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Docket Number

No. 12697.

Attorney(S)

Donald P. Moore, John W. Rogers, Chicago, Ill., for appellant. John C. Melaniphy, Corp. Counsel, Harry H. Pollack, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Judges

John Simpson Hastings

Acts

The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Generally — Civil Action For Deprivation Of Rights
The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Generally — Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights
The Public Health And Welfare — Civil Rights — Generally — Action For Neglect To Prevent

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: James Monroe et al. v. Frank Pape et al., No. 12697 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 1959)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are James Monroe and Flossie Monroe (husband and wife) and their six children (represented by their mother, Flossie Monroe, as next friend). The defendants are Frank Pape (Deputy Chief of Detectives, Chicago Police Department), twelve unknown police officers identified as John Doe Nos. 1–12, and the City of Chicago (joined on a respondeat superior theory).

The complaint filed in the district court contained nine counts alleging an unreasonable search and seizure, a series of unjustified batteries, and a long, inherently coercive and secret detention by defendants acting under color of law. Counts I, IV, and VII alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for James Monroe, Flossie Monroe, and the six children, respectively). Counts II, V, and VIII alleged conspiracy violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Counts III, VI, and IX alleged failure to prevent the conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under the Federal Civil Rights Act and denied leave to amend. The plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the alleged misconduct by city police officers of a state municipality, as pleaded, makes a sufficient showing of a violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act (specifically §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986) to state a cause of action in federal court.
Whether, given the dismissal of the complaint against the individual officers, any claim for relief remains against the City of Chicago (joined under respondeat superior).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants committed an unreasonable search and seizure, multiple unjustified batteries, and a long, secret, coercive detention under color of law.
Plaintiffs contended these acts violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights and therefore stated causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process claims).
Plaintiffs asserted that a conspiracy to commit these acts violated their right to equal protection and thus provided a basis for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
They also alleged that defendants' failure to prevent the conspiracy sustained claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

Defendants' Position

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Stift v. Lynch, 7 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 237	Held that the complaint did not state a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act as to certain state actors and local law enforcement defendants when similarly pleaded.	The court relied on Stift as the most recent controlling decision resolving this question adversely to plaintiffs; Stift's holding compelled affirmance of the dismissal in the present case.
Eaton v. Bibb, 7 Cir., 217 F.2d 446	Identified by Stift as part of the line of decisions supporting dismissal for failure to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act in similar circumstances.	Referenced (via the Stift opinion) as precedent underpinning the determination that the complaint failed to state a federal cause of action.
Miles v. Armstrong, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 284	Part of the cited set of Seventh Circuit decisions used to justify dismissal of claims under the Civil Rights Act against certain local officers.	Used (through Stift's reliance) to support the conclusion that plaintiffs' complaint did not state a federal claim.
United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 237 F.2d 953	Included among the decisions Stift relied upon in concluding that the complaint did not state a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act.	The court noted Stift's citation of this case and treated it as part of the controlling authority leading to affirmance.
Wakat v. Harlib, 7 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 59	Referenced in the opinion as a case distinguished by Stift.	The opinion notes that Stift distinguishes Wakat; the present court relied on Stift (and its distinctions) in reaching its decision.
Jennings v. Nester, 7 Cir., 1955, 207 F.2d 153	Listed by the court as a related decision in this line of Seventh Circuit cases addressing similar issues under the Civil Rights Act.	Cited by the court as part of the body of circuit decisions supporting dismissal; no separate analysis of Jennings appears in the opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the appropriate standard on a motion to dismiss: the allegations of gross misconduct must be taken as true for purposes of review. Plaintiffs had pleaded facts alleging unreasonable search and seizure, batteries, and a prolonged, coercive, secret detention by police acting under color of law. Plaintiffs asserted violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986.

The central legal question was whether allegations of misconduct by city police officers of a state municipality, as pleaded, constituted a sufficient showing of a violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act to state a federal cause of action. The court observed that this question had been recently and authoritatively addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Stift v. Lynch, which involved claims brought under the same statutory sections and resulted in dismissal as to defendants including local law enforcement officers. Stift itself relied on prior Seventh Circuit decisions (Eaton v. Bibb, Miles v. Armstrong, and United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen) to conclude that the complaint did not state a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act as to those defendants.

Because Stift and the other cited circuit decisions resolved the question adversely to plaintiffs' contentions, the court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the complaint in the instant case was compelled. The court emphasized that, although it did not condone the alleged misconduct, that factual consideration did not alter the legal determination under controlling circuit authority. The opinion further noted that plaintiffs retained potential remedies in state court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The district court's order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under the Federal Civil Rights Act was Affirmed.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, as pleaded against the individual Chicago police officers and Frank Pape, were dismissed and that the dismissal was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.
Because of this disposition, there was no claim for relief against the City of Chicago (joined under respondeat superior).
The court noted that plaintiffs are not without remedy; any available relief may be pursued in state court.
The decision was based on existing Seventh Circuit precedent (particularly Stift v. Lynch and the cases it relied upon); the opinion does not purport to establish a new rule of federal constitutional law beyond following circuit authority.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond those contained in the text.

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James MONROE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank PAPE et al., Defendants-Appellees.

HASTINGS, Chief Judge.

This action was brought in the district court under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, to recover damages for the alleged misconduct of the defendant Chicago, Illinois police officers. Such misconduct was claimed to be in violation of the rights of plaintiffs under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The City of Chicago, Illinois was joined as a defendant, liability being predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court entered an order dismissing the complaint on defendants' motion on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Act, then denied leave to amend; this appeal followed.

The plaintiffs are James Monroe and Flossie Monroe, husband and wife, and their six children represented by their mother, Flossie Monroe, as next friend. The defendants are Frank Pape, Deputy Chief of Detectives of the Chicago Police Department, and twelve unknown police officers assigned to the Detective Bureau designated as John Doe No. 1 to and including No. 12, and the City of Chicago, Illinois. The complaint contains nine counts.

Counts charging violation of 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 are Counts I, IV and VII. Count I contains the basic factual allegations constituting plaintiffs' cause of action and seeks recovery of damages for James Monroe. Count IV incorporates the facts alleged in Count I and seeks recovery for Flossie Monroe, as does Count VII on behalf of the six Monroe children.

Counts charging violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 are Counts II, V and VIII, charging a conspiracy of defendants to commit the acts alleged in Count I, again praying damages for James Monroe, Flossie Monroe and the six Monroe children, respectively.

Counts charging violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1986 are Counts III, VI and IX, charging failure of each of the defendants to make any effort to prevent the accomplishment of the above conspiracy and seeking recovery for James Monroe, Flossie Monroe and the six Monroe children, respectively.

The complaint alleges an unreasonable search and seizure, a series of unjustified batteries and a long, inherently coercive and unjustifiably secret detention committed against plaintiffs by defendants acting under color of law. Since this matter is before us on the ruling granting the motion to dismiss, we are required to treat the allegations of gross misconduct as true for the purpose of review; and they need not be detailed in this opinion. Plaintiffs claim these acts violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and give rise to a proper cause of action under Section 1983 of the Act. They further contend that a conspiracy to commit these acts violated their rights to equal protection of the law and furnish a proper basis for recovery under Section 1985. By the same reasoning they contend that the allegations charging a failure to prevent the conspiracy sustain their right to recover under Section 1986.

The ultimate issue before us is whether the alleged misconduct on the part of city police officers of a state municipality makes a sufficient showing of a violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act.

This question is not new to this court and has been resolved adversely to plaintiffs' contentions. The most recent decision is that of Stift v. Lynch, 7 Cir., 1959, 267 F.2d 237. In Stift, recovery was sought under the same three sections of the Act as in the instant case. Named as defendants were a sheriff and deputy sheriff, in addition to a Justice of the Peace and the State's Attorney and his assistant. The dismissal of the complaint as to all defendants was affirmed. In sustaining the dismissal as to the sheriff and his deputy, the court said:

"Under our decisions in Eaton v. Bibb, 7 Cir., 217 F.2d 446; Miles v. Armstrong, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 284 and United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 237 F.2d 953, we hold the complaint herein did not state a claim under the Federal Civil Rights Act upon which relief could be granted against defendants Lynch and Eichholz." Id., 267 F.2d at page 240.

Stift distinguishes Wakat v. Harlib, 7 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 59. See also, Jennings v. Nester, 7 Cir., 1955, 207 F.2d 153.

We do not condone the alleged misconduct of defendants, if true, but that is not the question before us. Under the holding in Stift v. Lynch, supra, and the other decisions of this circuit referred to therein, some of which are cited above, affirmance of the dismissal before us necessarily follows. Plaintiffs are not without their remedy in the state court.

In view of such a determination there is no claim for relief against the City of Chicago.

The order dismissing the complaint is

Affirmed.

MONROE v. PAPE