In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated April 25, 1960, which denied their motion, pursuant to section 306 of the Civil Practice Act, for a physical examination of plaintiffs. The motion was made more than two years after the filing of a statement of readiness. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. In our opinion, the Statement of Readiness Rule, promulgated under the court's inherent and statutory power over the control of the calendars ( Plachte v. Bancroft, Inc., 3 A.D.2d 437, 438; Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., 12 A.D.2d 44, 46-47), is not inconsistent with section 306 of the Civil Practice Act (cf. Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., supra; Maddaus v. Bowman, 12 A.D.2d 626). Since defendants do not claim, on this appeal, that they showed unusual, unanticipated conditions which developed subsequent to the filing of the statement of readiness, their motion was properly denied ( Fierro v. Del Gaudio, 14 A.D.2d 816; cf. Price v. Brody, 7 A.D.2d 204, 205; Morrison v. Sam Snead Schools of Golf of N.Y., 13 A.D.2d 986). Nolan, P.J., Beldock, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.