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  • John P. Horan, Water Valley, for appellant. I. The Court below erred in refusing to permit the defendant to offer proof to show that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. II. The Court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and in refusing to permit him to enter a plea of the guilty and in refusing to give him a trial by jury. III. And the defendant says there was error in accepting a plea of guilty under the circumstances, and then in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw guilty plea, and refusing to permit him to enter a plea of not guilty, and in refusing to allow him a trial by jury. Collation of authorities: Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 724; Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27 So. 618; Goulden v. Crawford, 30 Ga. 674; Pittman v. State, 198 Miss. 797, 23 So.2d 285; 14 Am. Jur. 961; 22 C.J.S., Sec. 421 pp. 640, 641; 24 C.J.S., Sec. 1862. G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. I. The Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute one of not guilty. De Loach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27 So. 618; Miles v. Monaghan, Sheriff, 211 Miss. 150, 51 So.2d 212; Perciful v. Holley, Sheriff, 217 Miss. 203, 63 So.2d 817; Stafford v. State (Miss.), 55 So.2d 477.
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  • GILLESPIE, J.
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  • John P. Horan, Water Valley, for appellant. I. The Court below erred in refusing to permit the defendant to offer proof to show that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. II. The Court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and in refusing to permit him to enter a plea of the guilty and in refusing to give him a trial by jury. III. And the defendant says there was error in accepting a plea of guilty under the circumstances, and then in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw guilty plea, and refusing to permit him to enter a plea of not guilty, and in refusing to allow him a trial by jury. Collation of authorities: Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 724; Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27 So. 618; Goulden v. Crawford, 30 Ga. 674; Pittman v. State, 198 Miss. 797, 23 So.2d 285; 14 Am. Jur. 961; 22 C.J.S., Sec. 421 pp. 640, 641; 24 C.J.S., Sec. 1862. G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. I. The Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute one of not guilty. De Loach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27 So. 618; Miles v. Monaghan, Sheriff, 211 Miss. 150, 51 So.2d 212; Perciful v. Holley, Sheriff, 217 Miss. 203, 63 So.2d 817; Stafford v. State (Miss.), 55 So.2d 477.
Judges
  • GILLESPIE, J.
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Smart Summary

SULLIVAN v. STATE — Supreme Court of Mississippi (Dec. 8, 1958)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was indicted for burglary and initially pleaded not guilty. The day after arraignment, while represented by counsel, he withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty. The court imposed a penitentiary sentence but suspended it and placed the appellant on probation. Approximately five weeks later the appellant violated the terms of his probation. Three months after the original sentence, and after the term of court had adjourned, the State initiated proceedings to revoke the suspension of sentence. In response to those revocation proceedings, the appellant filed a motion and an affidavit seeking leave to withdraw his guilty plea and to enter a plea of not guilty so that he could obtain a jury trial; he also averred in his motion that he was not guilty of burglary. The trial court overruled the motion, and the appellant appealed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the lower court's refusal to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to offer proof to show he was not guilty of the crime charged.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty in order to obtain a jury trial.
  3. Whether it was error to accept the guilty plea under the circumstances and then refuse to permit its withdrawal and refuse a trial by jury.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The court below erred in refusing to permit the defendant to offer proof to show he was not guilty of the crime charged.
  • The court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and in refusing to permit him to enter a plea of not guilty and to have a trial by jury.
  • There was error in accepting the plea of guilty under the circumstances, then refusing to permit withdrawal of that plea, refusing to permit entry of a plea of not guilty, and refusing to allow a jury trial.
  • The appellant's filings and affidavit asserted he was not guilty of burglary and sought permission to change his plea in order to secure a jury trial.

Appellee's Arguments

  • The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and substitute a plea of not guilty.
  • The appellee identified controlling authorities supporting the proposition that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be denied when not timely made and when the accused had the advantage of counsel.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691, 27 So. 618 Relief may be granted where a guilty plea was entered "unadvisedly" and motion to withdraw is made promptly, typically at the same term. The Court distinguished Deloach as involving a prompt, same-term motion where the plea was unadvisedly given; it held Deloach was not controlling because the appellant's motion here was not timely.
Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 724 Where a defendant entered a guilty plea without advice of counsel, did not understand the plea, and moved promptly (at the same term), the motion to withdraw should be sustained. The Court described Daniels as a case in which the plea was entered without counsel or understanding and the motion was timely; it concluded Daniels was inapposite because the appellant in this case had counsel and did not move promptly.
Pittman v. State, 198 Miss. 797, 23 So.2d 285 Relief where accused had not been sentenced and filed a prompt motion the next day to set aside a guilty plea entered before opportunity to consult counsel or friends. The Court cited Pittman as another example of a timely, same-or-next-day motion where relief was appropriate; it held Pittman did not apply to the late motion in this case.
Miles v. Monaghan, Sheriff, 211 Miss. 150, 51 So.2d 212 An application for relief to withdraw a plea of guilty should be made within a reasonable time. The Court cited Miles for the proposition that withdrawal motions must be timely and used it to support the conclusion that the appellant's motion was untimely.
Perciful (Percival) v. Holley, Sheriff, 217 Miss. 203, 63 So.2d 817 A similar citation for the rule that an application to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within a reasonable time. The Court relied on this authority in reiterating that the motion to withdraw must be timely and found the appellant's motion untimely under this rule.
Bullock v. Harpole, 102 So.2d 687 The judgment of conviction on a plea of guilty raises a presumption that the plea was freely and voluntarily given and that the accused understood the consequences. The Court invoked Bullock to support the presumption that the appellant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; the appellant's own testimony also demonstrated he understood the consequences.
Goulden v. Crawford, 30 Ga. 674 This authority was listed among the collated authorities in the briefs. The opinion lists Goulden among authorities but does not discuss specifics from that case in its reasoning; it was not treated as controlling in the Court's analysis.
Stafford v. State (Miss.), 55 So.2d 477 Listed among authorities cited by counsel for appellee. The opinion references Stafford in the appellee's list of authorities but does not quote or rely upon a specific holding from it in the Court's reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps:

  1. Chronology and procedural posture: The Court first set out the timeline — plea of guilty entered the day after arraignment while appellant had counsel; sentence imposed and suspended; appellant placed on probation; probation violated approximately five weeks later; three months after sentencing and after term adjournment, appellant moved to withdraw guilty plea during revocation proceedings.
  2. Evaluation of appellant's testimony: The Court summarized appellant's testimony that he was "not himself," elderly, ill, and that his attorney "out-talked him," and that he entered the guilty plea because it was supposedly the "easiest and simplest" way to settle the matter. The Court found, however, that the appellant's own testimony showed he knew he was pleading guilty, that the plea followed consultation with counsel, and that he understood the potential to avoid penitentiary time if he complied with probation ("walked the line").
  3. Timeliness and finality: Applying precedent, the Court emphasized that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within a reasonable time. It stated that had the appellant moved before sentencing or before the term expired, the lower court might have granted relief under authorities such as Deloach, Daniels, and Pittman because such motions in those cases were timely. But because the appellant waited until after the adjournment of the term and until charged with violating probation, the judgment was final and the motion was too late.
  4. Voluntariness presumption: The Court invoked the legal presumption that a conviction based on a guilty plea is presumptively freely and voluntarily given and that the accused understood the consequences (citing Bullock v. Harpole). The Court found this presumption supported by the appellant's testimony indicating understanding.
  5. Distinguishing precedent: The Court contrasted the facts of the present case with cases where courts granted motions to withdraw pleas (e.g., Deloach, Daniels, Pittman) — those involved unadvised or uninformed pleas and prompt motions at the same term; by contrast, the present plea was not unadvised, counsel was involved, and the motion was not filed with reasonable promptness.
  6. Conclusion of discretionary review: On the combined bases of untimeliness, the finality of the judgment, the presumption of voluntariness, and the appellant's own testimony showing awareness and consultation with counsel, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to enter a plea of not guilty; the judgment of the lower court was Affirmed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's ruling refusing to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea stands and the appellant's conviction, as entered on the guilty plea, remains effective and final for the purposes shown in the record.
  • The Court relied on established principles that (a) motions to withdraw guilty pleas must be made within a reasonable time and (b) judgments entered on guilty pleas carry a presumption the plea was voluntary and understood. The opinion distinguished earlier cases granting withdrawal where motions were timely and pleas were unadvised or uninformed.
  • The opinion does not announce or purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing Mississippi authority to the facts; it affirms that untimely motions made after adjournment of the term and after sentencing will typically be denied where the record indicates counsel was present and the defendant understood his plea.

Judge Gillespie delivered the opinion for the Court; McGehee, C.J., and Hall, Holmes and Ethridge, JJ., concurred.

Show full summary ...

SULLIVAN v. STATE

1. Criminal law — plea of guilty — motion for permission to withdraw plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty in order to have a jury trial — properly overruled — factual situation.

Where defendant on day following his arraignment, then being represented by counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty to indictment for burglary and entered a plea of guilty, he was then sentenced to a term in the State Penitentiary which was suspended and defendant placed on probation and about five weeks later defendant violated terms of probation, and three months later after date of his original sentence and after term of court had expired, and in answer to proceeding to revoke the suspension, defendant filed motion to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty so as to have a jury trial, and it was clear from his testimony that defendant knew he was pleading guilty and it was done after consultation with his attorney, defendant's motion was properly overruled.

2. Criminal law — plea of guilty — application for permission to withdraw plea of guilty should be made within a reasonable time.

An application for relief to withdraw a plea of guilty should be made within a reasonable time.

3. Criminal law — plea of guilty — judgment of conviction on, raises presumption that plea was freely and voluntarily given and that accused understood the consequences of his act.

The judgment of conviction on plea of guilty raises presumption that plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily given and that accused knew and understood the consequences of his act.

Headnotes as approved by Gillespie, J.

GILLESPIE, J.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to an indictment for burglary. On the day following that of his arraignment, appellant, then being represented by counsel, withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty. He was then sentenced to a term in the penitentiary which was suspended and appellant placed on probation. About five weeks later, appellant violated the terms of probation. Three months after the date of his original sentence, and after the term of court had expired, and in answer to the proceedings to revoke the suspension, appellant filed a motion to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty so as to have a jury trial on the burglary indictment. He said in his affidavit and motion that he was not guilty of burglary.

Appellant testified on the motion and said he was "not himself" when he withdraw his not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to burglary; that he was 73 years of age, ill and weak, and did not fully realize what was taking place; that his attorney "out-talked him", and he entered the guilty plea because he was advised that it was the easiest and simplest way to settle the matter. But it is clear from his testimony that appellant knew he was pleading guilty, and it was done after a consultation with his attorney; and it further appears that appellant knew that if he "walked the line" he would not have to serve time in the penitentiary.

(Hn 1) The trial court properly overruled the motion to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and have a trial before a jury. If appellant had filed the motion before he was sentenced, or even after sentence but before the term expired, the lower court may have granted the motion under the authority of Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691; Daniels v. State, 163 Miss. 245, 140 So. 274; and Pittman v. State, 198 Miss. 797, 23 So.2d 685, since such motion would have been timely made. But since he waited until after adjournment of the term of court at which he was sentenced and until he was charged with violating the terms of his probation, the motion comes too late. When he made the motion the judgment had become final.

In the Deloach case, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was made at the same term and the guilty plea was "unadvisedly given". In the Daniels case, the defendant entered the guilty plea without advice of counsel and did not know how to plead self-defense and did not understand the plea which she did enter; the motion appears to have been promptly made at the same term of court at which the guilty plea was made and before the State's witnesses had been discharged; and the court held that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea should have been sustained. And in the Pittman case, the accused had not been sentenced on the guilty plea when, on the next day, he filed his motion to set aside the guilty plea which had been entered before the accused had an opportunity to consult with friends or counsel. These cases relied upon by appellant, and others in the same category, are not in point.

In the present case, the guilty plea was not unadvisedly given, nor was it filed with reasonable promptitude. Appellant had the advantage of counsel and his own testimony shows that he understood the plea.

(Hn 2) An application for relief to withdraw a plea of guilty should be made within a reasonable time. Miles v. Monaghan, Sheriff, 211 Miss. 150, 51 So.2d 212; Percival v. Holley, Sheriff, 217 Miss. 203, 63 So.2d 817. (Hn 3) The judgment of conviction on the plea of guilty raises a presumption that the plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily given and that the accused knew and understood the consequences of his act. Bullock v. Harpole, 102 So.2d 687. Moreover, it is manifest from appellant's testimony on the motion that appellant understood the consequences of his act when, with the advice of counsel, he entered the plea of guilty.

Affirmed.

McGehee, C.J., and Hall, Holmes and Ethridge, JJ., concur.

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SULLIVAN v. STATE
(Dec 8, 1958)