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Attorney(S)
  • Francis X. Pugh for the appellant. Louis E. Schmidt, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Joseph S. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General, Saul A. Harris and Russell J. White, State's Attorney and Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, respectively, on the brief, for the appellee.
Judges
  • PER CURIAM.
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citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • Francis X. Pugh for the appellant. Louis E. Schmidt, Special Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, Joseph S. Kaufman, Deputy Attorney General, Saul A. Harris and Russell J. White, State's Attorney and Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City, respectively, on the brief, for the appellee.
Judges
  • PER CURIAM.
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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Hicks v. State, No. 295, September Term, 1960 (Decided June 13, 1961)

Factual and Procedural Background

John Anthony Hicks, Jr., a teen-age youth, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore (Foster, J.) of robbery and sentenced to serve not more than five years in the Maryland State Reformatory for Males. The prosecuting witness, Walter Douglas, testified that while walking to a restaurant he was accosted by two young men, struck in the mouth, and robbed of his wallet (containing between two and three dollars), keys, and a package of cigarettes. Douglas blew a whistle, which alerted two police officers in a patrol car. The officers observed two young men running about two and one-half blocks from the scene. Under a spot‑light on a housing project the men examined a wallet; as officers approached the codefendant dropped the wallet and both began to walk away. As the officers came closer, the appellant dropped a package of Camel cigarettes (the same brand taken from Douglas). The two men were arrested and taken back; the wallet and keys belonging to Douglas were found at the spot-light location. Two dollars and thirty-five cents were found on the appellant's codefendant. At trial Douglas positively identified the wallet and keys and identified both men as his assailants, but one officer testified that Douglas was unable to identify the men shortly after the robbery. Hicks appealed, raising an alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's finding of guilt for robbery.
  2. Whether the prosecuting witness's inability to identify the defendants shortly after the robbery precluded reliance on his in-court identification at trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that because the prosecuting witness (Douglas) could not identify him shortly after the robbery, the witness could not properly identify him at trial, and thus the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellee's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 The opinion references this decision in describing a trend of indigent defendants resorting to a "nothing-to-lose philosophy" following that decision. The Court invoked Griffin as contextual background to criticize the appellant's contention as frivolous; it did not rely on Griffin as governing the sufficiency analysis in this case.
Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 128 A.2d 634 Cited as one of the numerous cases stating the rule regarding the function of the appellate court when reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence. The Court cited Clay to support its statement of the appellate function on an appeal challenging sufficiency of evidence; it relied on that established standard in reviewing the record.
Maryland Rule 741 c Referenced as a procedural authority related to appeals and the appellate role in reviewing convictions. The Court cited the Rule alongside Clay to indicate the applicable appellate standard; the Rule informed the Court's approach to reviewing the sufficiency challenge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the single issue as an alleged insufficiency of the evidence and characterized the contention as "patently frivolous." It reiterated the well-established appellate standard for reviewing sufficiency claims (citing Clay v. State and Maryland Rule 741 c). The Court recited the testimony presented at trial: Douglas's account of the robbery, the whistle that summoned police, the officers' observation of two men running about two and one-half blocks away, the codefendant dropping a wallet, the appellant dropping a package of Camel cigarettes, the recovery of Douglas' wallet and keys at the spot-light location, and the monetary amount recovered from the codefendant.

The Court addressed the identification issue: although Douglas positively identified the wallet, keys, and the two defendants at trial, an officer testified that Douglas was unable to identify the men shortly after the robbery. The appellant argued that this short‑time inability precluded the in-court identification. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the appellant's argument might have merit but concluded that it was immaterial in this case because the trial judge did not base the finding of guilt upon Douglas' in-court identification. Instead, the trial judge relied on Douglas' testimony that he was robbed of certain items and that the wallet, keys and cigarettes recovered by the police were Douglas' property. Applying those factual findings to the legal standard for sufficiency of the evidence, the Court found that the evidence was ample to support the conviction.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Direct consequence: The trial court's conviction of John Anthony Hicks, Jr. for robbery and the sentence (not more than five years in the Maryland State Reformatory for Males) were upheld. The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new legal principle; it applied settled appellate standards to find the evidence sufficient and affirmed the conviction.

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HICKS v. STATE

CRIMINAL LAW — Evidence Held To Be Sufficient To Support Finding Of Guilt. In the instant case, the evidence was held to be sufficient to support a finding that the appellant was guilty of robbery. The prosecuting witness testified that he was struck and robbed of his wallet, keys and cigarettes by two young men who then ran away. The appellant and his codefendant were seen running down the street about two and one-half blocks from the scene of the robbery. The codefendant was seen to drop a wallet which the prosecuting witness identified as the one taken from him, and the appellant was seen to drop a package of the same brand of cigarettes as that taken from the prosecuting witness. Assuming, without deciding, that there was merit to the appellant's contention that since the prosecuting witness could not identify him shortly after the robbery he could not identify him at the trial, it would avail him nothing because the trial court did not rely upon the identification in determining guilt. pp. 561-562

T.G.B.

Decided June 13, 1961.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a teen-age youth, was convicted, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, of robbery, and sentenced to serve not more than five years in the Maryland State Reformatory for Males.

The only question raised is an alleged insufficiency of evidence to support the finding of guilt. The contention is so patently frivolous that it amounts to no more than another obvious illustration of the "nothing-to-lose philosophy" resorted to so frequently by indigent defendants since the decision in the case of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12.

Since the function of this Court on an appeal of this nature has been so frequently stated and restated, it will be unnecessary to repeat it again. Clay v. State, 211 Md. 577, 128 A.2d 634, is one of the numerous cases wherein the rule is stated. See also Maryland Rule 741 c.

There was testimony to the effect that the prosecuting witness, one Walter Douglas, was accosted by two young men while walking to a restaurant, struck in the mouth, and robbed of his wallet, the money contained therein, his keys and a package of cigarettes. As the two young men fled from the scene of the robbery, Douglas blew a whistle which he had in his possession. The whistle alerted two police officers, who were cruising in a patrol car in the vicinity. These officers observed two young men running down a street, about two and one-half blocks from where the robbery had occurred. The young men stopped under a spot-light on a housing project, and examined the contents of a wallet. As the officers approached them, one of the men, the appellant's codefendant, dropped the wallet, and both proceeded to walk down the street. As the officers came closer, the appellant dropped a package of Camel cigarettes, the same brand of cigarettes that had been taken from Douglas. The two men were placed under arrest and taken back to the location of the spot-light, where Douglas' wallet and keys were found. The prosecuting witness testified that the wallet contained between two and three dollars when it was taken from him; two dollars and thirty-five cents were found upon the person of appellant's codefendant.

At the trial below, Douglas positively identified the wallet and keys found by the officers, as being the same ones that had been taken from him in the robbery. He also definitely identified the appellant and his codefendant as the two who had robbed him. However, one of the officers testified that Douglas was unable to identify the appellant and his companion, when he saw them shortly after the robbery.

And this fact is the nub of the appellant's main contention: he argues that since the prosecuting witness could not identify him shortly after the robbery, he could not identify him at the trial. Of course, it is ordinarily for the trier of facts to weigh and determine what testimony is credible, and what is not to be believed; but, if we assume without deciding, that the appellant's argument is sound, it avails him nothing here, for the trial judge did not rely upon Douglas' identification of him at the trial in determining guilt. He only relied "upon the testimony of [Douglas] as to the fact that he was robbed of a wallet, keys and cigarettes," and that the wallet, keys and cigarettes recovered by the police were Douglas' property.

The evidence, as tersely outlined above, is ample, we think, to support the trial court's finding of guilt.

Judgment affirmed.

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HICKS v. STATE
(Jun 13, 1961)