BALDINGER v. BANKS, N.Y. Misc., Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Marvin G. Florman for plaintiffs. Bernard Helfenstein and Isadore Halpern for defendants.

Judges

EDWARD G. BAKER, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Barbara J. Baldinger, an infant represented by her guardian ad litem, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained when the infant defendant, Allan Banks, pushed or shoved her. The plaintiff's father also asserted claims for medical expenses and loss of services. At the time of the incident, the infant parties were four and six years old, respectively. The defendant was part of a group of boys playing "iron tag" on a lawn near the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff, not participating in the game, approached the group. An argument ensued between the plaintiff and one of the boys, after which the defendant stated, "I'll take care of Barbara," and pushed her, causing her to fall and sustain a serious elbow fracture. The plaintiff underwent unsuccessful closed reduction followed by open reduction surgery, resulting in a permanent scar and slight deformity.

Procedurally, the complaint initially stated three causes of action. The second cause, alleging negligence, was dismissed on defendants' motion at the close of plaintiffs' case. The third cause, asserted against the child and his parents, was discontinued at trial opening. The trial proceeded on the first cause of action for assault and battery. The defendants' motion to dismiss this cause at the close of proof was reserved and is now denied.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the infant defendant is liable for assault and battery for intentionally inflicting an offensive bodily contact on the infant plaintiff.
Whether the intent to inflict bodily harm is necessary to establish liability in a battery claim involving an infant defendant.
Whether the infant plaintiff is entitled to damages for the injuries sustained as a result of the defendant’s actions.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
27 Am. Jur., Infants, §§ 90, 91	Liability of infants for intentional acts causing harm without intent to cause bodily injury or foreseeability of injury.	Supported the court's conclusion that the infant defendant is liable despite lack of intent to cause bodily harm or foresee injury.
Restatement of Torts (Vol. 1, § 13)	Defines battery as an intentional act causing harmful or offensive contact without consent or privilege.	Provided the legal standard for liability based on intent to cause offensive contact, regardless of intent to harm.
Restatement of Torts, Comment d to § 13 and § 16	Clarifies that intent to harm is not required for battery liability; intent to cause offensive contact suffices.	Supported the finding that the infant defendant’s knowledge and intent to cause offensive contact established liability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence and found that the infant defendant, though only six years old, had the capacity to understand that pushing the plaintiff was offensive and intended to cause such offensive contact. The court relied on established tort principles that liability for battery does not require intent to cause bodily harm or foresee the injury, only the intent to bring about offensive contact. The defendant’s act was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s fall and resulting injuries. The court applied the Restatement of Torts § 13 and relevant commentary to confirm that the defendant’s conduct met the elements of battery. The dismissal of the negligence cause was upheld, and the third cause was discontinued, focusing the trial on the assault and battery claim. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the assault and battery cause at the close of proof was denied based on the evidence of intent and causation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the infant defendant is liable for assault and battery for intentionally inflicting an offensive bodily contact on the infant plaintiff. The plaintiff is awarded $12,500 for pain and suffering and injuries, and the plaintiff’s father is awarded $641.40 for medical expenses.

Implications: This decision affirms that an infant defendant can be held liable for battery if the act was done with intent to cause offensive contact, regardless of intent to cause bodily harm or foreseeability of injury. The ruling directly affects the parties by granting monetary damages but does not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing tort principles to an infant defendant.

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BARBARA J. BALDINGER, an Infant, by Her Guardian ad Litem STANLEY BALDINGER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALLAN BANKS, an Infant, by His Guardian ad Litem MILDRED BANKS, et al., Defendants

EDWARD G. BAKER, J.

Plaintiff, an infant, brings this action by her guardian ad litem to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her as a result of having been pushed or shoved by the infant defendant. Her father asserts a claim for medical expenses and loss of services.

On the date of the incident, which is the basis of the claims, the infant parties were four and six years of age, respectively.

The infant defendant was one of a group of neighborhood boys who, on the day of the occurrence, were engaged in a game of "iron tag" in and about the lawn area of one of the homes in the community. At about 4:00 P.M., the infant plaintiff walked from her home nearby to the lawn where the boys were playing. The credible evidence supports the claim that she was not a participant in the game.

Shortly after her arrival, an argument ensued between the infant plaintiff and one of the boys. The defendant said "I'll take care of Barbara", whereupon he pushed her with force sufficient to cause her to fall to the ground. It is clear that the defendant had the capacity to know and did, in fact, know that his act was offensive.

The fall resulted in a serious injury. Plaintiff sustained a fracture of the right elbow. A closed reduction was attempted but was unsuccessful. An open reduction of the fracture was accomplished and a Kirschner wire inserted. There is a large disfiguring postoperative scar which is obviously permanent, and there is an obvious, though slight deformity of the right arm. The complaint stated three causes of action. The second cause, based upon alleged negligence was dismissed, on defendants' motion, at the close of plaintiffs' case. The third, asserted against the child and his parents was discontinued at the opening of the trial. The trial proceeded and was concluded upon the first cause of action, for an alleged assault and battery. Decision on defendants' motion to dismiss this cause, made at the close of the proof, was reserved. That motion is now denied.

Defendant's intent to inflict upon plaintiff an offensive bodily contact, known to him to be offensive, has been established by the fair weight of the credible evidence. It was his intent to force her to leave the place where the game was in progress. The push, or the force intentionally exerted by him to that end, was the proximate cause of plaintiff's fall and the resulting injuries. For these injuries and their consequences, the infant defendant is liable although the proof fails to show an intent on his part to inflict bodily harm or that the fall and the resulting injuries were or should have been foreseen (27 Am.Jur., Infants, pp. 812-813, §§ 90, 91).

The rule which determines the liability of one who intentionally inflicts a harmful or offensive bodily contact upon another is stated in Restatement of Torts (vol. 1, p. 29, § 13) as follows:

"§ 13, Battery; Harmful Contact. An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with another's person makes the actor liable to the other, if (a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and (b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other's consent is procured by fraud or duress, and (c) the contact is not otherwise privileged."

Comment d of section 13 and section 16 of the Restatement define the character of the intent necessary to be shown to impose liability. Intent to harm need not be established; and the absence of it does not absolve the defendant so long as the act was done with intent to inflict an offensive bodily contact.

As stated above, the proof clearly indicates that the defendant, despite his tender years, had the capacity of mind to know and did, in fact, know, as would any normal six-year-old child, that his act, under the circumstances disclosed in the proof, was offensive; and it is equally clear that it was so intended.

For the injuries sustained and the resulting pain and suffering, the infant plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the sum of $12,500. Plaintiff, Stanley Baldinger, is entitled to judgment against said defendant in the sum of $641.40 representing the fair and reasonable sums expended by him for hospital and medical expenses.

Settle findings and judgment accordingly.

BALDINGER v. BANKS