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Curry v. State, Court of Appeals of Maryland (Decided July 2, 1964)

Factual and Procedural Background

Larry Zane Curry and one Tingler were arrested on a charge of the larceny of an automobile. They were tried on an indictment charging larceny and also unauthorized use of an automobile. The trial was before the Criminal Court of Baltimore, sitting without a jury (Judge Grady). Curry and Tingler were acquitted of larceny and were found guilty of unauthorized use of an automobile. Curry appealed the judgment, asserting (1) the evidence was insufficient largely because a principal State witness, Hawse, had a grudge against him, and (2) his arrest was illegal.

The record, as summarized by Judge Grady and recited in the opinion, includes these temporal and factual details: Spring's white 1959 Chevrolet was missing from near Spring's home at about 2:00 A.M. on April 17, 1963; at about 7:00 A.M. that day Curry pointed out a light-colored Chevrolet and claimed it was his (not then identified as Spring's); a few hours later Hawse identified both defendants as riding in a white 1959 Chevrolet on 30th Street and pointed out the automobile to police; almost simultaneously the police saw the car (later identified as Spring's), recovered it, and within 10–15 minutes apprehended Curry and Tingler within two to two and a half blocks of where the car was recovered. Curry's arrest occurred at about 10:30 A.M. on April 17, 1963.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Curry's conviction for unauthorized use of an automobile, given that a principal State witness (Hawse) had a demonstrated grudge against him.
  2. Whether Curry's arrest was unlawful, and if so, whether any alleged illegality of the arrest precluded his indictment or trial.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because a principal State witness, Hawse, had a grudge against Curry; Hawse had admitted saying he would like to see Curry go to jail.
  • The arrest of Curry was illegal.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of separate, specific legal arguments presented on behalf of the State beyond the factual summary and legal authorities relied upon by the court in reaching its decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Huelin v. State, 234 Md. 213, 198 A.2d 302 Authority addressing a claim that a witness had a grudge against the defendant. Used to support the proposition that alleged witness bias is a credibility matter for the trier of fact and does not, by itself, compel reversal.
Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 200 A.2d 683 Authority concerning credibility issues where a witness is claimed to have a grudge. Cited alongside Huelin to reinforce that credibility determinations rest with the factfinder.
Slater v. Warden, 233 Md. 609, 195 A.2d 675 Principle that an illegal arrest, if established, does not by itself and without more prevent a valid indictment and trial. Cited to explain that even an unlawful arrest would not necessarily invalidate the indictment or trial; the court then considered whether the arrest was, in fact, lawful.
Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80 Authority concerning circumstances under which an arrest is lawful when officers have reason to believe a felony was committed and the suspect committed it. Applied to conclude the officers had reason to believe a larceny had occurred and that Curry was involved, supporting the lawfulness of the arrest.
Raven v. State, 233 Md. 241, 196 A.2d 446 Authority supporting lawfulness of arrest where officers have reason to suspect felony involvement. Used with Mulcahy to uphold the validity of the arrest in this case.
Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 156 A.2d 423 (p.77) Principle that possession of recently stolen goods allows an inference that the possessor is the thief. Cited to justify inferring that Curry's possession of the automobile a few hours after the theft supported the officers' belief and the lawfulness of the arrest.
Cason v. State, 230 Md. 356, 187 A.2d 103 Authority related to inferences from possession of recently stolen goods. Used with Butz to support the inference that possession of the recently stolen automobile was probative of guilt and supported the arrest.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first acknowledged that Hawse's grudge against Curry was clearly shown and that Hawse admitted making a statement expressing a desire to see Curry jailed. The timing of that statement was disputed in Hawse's testimony, but the court noted the grudge was established.

The court then reviewed Judge Grady's factual summary: Spring's automobile was missing at 2:00 A.M.; at about 7:00 A.M. Curry pointed out a light-colored Chevrolet as his own; later Hawse identified both defendants riding in a white 1959 Chevrolet on 30th Street and pointed out the car to police; almost simultaneously police saw the car (later identified as Spring's), recovered it, and within 10–15 minutes apprehended the defendants within a couple of blocks of the recovery. Judge Grady found these physical facts, together with Hawse's testimony (if believed), established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were using the car without authorization and under circumstances indicating they knew or should have known it was stolen.

On the sufficiency-of-evidence point, the court emphasized the standard that credibility determinations are for the trier of fact (here the trial judge). Citing Maryland Rule 886 a and authorities (Huelin; Wiggins), the court held there was no basis to upset the judge's credibility determinations and that the evidence, if believed, was ample to support the conviction.

On the arrest issue, the court explained that even if an arrest were illegal, that fact alone would not automatically prevent indictment and trial (citing Slater v. Warden). The court then found the arrest was lawful because the officers had reason to believe a felony (the larceny of the automobile) had been committed and that Curry had committed it. The court relied on precedents (Mulcahy; Raven) for that principle and on the rule that possession of recently stolen goods permits an inference that the possessor is the thief (Butz; Cason), noting Curry had been seen in possession of the automobile a few hours after its theft.

