a new trial be had on the claim and appointed the undersigned, L.L. DARLING, county judge of Jefferson county, Wisconsin, to try and determine all the issues in said proceeding.
"The matter came on for further hearing on June 27, 1955; the claimant, Hugh F. Oldenburg, appeared personally and by H. Maxwell Manzer, his attorney, and the executor, Leslie J. O'Brien, also appeared personally and by William C. Dill of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, his attorney.
"After hearing arguments of counsel, and after determining that by reason of the provisions of sec. 324.05, Wis. Stats., the court was without authority to issue its order of May 6th, 1955, for a new trial, and being advised in the premises, on motion of H. Maxwell Manzer, attorney for the claimant,
"It is adjudged and decreed that the claim of Hugh F. Oldenburg, filed in this estate, be and the same is hereby allowed in the amount of $544.05."
Leslie J. O'Brien, individually, and as executor of the will appeals.
GEHL, J.
Sec. 324.05, Stats., provides as follows:
"If any person aggrieved by any act of the county court shall, from any cause without fault on his part, omit to take his appeal within the time allowed, the court may, upon his petition and notice to the adverse party, and upon such terms and within such time as it shall deem reasonable, but not later than one year after the act complained of, allow an appeal, if justice appears to require it, with the same effect as though done seasonably; or the court may reopen the case and grant a retrial, but the order therefor must be made within one year after the act complained of."
It is contended by the appellant that the court, presided over by Judge DARLING, erred in setting aside Judge KRONCKE'S order; that, since no determination of the issue presented by the objection to the claim had been made, the statute is not applicable, — the one-year period had not begun to run.
The order entered by Judge KRONCKE is a formal declaration of the court and the recital therein that "on June 12, 1952, the court . . . [had] orally rendered his decision for the claimant against the estate in the sum of $544.05" must be treated as a verity. In fact, it is not disputed that the pronouncement referred to by judge KRONCKE was made. When it was made the claim was allowed and there remained nothing to be done except the clerical duty of reducing the judgment to writing. The judicial act was complete. Zbikowski v. Straz (1940), 236 Wis. 161, 294 N.W. 541.
The objector contends that since there was a failure to comply with the provisions of sec. 313.06, Stats., there was no effective judgment. It is there provided as follows:
"The court shall make a statement embracing lists of the claims presented against the decedent and those exhibited in offset and stating how much was allowed and how much disallowed in each case, together with the final balance, whether in favor of the creditor or the estate; and the same shall be signed by the judge, be recorded, and stand as the judgment of the court. If the balance is in favor of the estate the payment thereof may be enforced by execution."
The statute does not purport to prescribe a mode of rendering a judgment on claims. It is no more than a direction as to the manner in which the court's action is to be recorded. That is made abundantly clear by its language that the court shall make a statement stating how much was allowed and disallowed in each case.
It follows that since the record discloses that the claim was allowed on June 12, 1952, the court was without jurisdiction to act in the matter after the expiration of one year from that date except to record its action. State ex rel. Chinchilla Ranch, Inc., v. O'Connell (1952), 261 Wis. 86, 51 N.W.2d 714, cited by the objector is not in point. The court held in that case that the record, particularly a statement of the trial judge, established that the document claimed to be an order was no more than the judge's opinion setting forth his views on the question presented and that it should not be accorded the dignity of a judgment or order. In the instant case there was a decision.
"`There is a wide difference between "decisions" and "opinions." The decision of a court is its judgment; the opinion is only the reasons given for that judgment.'" In re Brown (1940), 6 Wn.2d 215, 235, 107 P.2d 1104.
Judge DARLING, whose authority to act in the matter is not questioned, ruled correctly that Judge KRONCKE'S order for a new trial was entered without authority. The form and contents of his order are such that they may be interpreted as a recording of the judgment of June 12, 1952, allowing the claim. We give it such construction.
Appellants contend that the claimant should be held guilty of laches in that he failed for nearly three years to obtain the formal entry of the judgment pronounced on June 12, 1952. No one seems to have been prejudiced by the delay unless it be the claimant himself who has thereby put off the date of payment of his claim. Furthermore, we would not concede that it was his duty any more than it was the duty of the executor to present to the judge a formal order for his signature.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.