The Superior Court of Fulton County did not err in reversing the award of the deputy director of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation.
Jack D. Dempsey filed a claim against the Bethlehem Steel Company, employer and self-insurer, in which he sought to recover workmen's compensation for an alleged back injury which, according to his claim, occurred on May 5, 1955. The deputy director who heard the claim ruled that the claimant was not entitled to compensation since he had received the maximum allowable under Code § 114-404, for a total disability which resulted from an injury which occurred in 1941 thought it had no connection with the present claim. The claimant appealed the decision directly to the Superior Court of Fulton County where the deputy director's award was reversed. The employer in its bill of exceptions excepts to the judgment of the Superior Court of Fulton County reversing the award of the deputy director.
NICHOLS, J.
The employer contends that once an employee has received the maximum number of weeks of compensation allowable under Code § 114-404 as amended by the Acts of 1937, 1949 and 1955 (Ga. L. 1937, pp. 528, 531; Ga. L. 1949, pp. 1357, 1358; Ga. L. 1955, pp. 210, 211; Code, Ann. Supp., § 114-404), that he may never again receive compensation whether the loss of a member is involved in the previous awards or not. It has been held that where a person has lost a part of his leg in a previous injury, whether such previous loss involved workmen's compensation or not, and due to an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment he loses the remaining part of that leg he can only receive compensation for the part of the leg lost as the result of the latter injury and not for the loss of the entire leg. See American Mutual c. Ins. Co. v. Brock, 165 Ga. 771 ( 142 S.E. 101). This same rule has been applied to the loss of eyesight. Wisham v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 55 Ga. App. 778 ( 191 S.E. 489). Compensation in such cases is controlled by Code § 114-406 as amended by the Act of 1955 (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 210, 212; Code, Ann. Supp., § 114-406) and Code § 114-408. However, no cases have been found construing the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act (Code, Ann., Ch. 114), as to the question presented in the present case. Where an employee has received the maximum compensation allowable under Code § 114-404, supra, for a total incapacity, is he eligible for additional compensation for another injury occurring after a lapse of time greater than the number of weeks for which compensation was paid?
Code §§ 114-409 and 114-410 deal only with the loss of members for which compensation is provided under Code § 114-406, supra, and are therefore not under consideration in the present case since it has been held that the compensation allowable under Code § 114-404 for a total incapacity is distinguished from a disability, such as the loss of a member for which compensation is allowed under Code § 114-406. See Federated Mutual c. Ins. Co. v. Whiddon, 88 Ga. App. 12, 16 ( 75 S.E.2d 830) and cases cited. Code § 114-408 deals with a permanent disability for which compensation is allowed under Code § 114-406. Code § 114-406 does not deal with an incapacity, except in that it allows, in addition to the compensation for the industrial handicap, compensation, not to exceed ten weeks, for total incapacity (presumably for the period of time required for the wound to heal).
Code § 114-404 deals with the amount of compensation allowable for an injury and the maximum compensation allowable in each case; it does not set forth the amount of compensation allowable to an employee from all injuries and in all cases involving that employee. Therefore, in view of what has been said above, and in view of the fact that the act is to be liberally construed in order to effect its general purpose ( Van Treeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 204, 121 S.E. 215; Austin Brothers Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560, 121 S.E. 345), this court must hold that the limit referred to in Code § 114-404 is the limit for which compensation may be paid as the result of one injury and not the limit that an employee can draw regardless of the number of injuries he may be unfortunate enough to suffer.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court of Fulton County was not error for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed. Gardner, P. J., Townsend, Carlisle and Quillian, JJ., concur. Felton, C. J., dissents.