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Docket Number

No. 30,217.

Attorney(S)

Robert S. Baker, Public Defender, and Thomas A. Hoadley, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant. Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General and Donald L. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Judges

BOBBITT, J.

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Smart Summary

Gates v. State of Indiana — Case Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis following an earlier conviction in which James Gates (appellant) entered a plea of guilty to a charge of obtaining money under false pretense under a chattel mortgage from the Irwin Union Bank Trust Company in the amount of $200. The proceedings originated in the Bartholomew Superior Court (Sidney H. Showalter, Judge). The trial court denied the petition for writ of error coram nobis, and appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana. The Supreme Court filed its opinion on June 28, 1962; rehearing was denied October 16, 1962. Counsel of record included Robert S. Baker and Thomas A. Hoadley for appellant, and Edwin K. Steers and Donald L. Adams for appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

Was the petitioner-appellant properly advised of his right to counsel?
Did the petitioner-appellant enter a plea of guilty knowingly and understandingly?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant asserted that he was not properly advised of his right to counsel (implicit in the petition for writ of error coram nobis).
Appellant asserted he was induced to plead guilty by a promise from the Probation Officer that he would receive a sentence of not more than six months if he pleaded guilty.

Appellee's / State's Arguments

The record shows the trial court advised appellant of his right to counsel on three separate occasions and appellant refused counsel.
The Probation Officer denied making any promise of a six-month sentence; even if such a statement had been made, the court would not be bound by it.
The trial judge testified he personally advised appellant, inquired into appellant's understanding, and observed appellant's demeanor, concluding the plea was knowingly and understandingly entered.
Burden of proof rests on appellant to allege and prove facts that would have prevented entry of judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State ex rel. Emmert v. Gentry (1945)	Burden on petitioner in a writ of error coram nobis to sustain allegations and establish facts that would have prevented entry of judgment.	The court cited this case to state and apply the rule that appellant bore the burden of proof; the appellant failed to sustain that burden.
State ex rel. Barnes v. Howard (1946)	Reinforces the burden-on-petitioner rule in coram nobis proceedings.	Used along with Emmert to support the conclusion that the petitioner had the burden to prove entitlement to relief.
Chandler v. State (1949)	The court must advise the accused of the right to counsel but cannot compel acceptance of counsel against the accused's will.	The court relied on Chandler to explain that, having been advised, appellant's refusal of counsel could not be overridden by the court; the evidence supported that he had been advised and refused.
Mahoney v. State (1926)	A promise or representation by a probation officer about sentence does not bind the court.	The court cited Mahoney to state that even if the probation officer had told appellant he would receive six months, the court would not have been bound by such a promise; here the officer denied the promise.
Hoelscher v. State (1944)	The question whether a defendant intelligently and understandingly waived rights is primarily factual and for the trial court; judge's observation and reasonable inferences are relevant.	The court applied Hoelscher to defer to the trial judge's factual determination that the appellant knowingly waived rights, emphasizing the judge's personal observations and discretion.
Dearing v. State (1951)	The trial court has a duty to make reasonable inquiry into whether a guilty plea was entered freely and understandingly.	The court relied on Dearing to support that the trial court properly inquired into appellant's understanding before accepting the plea.
Eagle v. State (1944)	Conflicts in evidence are to be resolved in favor of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and had personal knowledge of prior proceedings.	The court invoked Eagle to resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the trial court's findings regarding the voluntariness and understanding of the plea.
State v. Minton (1955)	When an accused refuses counsel after being advised, it suffices that he be told the nature of the charge, the punishment for that offense, and his right to have an attorney.	The court applied Minton to hold that the advice given to appellant concerning the charge, penalty, trial rights, and right to counsel was sufficient despite appellant's refusal of counsel.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the governing procedural rule: in coram nobis proceedings the petitioner bears the burden to prove facts which, if known, would have prevented the judgment (citing State ex rel. Emmert v. Gentry and State ex rel. Barnes v. Howard). The Court then addressed the two discrete questions presented.

First, whether appellant was properly advised of his right to counsel. The record showed the court advised appellant of his right to counsel on three occasions, including during arraignment when the judge asked whether appellant wished to talk to an attorney and explained his rights to trial, witnesses, and counsel. A Parole (Probation) Officer's affidavit stated appellant said he did not have money for an attorney and that the court would appoint one if he desired, and that appellant requested to talk to the parole officer and informed the court he did not desire an attorney. The Court observed that while a judge must advise of the right to counsel, the judge cannot force counsel on a defendant who refuses (Chandler v. State). Given the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's finding that appellant was advised of his right to counsel was supported by the evidence.

Second, whether appellant's guilty plea was entered knowingly and understandingly. The record showed the court read the charge (obtaining money under false pretenses under a chattel mortgage for $200), the statutory penalty, and appellant acknowledged understanding the charge and indicated he wished to plead guilty. The trial judge testified he had asked whether appellant was a pauper, informed him of the right to counsel at public expense, and, based on face-to-face interaction and observation, believed appellant knew what he was doing when entering the plea. The Court cited Hoelscher v. State to explain that the determination of an intelligent waiver is primarily factual and within the trial court's province, and cited Dearing for the duty to make reasonable inquiry. Conflicts in evidence were resolved under Eagle v. State in favor of the trial court that observed witnesses. The Court further relied on State v. Minton for the proposition that a defendant who refuses counsel after being advised need only be told the nature of the charge, punishment, and right to counsel. The Court found these advisements were given and that appellant acknowledged understanding. Additionally, the Court noted appellant failed to allege or prove that he did not know he was entitled to counsel at public expense or that he was financially unable to hire counsel.

Because appellant failed to sustain his burden of proof on the material allegations necessary to obtain coram nobis relief, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's denial of the petition was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the trial court denying the writ of error coram nobis is affirmed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's denial of coram nobis relief stands and the earlier conviction and plea remain in effect. The Court applied established precedents concerning the petitioner's burden, the adequacy of advisement of rights, the nonbinding nature of promises by probation officers as to sentence, and deference to the trial court's factual determinations; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond these applications.

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GATES v. STATE OF INDIANA.

1. WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS — Pleading and Practice — Burden of Proof. — In petition for writ of error coram nobis the burden is upon the petitioner to sustain the allegations in his petition and establish facts which, if known to the court, would have prevented the entry of judgment against him. p. 327.

2. CRIMINAL LAW — Constitutional Law — Right to Counsel — Writ of Error Coram Nobis. — It is the court's duty to advise appellant that he was entitled to counsel, but the court could not compel him to accept counsel against his will if he did not desire to have one appointed. p. 327.

3. WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS — Criminal Law — Promise of Leniency — Advice of Probation Officer Not Binding Upon Court. — In proceedings for writ of error coram nobis even where evidence may be undisputed that a Probation Officer had advised appellant that he would receive a six months' sentence if he pleaded guilty, the court would in no way have been bound thereby. p. 328.

4. CRIMINAL LAW — Waiver of Constitutional Right — Plea of Guilty — Right to Counsel and Trial by Jury — Duty of Court to Inquire Into Plea — Writ of Error Coram Nobis. — The law requires an intelligent and understanding waiver of the constitutional right to trial by jury and to be represented by counsel in a criminal prosecution and it is the duty of the trial court to make reasonable inquiry into the facts to discover whether a plea of guilty was entered freely and understandingly. p. 329.

5. APPEAL — Conflict in Evidence — Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Waiver of Right to Counsel and Trial by Jury — Writ of Error Coram Nobis. — Conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the decision of the trial judge as to whether guilty plea was entered freely and understandingly as he saw and heard the witnesses and had personal knowledge of the prior proceedings when the plea of guilty was accepted. p. 330.

6. CRIMINAL LAW — Services of Counsel Refused — Duty to Advise Accused of Rights — Writ of Error Coram Nobis. — Where an accused waived and refused the service of an attorney it is enough if he is advised of the nature of the charge against him, the punishment for that specific offense, and his right to have an attorney to advise him concerning the law. p. 330.

7. WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS — Criminal Law — Right to Counsel — Plea of Guilty. — Where appellant, in refusing counsel in criminal prosecution was advised of the character and nature of the charge and the punishment therefor, that he had a right to a public trial and to have witnesses brought in, and an attorney to advise him, that he would be required to plead guilty or not guilty, and appellant stated that he understood what the charge was, appellant was sufficiently advised of his constitutional rights. p. 330.

8. APPEAL — Criminal Law — Right to Counsel — Writ of Error Coram Nobis — Burden of Proof. — The burden is upon appellant to allege and prove that he did not know, at the time of his trial, that he was entitled to counsel to represent him at public expense and that he was financially unable to employ an attorney. p. 330.

BOBBITT, J.

This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis.

Two questions are presented for our consideration.

1. Was petitioner-appellant properly advised of his right to counsel?

2. Did he enter a plea of guilty knowingly and understandingly?

In a petition for writ of error coram nobis the burden is upon the petitioner to sustain the allegations in his petition and establish facts which, if known to the 1. court, would have prevented the entry of a judgment against him. State ex rel. Emmert v. Gentry (1945), 223 Ind. 535, 538, 62 N.E.2d 860, 161 A.L.R. 532; State ex rel. Barnes v. Howard (1946), 224 Ind. 107, 110, 65 N.E.2d 55.

First: The evidence in the record here discloses that petitioner-appellant was, at three different times, advised by the court of his right to counsel with an attorney if he so desired.

At appellant's arraignment on June 3, 1957, appellant, when asked, "Would you like to talk to an attorney?" replied, "I would like to talk to the parole officer." The judge then replied, "You understand you have a right to have a trial and have the witnesses brought in and you are entitled to the services of an attorney at that trial. You wish to talk to the parole officer?" The appellant answered, "Yes."

The Parole Officer, in an affidavit filed as evidence in the hearing on the petition for writ of error coram nobis, stated that, "Affiant further states that James Gates stated that he did not have money to obtain an attorney, and he was advised by the Court that the Court would appoint him an attorney if he so desired." It is further stated in such affidavit, "Affiant further states that Mr. Gates informed the court that he did not desire an attorney, but requested to talk to the Parole Officer, namely, this affiant."

While it is true that it was the court's duty to advise appellant that he was entitled to counsel, the court could not compel him to accept counsel against his will, if he did 2. not desire to have one appointed. Chandler v. State (1949), 226 Ind. 648, 652, 83 N.E.2d 189.

In our judgment the evidence in the record here is sufficient to support the finding of the trial court on the question of whether or not appellant was advised that he was entitled to counsel.

Appellant further asserts that he was induced to enter his plea of guilty by a promise from the Probation Officer that if he plead guilty he would receive a sentence of not more than 3. six months. This assertion is denied by the Probation Officer Davis as attested by his affidavit which is a part of the evidence in the record. Had the evidence here been undisputed that the Probation Officer had advised appellant that he would receive a six months' sentence, the court would in no way have been bound thereby. Mahoney v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 335, 341-342, 149 N.E. 444.

Second: An examination of the record here discloses that appellant was advised that he was charged with obtaining money under false pretenses under a chattel mortgage from the Irwin Union Bank Trust Company in the amount of $200. When asked if he understood the charge he replied, "Yes, I understand what the charge is." The penalty provided by statute was read to appellant and he was advised of his right to have a trial and have witnesses brought in, and that he had a right to the services of an attorney. Appellant had been in court as a defendant on a prior occasion. After being advised by the court, as above stated, appellant replied that he understood what the charge and penalty therefor was, and that he desired to enter a plea of guilty.

At the hearing on the petition for writ, the trial judge took the stand as a witness for the State and testified, inter alia, that he asked appellant-Gates if he was a pauper and informed him that he had a right to talk to an attorney, at public expense; and because he had talked with the appellant face to face, and had heard his answers and observed the expression on his face, it was his (the court) opinion that he (appellant) knew what he was doing, and when appellant said he wanted to plead guilty, the court accepted his plea.

A question similar to that here under consideration was before this court in Hoelscher v. State (1944), 223 Ind. 62, 57 N.E.2d 770, and at pages 68-69 of 223 Ind. this court said:

"Appellant says that it does not appear that he intelligently and understandingly waived his constitutional right to a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel. This is a question of fact to be determined primarily by the trial court, and unless we can say that upon the evidence there can be no reasonable difference of opinion, the decision of the trial court must stand. We must consider not only the printed words, but the reasonable inferences which might be drawn by the trial court from the judge's observation of the appellant at the time he accepted the plea. The law requires an intelligent and understanding waiver of constitutional rights. No special form of words is required. The intelligence and understanding of the appellant might be as clearly indicated by his manner and appearance as by the actual words used in his conversation with the trial judge."

It was the duty of the trial court here to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts to discover whether a plea of guilty was entered freely and understandingly. Dearing v. State 4. (1951), 229 Ind. 131, 139, 95 N.E.2d 832.

"Conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the decision of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and had personal 5. knowledge of the prior proceedings when the plea of guilty was accepted." Eagle v. State (1944), 221 Ind. 475, 476, 48 N.E.2d 811.

An accused who has freely and understandingly waived and refused the services of an attorney need not be instructed by the trial judge concerning all of the intricacies of the 6. criminal law. It is enough if the defendant is "advised of the nature of the charge against him, the punishment for that specific offense, and his right to have an attorney to advise him concerning the law, if he so desires." State v. Minton (1955), 234 Ind. 578, 584, 130 N.E.2d 226; Hoelscher v. State, supra.

In the present case, as was the defendant in the Minton case, appellant, in refusing counsel offered by the court, was advised of the character and nature of the charge and the 7. punishment therefor, that he had the right to a public trial and to have witnesses brought in, and that he would be required to plead guilty or not guilty. When appellant was asked if he knew with what he was charged, he answered, "Yes, I understand what the charge is." Under the circumstances in this case, we think this was sufficient to advise appellant of his constitutional rights.

Appellant has failed to allege and prove that he did not know, at the time of his trial, that he was entitled to counsel to represent him at public expense, and there is no showing in 8. the record that he was financially unable to employ an attorney.

Appellant has failed to sustain his burden of proof, and the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Arterburn, C.J., Jackson, Landis and Achor, JJ., concur.

NOTE. — Reported in 183 N.E.2d 601.

GATES v. STATE