In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals as follows from three orders of the Supreme Court, Nassau County: (1) from that portion of an order dated February 1, 1960, which, as a condition to the granting of her (plaintiff's) motion to obtain a copy of the report of the defendants' physical examination of her, required her to deliver simultaneously to defendants copies of all written medical reports made to her; (2) from an order dated April 5, 1960 granting defendants' motion for a further physical examination of the plaintiff by a physician designated by the court and directing that a copy of the report of such examination be furnished to both parties; and (3) from so much of an order dated May 6, 1960 as, upon reargument, adhered to the decision embodied in the order dated April 5, 1960, which granted defendants' motion for a further physical examination of the plaintiff by a physician named by the court. Order dated February 1, 1960, insofar as appealed from, reversed, without costs; the condition imposed is directed to be deleted. Order dated May 6, 1960, insofar as appealed from, reversed, without costs, and defendants' motion for a further physical examination and other related relief denied, without costs. Appeal from order dated April 5, 1960 dismissed, without costs; such order was superseded by the order of May 6, 1960, made upon reargument. It was improper to condition receipt by the plaintiff of a copy of the report of her physical examination by defendants' physician upon her furnishing to the defendants a copy of the report of her examination by her own physician ( Baum v. Nussenbaum, 7 A.D.2d 991; Mansoor v. Simon, 5 A.D.2d 845). The conditions under which defendants moved for an additional physical examination after the action had been on the calendar over two years, namely: (1) the substitution of attorneys for defendants by reason of the refusal by the insurance company, at whose instance the original physical examination was conducted, to continue the defense of this action; (2) the fact that such substitution occurred some seven months before the action was placed on the calendar; and (3) the long duration of plaintiff's injuries, are not unusual and unanticipated within the meaning of subdivision (c) of section (9) of our present Statement of Readiness Rule. Beldock, P.J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur.