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Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit — October 27, 1960 (Gladney, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This action was instituted by Mrs. Lester Carr and her husband to recover damages for personal injuries Mrs. Carr sustained as a passenger in the automobile driven by Mrs. Catherine V. Green. The Green vehicle collided at the intersection of Hilton Street and North Fifth Street with a car operated by Mrs. Carolyn B. Simpson. The named defendants were Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company (insurer of Mrs. Green's automobile) and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (liability insurer of the Simpson car).

The District Court, Parish of Ouachita, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs against Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company but rejected the demands against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Plaintiffs and Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company appealed.

Key factual points found by the trial court and recited on appeal: on July 29, 1958, in normal conditions with dry streets, Mrs. Green, driving west on Hilton Street, slowed but did not stop at the stop sign controlling traffic on Hilton Street before entering North Fifth Street (a right-of-way thoroughfare). Mrs. Simpson was traveling south on North Fifth Street at the lawful speed of 25 miles per hour, under control, and did not observe the Green car until she was within one to three car lengths of the intersection. Visibility at the northeast corner was obstructed by shrubbery; Mrs. Green testified she had to drive into the intersection before she could see in both directions on North Fifth Street.

Medical evidence: Dr. James D. Kelly examined Mrs. Carr on the evening of the accident, found a large temporal/parietal hematoma, abrasions, and thoracic pain; x-rays were negative. The hematoma resolved after about one week with treatment; ultrasonic treatments were given for muscular complaints and, in Dr. Kelly's opinion, Mrs. Carr had recovered with no serious residual effects after October 15, 1958. She later complained on March 26, 1959, but she did not pursue further orthopedic consultation or additional treatment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Mrs. Carolyn B. Simpson (driver on the right-of-way thoroughfare) was negligent in the operation of her vehicle and whether her insurer (State Farm) was liable.
  2. Whether Mrs. Catherine V. Green was negligent in failing to stop at the stop sign and whether her insurer (Grain Dealers Mutual) was liable.
  3. Whether the trial court's award of $2,000 for Mrs. Carr's injuries was excessive and should be reduced.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' and Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company's Arguments

  • They contended that Mrs. Simpson was negligent by traveling along North Fifth Street at a rate of speed in excess of the 25 mile per hour maximum prescribed by the ordinance.
  • They further argued Mrs. Simpson failed to maintain a proper lookout and would have observed Mrs. Green's approach in time to avoid the collision had she kept such a lookout.

State Farm / Mrs. Simpson's Position

  • The record indicates Mrs. Simpson was operating her vehicle at a lawful speed (25 mph), with the car under control, and was alert; she did not observe Mrs. Green until very near the intersection because of the limited sight lines caused by shrubbery.
  • The trial court found no fault on Mrs. Simpson's part, a conclusion the Court of Appeal upheld.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Koob v. Cooperative Cab Company, 1948, 213 La. 903, 35 So.2d 849 The favored motorist at an intersection controlled by a stop sign is entitled to assume drivers from the less favored street will stop. Listed among authorities establishing the rule that a motorist on the favored street may assume others will stop at the stop sign; used to support the conclusion that Mrs. Simpson had no reason to anticipate Mrs. Green's failure to stop.
Ryan v. Allstate Insurance Company of Chicago, 1957, 232 La. 831, 95 So.2d 328 Same rule regarding the assumption by favored motorists that others will obey stop signs. Cited as supporting authority for the rule applied to exonerate Mrs. Simpson from fault under the facts of this case.
Steele for Use and Benefit of Steele v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 1958, 235 La. 564, 105 So.2d 222 Same principle concerning expectations of motorists on the favored street at controlled intersections. Adduced as part of a consistent body of authority relied upon by the court to conclude that Mrs. Simpson was not negligent.
Henderson v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 1959, 238 La. 250, 115 So.2d 339 Same stop-sign assumption rule for favored motorists. Used with the other precedents to justify rejecting plaintiffs' claim of negligence against Mrs. Simpson.
Youngblood v. Robison, 1960, 239 La. 338, 118 So.2d 431 Same rule affirming the principle that favored motorists may assume compliance with stop signs by others. Included among authorities supporting the court's application of the rule to the facts, resulting in a finding of no fault by Mrs. Simpson.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first accepted the trial court's factual findings: Mrs. Green failed to stop at a stop sign controlling Hilton Street before entering North Fifth Street, and Mrs. Simpson was traveling at the lawful speed of 25 miles per hour, with her vehicle under control, and did not see Mrs. Green until she was within one to three car lengths of the intersection. Visibility at the intersection was obstructed by shrubbery on the northeast corner, and Mrs. Green had to drive into the intersection before she could see along North Fifth Street.

Given these facts, the court concluded Mrs. Green was negligent for failing to stop. The court then applied settled Louisiana precedent holding that a motorist on the favored street at an intersection controlled by a stop sign is entitled to assume that drivers on the less favored street will stop before entering the intersection. Citing several cases that have "cited and followed consistently" that rule, the court determined that Mrs. Simpson had no reason to anticipate that a vehicle would ignore the stop sign. Accordingly, Mrs. Simpson was not at fault in attempting to traverse the intersection at a reasonable speed.

On damages, the court relied on the medical testimony of Dr. Kelly: Mrs. Carr suffered a significant hematoma and abrasions immediately after the accident, received treatment that resolved the hematoma within about one week, and had ultrasonic treatment for muscular complaints. Dr. Kelly opined Mrs. Carr had recovered with no serious residual effects by October 15, 1958. Because the physician's testimony indicated the injuries were not of a serious or lasting nature, the appellate court concluded the trial court's award of $2,000 was excessive and that $1,500 was adequate compensation.

The court therefore affirmed the rejection of plaintiffs' demands against State Farm (insurer of Mrs. Simpson), affirmed liability of Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company for Mrs. Green's negligence, but amended the judgment to reduce the damages award to $1,500.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court of Appeal amended the judgment by reducing the award in favor of Mrs. Carr from $2,000 to $1,500, and, as amended, affirmed the judgment in all other respects.

Implications: The direct consequences are (1) plaintiff's claim against the insurer of Mrs. Simpson (State Farm) was properly rejected because Mrs. Simpson was not at fault under the governing rule that favored motorists may assume compliance with stop signs, (2) Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company remains liable for Mrs. Green's negligence, and (3) the damages recoverable by Mrs. Carr were reduced to $1,500 based on the medical evidence. The opinion applies existing Louisiana authorities on stop-sign intersections and does not announce any new legal principle beyond those precedents.

Costs: Costs of the appeal were taxed against the plaintiffs; all other costs were taxed against Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company.

Mrs. Lester CARR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. GRAIN DEALERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.

GLADNEY, Judge.

This suit, instituted by Mrs. Lester Carr and her husband, seeks recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Carr while a passenger in the automobile of Mrs. Catherine V. Green, which was involved in an intersectional accident with a vehicle driven by Mrs. Carolyn B. Simpson. The named defendants are Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, insurer of Mrs. Green's automobile, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the liability insurer of the Simpson car. Following a trial on the merits of the case, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs against Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, but rejecting the demands against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. From that decree, plaintiffs and Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company have appealed.

The essential facts as presented to the trial court are not seriously controverted. On the late afternoon of July 29, 1958, at which time the atmospheric conditions were normal and the streets dry, Mrs. Green, accompanied by Mrs. Carr, was driving west on Hilton Street in the City of Monroe, and upon approaching the intersection of North Fifth Street, slowed down, but failed to stop before proceeding into North Fifth Street, where her automobile was struck by a car being operated by Mrs. Carolyn B. Simpson. North Fifth Street is by municipal ordinance denominated a right-of-way thoroughfare and consequently traffic approaching on Hilton Street is required to come to a stop before attempting to cross or enter North Fifth Street. A stop sign indicative of this traffic regulation was not obeyed by Mrs. Green, and she so testified. The evidence preponderates to the effect that Mrs. Simpson at the time of the accident was traveling at a lawful rate of speed, twenty-five miles per hour, with her car under control and, although alert, did not observe the approach of the vehicle of Mrs. Green until she was within one to three car lengths of the intersection. The northeast corner of the intersection, due to the presence of shrubbery, prevents a southbound motorist approaching the intersection on North Fifth Street, as was Mrs. Simpson, and a westbound motorist on Hilton Street, as was Mrs. Green, from observing each other until they are extremely near the intersection. In fact, Mrs. Green stated that she had to drive into the intersection before she could see in both directions on North Fifth Street.

From the established facts it is clear that Mrs. Green was negligent in failing to stop upon arriving at the intersection. It is equally clear that Mrs. Simpson was operating her vehicle in a careful and prudent manner.

There can be no question as to the negligence of Mrs. Green and counsel for Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company does not seriously contend the absence of such negligence. Both plaintiff and Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company, however, assert that Mrs. Simpson was negligent in traveling along North Fifth Street at a rate of speed in excess of the twenty-five mile per hour maximum speed prescribed by the traffic ordinance, and they further argue that she failed to maintain a proper lookout or she would have timely observed the approach of Mrs. Green and so controlled her vehicle as to avoid the accident. These contentions are not established and we find nothing in the record to indicate fault on the part of Mrs. Simpson.

Where an intersection is controlled by a stop sign the motorist on the favored street is entitled to indulge in the assumption that any driver approaching from the less favored street will bring his car to a complete stop before entering the intersection. This rule has been cited and followed consistently. Koob v. Cooperative Cab Company, 1948, 213 La. 903, 35 So.2d 849; Ryan v. Allstate Insurance Company of Chicago, 1957, 232 La. 831, 95 So.2d 328; Steele for Use and Benefit of Steele v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, 1958, 235 La. 564, 105 So.2d 222; Henderson v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, 1959, 238 La. 250, 115 So.2d 339; Youngblood v. Robison, 1960, 239 La. 338, 118 So.2d 431.

Under the facts as set forth above, Mrs. Simpson was not at fault in attempting to traverse the intersection at a reasonable speed when she had no reason to believe that a vehicle would ignore the stop sign as Mrs. Green did in this instance. The trial court properly rejected plaintiffs' demands against the insurer of Mrs. Simpson, and we approve of his determination of liability of the insurer of Mrs. Green's vehicle.

On the evening of the accident, July 29, 1958, Dr. James D. Kelly examined Mrs. Carr, finding that she had a large hematoma of the right temporal and parietal area of the skull, several abrasions on her arm, and she complained of pain in the thorax behind the right shoulder blade. X-rays made at the time of the examination were negative. Treatment of the hematoma followed for a period of about one week and consisted of injections of chymar, which were successful and the hematoma subsided without any residual effect. Prior to October 15, 1958, Dr. Kelly administered to Mrs. Carr seven ultrasonic treatments for the purpose of relieving any muscular distress in the right posterior thorax region, of which Mrs. Carr complained. It was his opinion that his patient had recovered and had no serious residual effects of the accident after October 15th. However, she returned to see the doctor on March 26, 1959, complaining of muscular soreness and numbness in the thorax region. The physical examination revealed no apparent discomfort in the movement of the patient's arms and he could not discern any cause for plaintiff's complaints at that time. When she continued to complain, however, he recommended that she see Dr. Cannon, an orthopedist. She never went to see Dr. Cannon, nor did she find it necessary to receive any other medical examinations or treatment.

In our opinion, the testimony of Dr. Kelly reflects that the injuries of Mrs. Carr were not of a serious nature and had more or less disappeared by October 15, 1958. Forasmuch as Mrs. Carr did not feel that medical attention was required from August 2, 1958, to October 8, 1958, and from October 15, 1958, to March 26, 1959, we are of the opinion that the complaints of Mrs. Carr following October 15th do not indicate she was suffering from substantial pain.

The trial court awarded the sum of $2,000 for the personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Carr. In our opinion this award is excessive as we feel that $1,500 is adequate.

For the reasons hereinabove set forth, the judgment from which appealed is amended by reducing the award in favor of Mrs. Carr to $1,500, and as so amended the judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Costs of the appeal are taxed against plaintiffs and all other costs against the defendant, Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company.

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CARR v. GRAIN DEALERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
(Dec 1, 1960)