Holding and Implications

Judgment affirmed.

Direct effect: The Court of Appeals affirmed the Criminal Court of Baltimore's judgment convicting Curry of unauthorized use of an automobile. The trial court's credibility determinations and factual findings were upheld, and the appellate court concluded the arrest was lawful. The opinion does not discuss broader implications or announce new legal precedent beyond applying existing Maryland authorities to the facts; its effect is to leave the conviction intact.

CURRY v. STATE

WITNESSES — Credibility Of, Is For Trier Of Facts Even Where Witness Has A Grudge Against The Accused — Evidence Was Sufficient Here To Convict Of Unauthorized Use Of Automobile. The appellant in the instant case contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of unauthorized use of an automobile, largely because a principal witness for the State had a grudge against him. The Court stated that the credibility of the witnesses (including the one with a grudge) was for the determination of the trier of fact, and they saw no basis upon which to upset his finding. It was held that the evidence in this case, if believed, (as it evidently was) was sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction. pp. 379-381

ARREST — Was Legal Here Where Police Had Reason To Believe Appellant Committed A Felony — Possession Of Recently Stolen Goods Allows Inference That Possessor Is The Thief. In the instant case it was held that appellant's contention that his arrest was illegal was without force. If well founded, it would not of itself and without more prevent the appellant from being validly indicted and tried. However, the Court stated it was not well founded. The officers had reason to believe that a felony — larceny of an automobile — had been committed and that the appellant had committed it. Hence, the arrest was lawful. The possession of recently stolen goods — and the appellant had been seen in possession of the automobile a few hours after its theft — allows an inference that the possessor is the thief. p. 381

H.C.

Decided July 2, 1964.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant Curry and one Tingler (who did not appeal) were arrested on a charge of the larceny of an automobile. They were tried on an indictment charging that offense and also unauthorized use of an automobile. After a trial before the court, sitting without a jury, they were acquitted of larceny and were found guilty of unauthorized use. Curry claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction largely because a principal witness for the State, one Hawse, had a grudge against him. He also claims that his arrest was illegal.

The fact that Hawse had a grudge against Curry was clearly shown, and Hawse admitted having said that he would like to see Curry go to jail. Hawse's testimony is conflicting as to whether the incident which gave rise to this statement occurred the evening before or the day of Curry's arrest. The former seems more probable, as Curry was held in custody for several days after his arrest, which occurred at about 10:30 A.M. on April 17, 1963.

In summarizing the evidence Judge Grady pointed out that a white, 1959 Chevrolet automobile belonging to one Spring was missing from the area of Spring's home at 2 A.M. on April 17th, that at about 7 A.M. that day Curry pointed out a light colored Chevrolet car as his, though at that point it was not identified as Spring's automobile. Judge Grady then continued:

"A few hours after that, the witness, Hawse, identifies both of the Defendants as riding in a white 1959 Chevrolet on 30th Street. Again, no specific identification is made that this is Mr. Spring's automobile. But, in this instance, within a matter of moments later, Mr. Hawse points out this automobile which he had seen these boys in in the immediate vicinity, and the police officer testified that almost simultaneously with getting this information from Hawse, he saw the car which turned out to be Mr. Spring's car, and that thereafter, within 10 or 15 minutes, the two Defendants in this case, Curry and Tingler, were apprehended within two or two and a half blocks from where the car was recovered by the police officer.
"So that, in addition to the testimony of Hawse, we have the physical facts of the case, the physical presence of the boys in the vicinity of where this car was recovered within a matter of hours after this car was stolen. All of which established to the Court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these boys were using the car without the authorization of the owner and that they were using the car under such circumstances that [they] either knew or should have known the car was stolen."

Evidence in the record supports Judge Grady's summary, and we think that it was ample, if believed, to support his finding. It evidently was believed. The credibility of the witnesses — and that of course includes the credibility of the one with the grudge — was for the determination of the trier of fact, and we see no basis upon which to upset his finding. Maryland Rule 886 a; Huelin v. State, 234 Md. 213, 198 A.2d 302, another case in which a witness was claimed to have a grudge against the defendant; Wiggins v. State, 235 Md. 97, 200 A.2d 683.

The claim that the arrest of the defendant was illegal is without force. If well founded, it would not of itself and without more prevent the appellant from being validly indicted and tried. See Slater v. Warden, 233 Md. 609, 195 A.2d 675. It is not, however, well founded. The officers had reason to believe that a felony — larceny of the automobile — had been committed and that the appellant had committed it, and hence the arrest was lawful. Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80; Raven v. State, 233 Md. 241, 196 A.2d 446. The possession of recently stolen goods — and Curry had been seen in possession of the automobile a few hours after its theft — allows an inference that the possessor is the thief. Butz v. State, 221 Md. 68, 77, 156 A.2d 423; Cason v. State, 230 Md. 356, 187 A.2d 103.

Judgment affirmed.

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CURRY v. STATE
(Jul 2, 1964)