In an action by plaintiff against its three former employees and their corporation, to enjoin them from soliciting plaintiff's customers and to recover damages caused by such solicitation, plaintiff appeals: (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered nunc pro tunc as of February 19, 1959, which denied its motion to open its default upon the trial for the assessment of its damages pursuant to the Court of Appeals' remittitur ( 3 N.Y.2d 554); and (2) from so much of a judgment of said court, rendered the same day on plaintiff's said default, as dismissed the amended complaint in all respects other than the claim for injunctive relief ( 16 Misc.2d 779, 826). By stipulation of the parties, subsequently filed, the notice of appeal and record were amended to include said order. Order reversed and judgment vacated, without costs, plaintiff's motion to open its default granted, and action directed to be placed on the Special Term Day Calendar of the Nassau County Supreme Court for an assessment of plaintiff's damages and for the entry of an appropriate judgment in accordance with the said remittitur of the Court of Appeals, upon condition that plaintiff shall pay defendants the sum of $100 costs. Plaintiff's attorney, having marked the case "ready" on four consecutive days, was responsible for not being actually ready to proceed to trial when the case was reached for trial. However, in view of all the circumstances here present, his conduct was not of such inexcusable nature as to warrant dismissal of the complaint. Hence, the unconditional denial of plaintiff's motion to open its default was an improvident exercise of discretion. Nolan, P.J., Beldock, Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Brennan, JJ., concur.